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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPI£ OF INDETERJUIttCT OF TRANSIATION
A. Sources of the Principle
Willard Van Orman Quine* s principle of the indeterminacy of
transla tion> outlined most fully in Word and Object, represents the
convergence of his acceptance of Skinnerian behaviorism and his re-
jection of an absolute analytic-synthetic distinction. Both his ac-
ceptance of behaviorism and his conclusions about the lack of defining
criteria for analyticity are sources of the principle of indeterminacy
of translation. A critique of indeterminacy must question the strict-
ness of Quine’s behaviorism or the soundness of the argument in "Two
Dogmas of En^iricism. " It is, therefore* important to examine both
sources.
Indeterminacy is a consequence of the "empirically uncondi-
1
tioned variation in one’s conceptual scheme." The "net empirical
import'* of a single sentence, if any, is the "stimulus meaning", if
any, of the sentence. Commentators have rightly recognized the concept
3
of stimulus meaning as the crucial one in the exposition. It is de-
fined as "the class of all the stimulations. • .that would prompt" assent
U
or dissent "for a speaker at a date" to a sentence. Quine acknow-
ledges that "stimulus meaning as defined falls 3hort in various ways of
one* s intuitive demands on ‘meaning* as undefined," but he maintains
that it is nevertheless the "objective reality" available to the
linguist. Quine’s advocacy of "stimulus meaning" is based on his views
of (l) the process of language learning! (2) the end product* the learned
language! (3) admissible evidence for the lihguist.
2(1) Quine accepts, rather uncritically, Skinner’s analysis of learn-
ing a language as being conditioned to give and expect predictable
responses to particular stimuli. He does not go to great lengths to
defend his acceptance of Skinner’s approach. He mentions in passing
that Skinner "is not without his critics," and with a bare reference
without comment to Gronsky* s attack on Skinner’s main work in the field
of language. Verbal Behavior
, concludes, "But at worst we nay suppose
that the description, besides being conveniently definite, is substan-
tially true of a good part of what goes into the first learning of words. "
6
In a work where very little is taken for granted, Quine is content
to start with the assumption that "words mean only as their use in sen—
7
tences is conditioned to sensory stimuli, verbal and otherwise."
Understanding the sentences uttered by others and constructing
one’s own sentences are possible only because one has been conditioned
by stimulus-response beards to do so. The history of each speaker’s
conditioning to meanings is unique, and yet, in a speech community, all
are speakers of a cannon language. Since there is nothing more to
language learning than being conditioned publicly by mature speakers of
the language, the existence of a cannon language in the face of this
8
"chaotic personal diversity of connections" appears paradoxical. This
situation provides Quine with a hook on which to hang the principle of
9
indeterminacy. As speakers of a common language, we are like the bushes
trimmed to look like elepnants (of all things) which achieve this re-
markable, uniform result despite the different arrangements of twigs in
10
each case.
3Quine uses the Skinnerian aocount not only to explain "the
first learning of xords" but to explain the entire learning of ,
language, and in so doing he accepts the "stretched" use of concepts
from entirely nonlinguistio psychological experiments to account for
the most complex features of language.
U
He also includes features of
linguistic development which do not seem to be justified by the theory
(although Skinner does the same). For example, he holds that, beyond
the whole sentences learned directly by stimulus-response conditioning,
some sentences are constructed "fr® learned parts" on "analogy" to the12
directly conditioned ones. How one learns to draw an analogy — to
recognize a relevant similarity — is a process very much in need of
clarification which neither Skinner nor Quine gives. This might be
said to be the fundamental question that a linguistic theory must an-
swer in order to account for a speaker's ability to construct and un-
Hi
deratand previously unheard sentences.
Chcrasky tends to deprecate a reliance on “analogy’', but this is
to make his own explanation for the “creativity” of speakers appear
the only possible one. I«t us grant that the ability to draw analogies
is a baaic intellectual 3id11, without which we would be hard pressed
to account for language or for any knowledge whatsoever. The question
to be asked is what relation the development and exercise of this abili-
ty have to the proposed theory of stimulus-response conditioning. It
looks suspiciously as if “analogy” were inserted to allow for a suffi-
ciently rich language although it has no foundation in the learning
theoiy.
Initially the stimuli involved are nonverbal, or nonverbal to-
gether with verbal, but in order to achieve a language which is more
ll
th“* the "f,nciful:iy ftncyless medium of unvarnished new,"
15
provision must be mad. for sentences to 40t as stimuli for etoer
sentences, toe so-called
"interanimation of sentences"^One cannot
account for scientific theories, or even for an enriched everyday
language about things in toe world, without a "sullying of toe stream"
of experience by constructs and concepts."
7
Ihis must surely be
granted, but Quine also wants to hold that oven these relations be-
tween sentences are established
"by to. mechanism of conditioned res-
ponse." For this to be the case in a nonmetaphorioal sense, learning
would have to be strictly by rote because the sentences in a stimulus-
response relationship would have to be always the same, word for word.
There is nothing in a straightforward account of conditioned
response to explain how one learns to understand that any one of a
large group of differently worded, but cognitively equivalent, utter-
ances calls for one of another large group of differently worded, but
cognitively equivalent, responses in a particular situation. The
xaco that this is so raises those troublesome questions about synorQmy
which are so neatly avoided by evoking conditioned response. A straight-
forward interpretation of conditioned response would have to allow that
a separate bond must be established between each possible wording of
interanimating sentences, involving a troublesome infinity of established
19
conditioned responses for coianunication to be possible.
(2) Once one has progressed from babbling infant to speaker of a
language, it is the "totality of [one's] dispositions to verbal beha-
20
vior" which are the concern of the linguist. This is, in fact, how
Quine defines language. As recently as February, 1967, he wrote, ”lan-
5gwge i*
2
»rst and foremost a system of dispositions to observable be-
havior." One does not mint to restrict 'language' to the totality of
observed verbal behavior, of an individual or a speech community, be-
cause of the arbitrary limits of time, speakers, situations, as veil as
observed chance errors, etc. And yet one vants to be empirical, to
speak of verbal behavior, and not of "competence", as Chensky does,
22
which is the “mental reality underlying actual behavior*"
Moreover, dispositions, as we have been assured by Carnap, Good-
man, and in £grd and Object by Quine as well, are really nothing to
worry about,. Despite their kinship with counterfactual conditionals,
they are quite harmless. For example, the "disposition to assent to or
dissent from’' a sentence, which is part of the definition of stimulus
meaning, is "no worse" than »x is soluble in water* and that is aot bad
at all* "fhe disposition ^Lnvolved in stimulus meaning^ may be presumed
to be some subtle structural condition, like an allergy and solubi-
23
lityj like an allergy, more particularly, in not being understood*"
Again in section U6, when Quine is "explicating" dispositions, he posits
"subvisible structure" for 'soluble* and "some subtle neural condition,
induced by language-learning" for the disposition to assent or dis-
2U
sent, and thus eliminates the subjunctive mood from expansions of
expressions containing these dispositional predicates. But this "pre-
sumption" of unobservables is convenient but not necessary? "we are
familiar enough in a general way with how one sets about guessing, from
judicious tests and samples and observed uniformities, whether there is
25
a disposition of a specified sort."
Kow does one test, however, for a disposition to verbal behavior?
6>.
re needn’t test at alls vre know all human beings have it* (By the sane
reasoning, one could establish an innate capacity for speech in humans.
)
The totality of dispositions to verbal behavior? That is everything
that a speaker has said, -will say, could say, and -would say* We can "pre-
sume" to attribute the totality of dispositions, structurally, to
"principles of neural organisation”, but that phrase, strangely enough,
26
is Chomsky’s, arch-foe of empiricism i One night indeed wcnder -what
is so empirical about the "totality of dispositions" except that it is
an extension of particular dispositions, which can be empirically tested
for* At any rate, for Quine, a language is a system of dispositions to
verbal behavior, and stimulus meanings are a subclass of dispositions
in a language.
(3) In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine argues against the veri-
fication theory of meaning by arguing that "in taking the statement as
unit [for confirmation, disccnfirmation by experience] we have drawn
our grid too finely* The unit of empirical significance is the whole of
27
science." He rejects the empirical-simplemindedness of verifiestion-
ism, and the holism of scientific theory, which he espouses in "Two
28
Dogmas," reappears, only slightly qualified, in Word and Object*
However, in that later work, with which we are here concerned, he writes,
in a section titled "Evidence," "words mean only as their use in sentences
is conditioned to sensory stimuli, verbal and otherwise* Ary realistic
theory of evidence must be inseparable from the psychology of stimulus
29
and response, applied to sentences*" If one allows Quine to treat
whole theories as "verbal stimuli", the first sentence quoted is no great
departure. We have seen, above, that there are serious difficulties in-
7volved in treating the "interanimation of sentences" as conditioned
responses, bat that is not at issue here* The second sentence quoted
appears to take single sentences as units, and, as it turns oat later
in the exposition, the necessity of doing so — that is, of taking the
sentence as the unit of meaning in a language — reveals the depth of
the problem of meaning in a language and its dissimilarity to the prob-
30
lean of truth in science.
The linguists evidence consists of sentences, one by one, as
stimuli and as responses, and of nonverbal stimuli. A scientific theory
does not stand or fall on confirming or disconfiraing "sensory evidence"
for single statements, even viien these are predictions arising from the
31
theory. Standards of coherence, simplicity, and centrality of or to
tiie system must also be met, and may override sensory evidence* binguis-
32
tic theories are "-worse off” than scientific theories because, al-
though both attempt to account for "systems of dispositions" — of phy-
sical objects generally and of speakers of a language — "sentences are
33
thought of as conveying meanings severally" -while "statements about the
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but
3k
only as a corporate body."
If sentences must b© as signed meanings one by one, what is the
only possible empirically sound ’meaning 1 of a sentence? Stimulus mean-
ing, answers Quine. Only far stimulus meaning can the observer have
reliable evidence, the correlation of verbal and nonverbal stimuli with
assenting and dissenting responses* Quine assumes, but doer net deiend
explicitly because he does not doubt, the reliability, under suitable
controls, of these correlations* Tfoat he questions, and rejects, is that
8the sort of hypothesis^cmfteaing/disconfirndng evidence that the
scientist looks for is "reliable" evidence for the linguist. On the
contrary, he holds that the consequences of the linguist’s hypotheses
_
“
35
"can be defended only through the • . • hypotheses, nw and forever."
According to the principle of indeterminacy, there is no empiri-
cally sound way of determining that two terms, within one language or
between two languages, are synonymous because, beyond stimulus synonymy,
which is not adequate to the job, an indefinite number of pairings can
be made without any defensible way of choosing between them. There is
no way, in other words, of singling out those true statements of a
language which are true solely try virtue of meanings, rules of the lan-
guage, linguistic usage, and totally independent of facts of the non-
linguistic world. The arguments of parts 1.-U* of "Two Dogmas of Empiri-
cism," which conclude that "a boundary between analytic and synthetic
36
statements simply has not been drawn," are thus an important prop for
the approach Quine takes in Word and Object, and it will be useful to
review them here.
Quine distinguishes two classes of accepted analytic statements.
The first includes those statements which are logical truths (i*e., truth-
functional tautologies), true under any interpretation of their nonlogi-
37
cal components. This first class is unproblematic, and philosophically
uninteresting. The second class comprises statements which can be trans-
formed into tautologous truths by substitution of synonyms. Thus,
’Brothers are male siblings* can be transformed into the logically true
’Brothers are brothers’ if it can be established that
? male sibling- is
synonymous with ’brother*. Quine then turns his attention to the relation
9of synonymy to see if it can provide support for the attribution of
analyticity to statements*
Synonymy is not, as might conveniently be thought, established
by definition except in cases of explicitly stipulated definitions
which establish synonymy by fiat. Definitions rest on "prior relations
38
of synonymy" discovered by the lexicographer, an "empirical scien-
39 UO
tist". They are "grounded in usage," and the criterion of synonymy
used by the lexicographer "has still to be clarified, presumably in terms
hi
relating to linguistic behavior*" Quine does no more in this essay
than assert that compiling dictionaries and providing for the possibi-
lity of translation and paraphrase (intralinguistic translation) is the
business of the lexicographer. Just how much of an "empirical scientist"
the lexicographer really is becomes an important issue in "The Problem
of Meaning in linguistics" and of oentral importance in Chapter II of
Word and Object* The point made about definition here is merely that a
dictionary definition cannot justify -transforming a statement which is
not a tautology into one which is. Unlike a definition in a logical cal-
culus, a dictionary definition is the end product of an empirical in-
vestigation. It is as strong or as weak as the procedure, assumptions,
and data which have produced it. It is not prescriptive.
Quine does not mention this, but another weakness of dictionary
definitions, overlooked by those who put their faith in them for sorting
out truths of language from truths about the world, is that standard
(as opposed to ideal) dictionaries do not distinguish "factual" from
"purely verbal" components in the definitions given* The Preface
to the
Concise Oxford Dictionary recognizes this lack of a clear boundary.
10
The- book is designed as a dictionary* and not as
an encyclopaedia j that is* the uses of words and
phrases as such are its subject matter* and it is
concerned with giving information about the things
for which those words and phrases stand only so
far as correct use of the words depends on know-
ledge of the things. The degree of this dependence
varies greatly with the kind of word treated* the
difference between cyclopaedic and dictionary
treatment varies with it* and the line of dis-
tinction is accordingly a fluctuating and dubious
one. U2
The dictionary reader must sort out the verbal from the factual compo-
nents himself* if he can* Those who rely on dictionary entries to sup-
port synonymy implicitly use soma further criterion* such as the incon-
ceivability of the contradictory*
The next approach to synonymy is through interchangeability*
Granting that any substitution of terms changes something (the inscrip-
tion itself* psychological or metaphorical associations, etc.), what
sort of substitution preserves "cognitive synonymy" — whatever that
is — and provides a basis for the second class of analytic statements?
Quine simplifies the problem by considering as indivisible words com-
pound terms* including terms in quotation marks. Thus* we need not worry
that we cannot substitute fmale sibling* for *brother* in *brotherhood'
or in " ’Brother* is a two-syllable word." He does not discuss the prob-
lem of distinguishing different senses* or readings* of a terms a
’brother* of a religious order may appear in sentences in which it can-
not be considered a compound term* and yet one would not want to re-
quire substitutability of putative synonyms with all readings of both
terms. Quine also does not discuss here substitution into intentional
li3
contexts of believing* looking for* hoping* etc. However* Quine finds
reasons to reject the criterion of interchangeability even for the
11
simpler oases) a fortiori , it wi11 not do for the more problems tic
ones.
Interchangeability which preserves the truth-value of the
3tatenant is found to be too -week as a criterion of synonym for ex-
tensional languages* Tene which have the same extension (i. e*, are
true of the same entities) include both those pairs apparently related
by linguistic conventions only (e*g*
,
•brother 1 and 'male sibling 1 )
and those pairs related by any facts at all (e.g. , •creature with heart’
and ’creature with kidneys’)* Such interchangeability cannot be the
criterion for a synonymy which supports distinguishing analytic truths
(about language) from synthetic truths (about the world)*
On the other hand, interchangeability does not serve as an inde-
pendent criterion in languages which include modal operators (e.g*,
'necessarily') because the inclusion of such terms presupposes that
meaning has been given to 'analytic' • An attempt to distinguish pairs
of interchangeable terms which cannot but be paired in the language in
question from pairs which are not, but could be, unrelated, cannot make
any headway without the use of concepts intrinsically connected to
the concept of analyticity. "Cognitive synonymy” itself appears to suf-
fer from the same malaise* it is the sort of synonymy which preserves
analyticity*
At this point, Quine gives up looking for a firm support for
analyticity in synonyny, and turns to semantical rules, such as those
formulated in artificial languages* He does not consider any treatment
of "rules of language" other than for artificial languages*
main
conclusion is that constructed languages use
5 is analytic 1 and ’soman-
12
tical rule* as unanalyzed terras, and cannot therefore illuminate the
nature of analyticity. A metalinguistic definition of ’analytic* in
a constructed language, which uses the term ’analytic', cannot clarify
analyticity. A statement held to be true by a ’senantical rule’ like-
wise does not explicate 1 true-due-to—language—only • in a natural
language. What are semantical rules in a natural language? In a con-
structed language, they are not characterized, but only listed under
the heading, ’semantical rules*. These comments reveal a sharp difference
of opinion between Quine and several commentators on what formalized
languages can contribute to the understanding of natural languages.
Martin is a good representative of this other viewpoint, parti-
cularly since he addresses himself directly to some of the arguments of
"Two Dogmas". Martin asserts that "Quine’s demands for a definition of
’analytic in L* in ’L' ranging over the natural languages is exorbi-
tant." A demand for a definition "ranging over all formalized language
bh
systems is ... at best premature." Carnap’s work has been on lan-
guages "having a very simple structure," and the "hope" of such work is
that, in time, the definitions given for these simple languages can be
US
"extended". Such explication oonsists in "making more exact, clear,
and precise an older, less clear, less precise concept. . • •" "That
the new concept is an explication for the older concept is indicated by
using the same word for both." To this assertion, which seems to over-
look the fact that "using the same word for both" is insufficient to in-
sure that the new concept is an explication of the older, Martin adds
that to c all the new concept by a less "tendentious" name, as Quine
suggests, since it is an unanalyzed " *analytic-for-Lo’ ", "would be to
13
U6
miss the point.” b-truth uses the term ’analytic' to "indicate” that
U7
it is an explication of analytic truth.
To Quine’s complaint that he does not know what "semantical
rules” are, Martin answers that, in a constructed language, they are
U8
definitions in the metalanguage. He implies that Quine is being per-
verse in not acknowledging this. In answer, Quine has added a para-
h9
graph to the essay. He knows what definitions, postulates and asrf run.
are in a logical calculus, and he knows what "semantical rules" are in
a formalized language. His point is that, apart from being selected as
"semantical rules" for a particular formalized language, there is nothing
intrinsically semantical-rule-like about the statements so specified.
"Semantical rules" are relative to the purposes and procedures of the
languages for which they are formulated. Any statements could be seman-
tical rules in a language. Thus, "no one signalization of a subclass of
the truths of L is intrinsically more a semantical rule than another;
and, if ’analytic’ means ’true by semantical rules', no one truth of
50
L is analytic to the exclusion of another."
Martin's defense of the use of formalized language systems to
clarify concepts in natural language has two prongs t (l) one can clari-
fy concepts in a simple structure which resist analysis in a complicated
— and not systematically complicated — one; (2) one can, with further
knowledge (of an unspecified sort* perhaps of the structure of natural
languages? perhaps of formalized languages, comparatively?) extend the
results of explication in simple artificial languages to natural language.
With reference to this, consider, as Quine does, the application
to natural language of Carnap’s explanation of an analytic statement as
one which is true in *11 state-descriptions/ Quine holds that this
method is not applicable to natural languages because they contain
some mutually dependent pairs of sentences. This can be clearly sham,
as follows
:
(jl) (x)vx is a bachelor)
-r —(x is married)
(2) (x)(x is a bachelor)
(x)«i»(x is married)
(3 ) a is a bachelor, b is a bachelor. • •
-(a is married),
-(b is married). . .
(U) Tom is a bachelor
purportedly analytic
’p * both statements,
or neither, hold
in all state-
descriptions
* (x) * 1 all substitution-
instances of its
scope hold in all
state-descriptions
state-description* may
be T or F
(5 ) Tom is married state-description* may
be T or F
S uate
-description-^ State-de3cription^ State-description^ State—description
(U) is T
(30 is T
(U) is T
(S) is F
(U) is F (U) is F
(S) is T ($) i3 F
State-description^, in which *Tom is a bachelor* and ’Torn is married*
are both true, is obviously at variance with the conditions (2) and (3)
of the analyticity of (l). In natural languages, which contain such
"synonym-pairs" as ’bachelor* and ’not married’
,
this method will not
pick out the su3»stitution-of-oyrionyrQs-type analytic statements.
The above is merely an example of Quine’s general point about the
limitations of explicating concepts in natural language via simple con-
structed languages.
Appeal to hypothetical languages of an artifi-
cially simple kind could conceivably be useful
in clarifying analyticity, if the mental or be-
havioral or cultural factors relevant to analy-
ticity — whatever they may be — were somehow
sketched into the simplified model. But a
model which takes analytic!ty merely as an
irreducible character is unlikely to threw
light on the problem of explicating analy—
ticity. £3
One might say that the failure, which "Two Dogmas" so neatly
shows, of the traditional criteria of analyticity has led Quine to
his holistic view of knowledge, expressed in various picturesque xaeta-
9x
phora s fabric, field of force, arches and blocks. All statements are
open to review; all statements can be held "come what may"; all
statements have some, at least indirect, relation to experience.
Whether some statements can be asserted to be analytic on the
basis of inductively established synonymies ia a question to which
Quine turns in "The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics" and, in greater
detail, in fiord and Object. In this undertaking, his results can be
criticized by questioning the strictness of his inductive procedures
and the stopping-point of the investigation which his behaviorism dic-
tates, as well as by meeting the "Two Dogmas" arguments. Such criticisms
will be taken up, below, after we see the consequences of giving up the
absolute distinction between analytic and synthetic statements and of
determining to give an account of language in terms, exclusively, of
observable behavior, as Quine conceives it.
B. Two Expositions of the Principle
It might be interesting to look first at a brief, earlier formula-
tion of indeterminacy of translation which appeared in the essay, "The
56
Problem of Meaning in Linguistice". The situation ia similar to that
in Chapter II of Word and Object 1 a linguist finds himself among speakers
16
Of «n unknom laneuage whose culture is very different from hie oro.
He observes correlations between
-KeUb." utterances and "the other
things that are observed to be happening.""
7
H. form, hypotheses
.bout
these uttenenoes as wholes and tests for them. After "picking up some
Initial Kalaba vocabulary," he tries breaking .hole utterances down
into shorter caoponents and correlating these with English words. He
tests these correlations "as best he can" and ultimately compiles
his Kalaba-£ngliah lexicon#
The serious theoretical difficulty with this procedure, «s Quine
sees it, is that "the relevant features of the situation issuing in a
given Kaleba utterance are in large part concealed in the person of the
speaker," and by this Quine does not mean only the speaker's unique
language-learning history but what he sees his experience "as" because
of the structure ol his language* The formula ticai of indeterminacy of
translation in this essay is more explicitly IShorfian than that in Word
and Object* To read the following statements, and to view this presen-
tation as equivalent, in capsule farm, to the one in Word and Object,
61
is to understand why Jonathan Cohen sees Quine as the heir of Wharf*
Theoretically the more important difficulty is
that, as Cassirer and Whorf have stressed,
there is in principle no separating language
from the rest of the world, at least as con-
ceived by the speaker# Basic differences in
language are bound up, as likely as not, with
differences in the way in which the speakers
articulate the world itself into things and
properties, time and space, elements, forces,
spirits, and so on. It is not clear even in
principle that it makes sense to think of
words and syntax as varying from language to
language while the content stays fixed) yet
precisely tills fiction is involved in speak-
ing of synonymy, at least as between radically
different languages* 62
17
Wlat provides the lexicographer with an enter-
ing wedge is the fact that there are mny
basic features of men’s ways of conceptual-
izing t,heir environment* • •vdiich are comaon
to all cultures.
I have suggested that our lexicographer’s
obvious first moves in picking up some ini-
tial Kalaba vocabulary are at bottom a nat-
ter of exploiting the overlap of our cultures. 63
Quine appears to be stressing the cultural factor in language
differences and similarities in these passages. However, even his
Whorfian starting point takes account of most of the criticisms one
can make of T»7horf’s relativity thesis* Quine does not go so far as to
claim that "basic differences in language” determine "differences in
the way in which the speakers articulate the world itself into things
and properties, [etc*]" He says that these two sets of differences are
6U
"bound up” with each other, a much weaker claim. He recognizes that
one cannot think of the "content" of an utterance as fixed, independent-
ly of the way a given language slices up experience. This is also the
essence of "Whorf’s claim, but Whorf, unlike Quine, does not think it
inconsistent to "translate” Hopi locutions at the same time that he is
insisting that they cannot be translated, almost as If he proves his
65
point by showing how odd the translations are*
Perhaps most importantly, Quine sees that the undertaking of
translating a radically different language, from the very start, "en-
66
courages the misconception of meaning as reference" because it begins
by pointing (and other ostensive procedures) and then proceeds by rest-
ing as much as possible cm the "presumably common, fund of eonceptuali-
67
zaiion" among human beings. Thus, even if the linguist keeps testing
his hypothetical translations, "the clarity of any possible conflict
18
decreases*" Even in the most cloarcut, public situations, the terms
of the English sentence may simply not pick out the same "relevant
features" as the terras of the Kalaba sentence. The English sentence
and the Kalaba sentence may both denote 'that, over there* without
having the same meanings. The farther one gets from reports on 'that,
over there 1
,
the more important the conceptual structure of a language
is to the translation of a sentence. Part of Whorf 5 s puzzle ccxues from
his failure to distinguish meaning from reference. Perceiving that Hopi
enshrines different features of experience as relevant, Whorf concludes,
not only that Hop! sentences have different meanings from their puta-
tive translations in English, but also that the Hopi experience of the
world (i.e.
,
what in fact is sensed) is different from the American-
69
European experience of the world.
The linguist's procedure rests on interchangeability aalva veri-
ba te plus an attempt to get beyond, this thoroughly inadequate standard
of synonym (see above, p. ll) by projecting "himsolf, -vdth his Indo-
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European Weltanschauung, into the sandals of his Kalaba informant.
"
His completed lexicon, the result of tills method, has more than the
usual inductive weaknesses. If this were all, further field work could
locate mistranslations and confirm correct ones. But in the case of a
lexicon coiaoiled in the absence of a criterion for synonymy, there is
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"nothing for the lexicographer to be right or wrong about.'
1
For the second formulation of indetexiidnacy, in v« ord arxi Object ,
Quine sets his linguist up in an even more explicitly forbidding situa-
tion. The language he is to translate is totally unrelated to his own,
or to languages familiar to him; the culture is likewise without any
19
points of similarity to his own or related cultures* nor have the
people had contact with any outsiders* Furthermore
* he does not have
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the services of an informant. It is not a practical case* but a Ge-
dankenexperiment intended to make the conclusions stand out more
sharply and with more plausibility — one English-speaking observer
and a number of Other-speaking natives. "liadical translation" turns out
to involve problems no different in principle from those of translation
between closely related languages* even by one bilingual speaker* or of
paraphrase or understanding within one language. The purpose of this
approach is* first* to overcome resistance to the principle of indeter-
minacy of translation by demonstrating its plausibility in an extreme
case* and then to show that it does not result from cultural peculiar-
ities but from problems with synonymy and with the limits of observabi-
lity.
The linguist begins by matching stimulations (controlled for
clarity* duration* etc* * by him) with utterances * taken to be sentences*
and from these correlations derives the only empirically sound results
in his translation of the language* stimulus meanings of highly obser-
vational occasion sentences. He moves from these* on peril of increasing
uncertainty* to "results" which are ultimately neither confirmable nor
falsifiable.
"Stimulus meaning" is defined for any one speaker, for a sentence*
as his disposition to assent or dissent from the sentence -when con-
fronted by it in conjunction with one of a class of stimulations at a
given time. Two sentences are stimulus-synonymous when they have the
same stimulus meaning for a speakerj "socially” stimulus-synonymous
20
when this correlation holds overwhelmingly throughout the speech com-
munity* A sentence is stimulus
-analytic -when a speaker would assent to
it or to nothing, or react with shocked disbelief and sudden doubt of
his questioner's grasp of the language to the denial of the sentmce.
Stimulus
-analyticity can also be "socialised" by taking it to apply to
those sentences to -which almost all members of the speech ccmsaunity
would so react*
Stimulus meaning is granted by Quine to fall far short of the
traditional concept of meaning* Stimulus synonymy and stimulus analyti-
city, since they are based on stimulus meaning, also represent only a
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"behavioristic ersatz" for the concepts of synonyny and analyticity*
They represent for Quine how far — and it is not very far — the lin-
guist can go on available (acceptable) evidence. Before sketching the
linguist's next steps, beyond the evidence, as it were, we will look at
what Quine means by "stimulations" and at the kinds of sentences for
which stimulus meaning adequately represents meaning* Perhaps even more
important is his rationale for correlating stimulations with sentences
rather than with words*
7U
The stimulations are taken to be "repeatable event farmjjij",
and they are counted as similar, if not identical, for different speak-
ers if the speakers are similarly placed with respect to lighting con-
ditions, distance of objects, etc*, on assumptions about "the anatomical
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resemblance of people*" As Quine writes in a later paper, "It is the
stimulation at the bodily surface that counts, and not just the objec-
tive existence of objects of reference off in the distance, nor yet the
76
events deep inside the body*"
21
Other factors may influence a speaker’s assent or dissent in a
particular case, such as the duration of the stimulation (too long or
too momentaxy), the speaker’s condition, "intrusive infommtion" given
oj another native speaker on the scene or known through experience by
the queried speaker himself (but not by the linguist)* Some of these
factors can be controlled and compensated for by the linguist, but not
all of them. "Intrusive information", particularly when it is widely
shared in the community, cannot be reliably stripped away free the
disposition to assent or dissent to sentences in the presence of stimu-
lations* This is, of course, a homely illustration of the lack of a
boundary between facts about language and facts about the world. Quine
writes that "we have made no general experimental sense of a distinction
between what goes into a native’s learning to apply an expression and
what goes into his learning supple mentary matters about the objects
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concerned.
"
Some kinds of sentences are "less susceptible than others" to
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the influence of intrusive information* If "occasion" sentences are
distinguished from "standing" sentences by the fact that the former
command "assent or dissent only as prompted all over again by current
stimulation" whereas for the latter assent or dissent may be prompted
80
or may be repeated in the absence of prompting, then "observation"
sentences are those occasion sentences "whose stimulus meanings vary
81
none under the influence of collateral information." Observation
sentences may be an idealisation} at least, however, there are "degrees
82
of observatianallty" of occasion sentences# Stimulus meaning, accord-
ing to Quine, is moaning for highly observational occasion sentences.
22
Pairs of sentences can be matched for stimulus synonymy, and sen-
tences can be tested for stimulus analyticity, even if the sentences
are not observation sentences, but these sentences cannot be trans-
lated except 'with the help of ’’analytical hypotheses”* Observation
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sentences can be translated by their stimulus meanings*
One could ask why the linguist starts by correlating whole
utterances with stimulations. The first reason is that, initially, he
obviously does not know which are the independent parts of any utter-
ance* It is true that, given differences in conventions about the
rise and fall of the voice, and pauses, in different languages, some
’’whole” utterances may be larger units than single sentences* However,
any number of sentences in an utterance can be taken to be one sen-
tence which is a conjunction of the contained sentences* It seems
evident that the linguist could make more mistakes by premature seg-
menting than by taking as a sentence an utterance which is actually two
or more sentences. Quine* s view of the primacy of sentences is based
on a number of different lines of reasoning, which go beyond this prac-
tical one.
With respect to learning a language, even one’s native language,
he believes that words are learned as parts of sentences, or as one-
word sentences, and that many early compound sentences are learned as
8U
wholes. Sentences, therefore, have a genetic primacy*
Conventions for identifying well-formed sentences are more reli-
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able than those for identifying separate words* With words, one has
the problem of words contained in words or bridging words* not only
•bachelor* s-button 1 or •bachelorhood* but also ’cat* in ’cattle’ and
23
, xce’ in ’I scream’ (whan spoken)* There are also numerous "formula”
expressions in a language which consist of at least two nords habitual-
1/ joined: o*g*, ’How do you do?*, ’pure creamery butter 1
,
etc* This
is not to say that ’how’ never exists alone or in other combinations,
but, just as ’cat* is concealed in the wal'd ’cattle’, ’how’ may be
thought to be concealed in the "word" ’Howdoyoudo 1 .
Another reason for the primacy of sentences is found in "The
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Problem of Meaning in linguistics’1 . "Primary synonymy" is between
fairly long segments of discourse* Sentences, on this view, are the
shortest units which could have the same meaning* In some cases, the
scope has to be extended to sentence pairs or whole paragraphs* So-
called synonymy between words, according to Quine, amounts only to
87
"lame partial synonymy plus stage directions*" One only makes the
effort with words because the pairs of truly synonymous long segments
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are "altogether limitless in number and variety," and therefore un-
campilable* Dictionaries are a convenience. However, because diction-
aries exist, and because we look up "the meaning" of a ward in them,
we mistakenly cents to think that synonymy i3 a relation between words*
Not 30.
The most important reason for the primacy of sentences, however,
is the one that has already came up in connection with the plight of
the linguist in "Meaning in linguistics"* An English and a Kalaba utter-
ance were both correlated with the same public experience, but there
was no presumption from that that they meant the same, in & fuller sense
of ’meaning* than "stimulus meaning", or even that the terns in each
sentence denoted the sane entities* As Quine puts it in »Iord ana Object,
2U
"Occasion sentences and stimulus meanings are general coin; terms and
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reference are local to our conceptual scheme." There is even a sug-
gestion in the passage from which this sentence cotaes that syntactic
features may be so radically different between the two languages that
the linguis t can do violence to the language he is trying to translate
by hypothetically constructing and analysing sentences from and into
"parts". But Quine is mainly talking about the conceptual categories
to which terras belong — is ’gavagai’, as a term, ’rabbit’ or ’rabbit-
stage’ or ’part of scattered rabbithood’, etc. ? — and he may be think-
ing of syntax, as Wharf does, in terms of the semantical correlates of
syntactic categories.
The inaccessibility of both the extension and. Intension of
tenas is the basis of Quine’s answer to Carnap’s proposal in "Meaning
and Synonymy in Natural language." Carnap has his linguist engage in
a series of questions and answers with "ICarl" to determine the inten-
sions of terms, after taking it as "granted" that the extensions of
90
terms can be determined. Quine notes tliat a considerable command of
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the language is required to cany on this questioning, but that would
be a practical matter and a question of time, if it were all* Thu real
flaw in the procedure is that questions which would elicit the inten-
sion of a term must be couched in the "provincial" concoptxial frame-
work of Karl’s language which the linguist doss not knew — and which,
according to the principle of indeterminacy* he cannot get to know
even with empirical probability. As he frames his questions in Karl’s
language, without this lowwledge, what the questions mean to Karl is
inscrutable to the linguist.
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The linguist must ask Karl such questions as "Is that]. (stimu-
lation of a rabbit) the same as that2 (stimulation of another rabbit) ?"
or M Is that (stimulation of a horse -with a horn in the middle of its
forehead — a picture) a 'Pferd' ?" The reliability of the answers
depends entirely on the accuracy of the linguist’s hypothetical trans-
lation of ’the same as 1 and 'Pferd'* The same responses which would
confirm his hypothetical translations could also confirm other* entire-
ly disparate hypothetical translations, as well as the actual inten-
sions of the terms for the native speaker* If ’the same as* does not
mean 'is the same kind of thing as* but ’is part of the same scattered
rabbithood as’, the responses will be the same, but the linguist, in-
terpreting 'is the same as’ as 'is the same kind of thing as’, will be
wrong in his subsequent translation of ’gavagai’* Likewise, ’Pferd* may
not mean ’horse’ to the native speaker, but 'that participant in the
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tribal totem with cloven hooves’*
It is important to see, as Carnap apparently does not, that the
extension of a term is as much in question here as its intension* The
linguist cannot determine the range of entities to which Karl is willing
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to apply a term with only "the uncertainty of all inductive inference,"
because, after the first few responses, he must formulate an hypothesis
about the extension and intension of the term in question, and his
hypothesis will determine the sorts of stimulations he presents to Karl.
His results may therefore show areas of positive, negative and uncertain
responses and yet not be a map of the extension of the term*
Imagine a Kalaba-epeaking linguist investigating English, who
wanted to determine "at least" the extension of the terra ’blue*. After
26
the first few assents and dissents of his informant to presentations
of small physical objects, eyes, sky and clothing, he hypothesizes that
the sound ’blue* picks out a quality of being not readily edible. With
this in mind, he presents a variety of edible, inedible, unappetizing,
and possibly edible things to his informant. As long as he works with
that hypothesis, he will leave totally out of account certain kinds of
testing presentations, and his results will only show the areas of
responses within the range of presentations which have been chosen with
the hypothesis in mind.
It has not seemed possible to discuss why stimulus meaning is a
relation between stimulations and sentences, rather than terms, without
bringing in the linguist* s hypotheses. ’’Analytical hypotheses”, as
Quine calls them, are directly responsible for the indeterminacy of
radical translation* Quine does not demonstrate that such hypotheses
are not also involved in the determination of stimulus meanings. ?liis
requires a brief defense.
After all, one does not know intuitively what signs speakers give,
9U
orally or by their behavior or gestures, for assent and dissent.
It wE.ll take seme sort of hypotheses and the testing of them to estab-
lish this. The nod, headshake, and shrug are not universal, and the
Kalaba linguist may well get them wrongly sorted out on his
first try
with English speakers* The point about these hypotheses is
that the;
are veiy limited, and even if the linguist is slow or has
bad luck with
them, he idll soon have tried them *11 out, with djffergrt r*nMa
(sines
assent and dissent are contradiotory attitudes), and
determine which is
which. Analytical hypotheses cannot be tested in
this way.
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The assumption ia being made that there is something equi-
valent to ’Yea 1 and ’No’, in words and/or behavior, in any language, and
it might be argued that this is not necessarily so. In that case, the
linguist would have to go home prematurely in abject defeat. However,
it seems more fruitful to assume that, both for any kind of reasoning,
problem-solving, etc.
,
and for survival itself (there has to be a ivay
of giving in when your arm lias been twisted long enough), acme expres-
sions of assent and dissent are basic — and even conspicuous — in
human communities.
From this assumption about assent and dissent, Quine also derives
the translatability of truth-functional connectives, ’and 1
,
'or 1 and
’not*. These can be given behavioral meaning in terms of assent and
dissent to sentences combined or negated. Their translatability rests
on a further assumption, closely related, however, to the first, that
9$
there must be this much implicit logic in any language. One is not
imputing the knowledge of logic in some form, or logically consistent
behavior most of the time, to members of all societies, however primi-
tive, but merely some means of making distinctions and resisting self-
contradiction, again for the sake of survival (which should probably be
taken to include prdblem-solving )
.
This justification of the universal existence of assent, dissent,
and truth functional logic in languages by the need to "survive’’ is not
to be found explicitly in Quine's writings. It is ay attempt to 3tate
presuppositions of his linguist's starting point which are consistent
with Quine's general position. Peter Winch, in an article which argues
for attempting to understand "native" beliefs and practices through in-
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teraal, rather than externally imposed, criteria, nevertheless expli-
cates tnc "necessity" of rationality in ary language, on somewhat more
restricted grounds, as follows?
Where there is language, it iaust make a dif-
ference what is said and this is only possible
where the saying of one thing rules out, on
pain of failure to communicate, the saying of
something else. %
The question might arise, after this line of argument, whether,
in this sense, the higher primates are not also "logical” in their
behavior. "Logic" is certainly being defined very broadly here. Further-
more, if one accepts Vygotsky’s analysis that, in a child’s mental
development, there is a stage of pre-linguistic thought (problem-
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solving) and pre-logical speech (the earliest expressive utterances),
why is it not possible for a very simple society to have a language
which is expressive but not logical, although they can go about the
business of survival as animals do? Quine might answer that we simply
could not understand a nonlogical language, and if a linguist found
such a society, he would conclude that they have no language. (In fact,
I believe that there are no known cases of societies with incoherent,
babbling languages. The degree of complexity of language has resisted
98
all correlations with the degree of complexity of society.
)
Let us return to the Quinian linguist. Having translated highly
observational occasion sentences and logical connectives by stimulus
meanings, and having identified stimulus-analytic sentences and stim-
lua-«ynanymou3 pairs of sentences, the linguist begins to segment
utterances into units, which he takes to be the wards of the language,
and to match these up with words in his own language. From observing
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the important daily activities and preoccupations of his native
speakers, he oara to conclusions about wlat brief expression*" there
are likely to be (e.g., a term for rabbit in rabbit-banting country-;
seversx words for kinds of snow among Eskimos). Experienced, perhaps,
^xt. i several languages, the linguist’s guesses are infoimad by his
sharpened sense for formal similarities among languages. The "typical
case" of formulating an hypothesis is where the linguist "apprehends
a parallelism in function between some component fra©r»nt of a trans-
la ted whole nativa^sentenoe and some component word of the translation
of the sentence." He tents his tentative definitions against the
3enhances he has already translated by stimulus meanings and those
identified as analytic and synonymous. When the latter two kinds are
translated, they should encouragingly yield analytic and synonymous
sentences in English. And so lie goes on, "thinking up” hypotheses, test-
ing and rejecting, until he has compiled his lexicon which, he believes,
conforms to the "totality of speech behavior" he has observed, and even
102
to dispositions beyond what he has observed.
The analytical hypotheses "extend the working limits of trans-
103
latian beyond where independent evidence can e:d.st. " They do this
primarily by -shat may be a most skillful and subtle perception of ana-
logies. Thile there may be no denying that the analogies (i.e.
,
simi-
larities in certain respects) perceived by the linguist do exist between
the language under stu^y and, say
,
English, thi3 in no way entails tiiat
these features in the unknown language, on which the analogies are based.
have the same significance, or any significance, to the speakers of that
language. It also does not ontail that all English-speaking linguists
30
would perceive the same analogies* There is nothing in the overt be-
havior, elicited or spontaneous, of the native speakers which could
falsify an analytical hypothesis* The completed English-Other lexicon
is nwoefully under-dete^Mine^u^'
.jy the stimulus iiieaning translations of
10U
observation sentences* The translations of these sentences and all
the observed behavior of native speakers are compatible with countless
105
"rival systems of analytical hypotheses." Nothing that the linguist
has observed, nothing that the liiiguist can or could observe, can se-
lect a "right" system of analytical hypotheses or elimixiate a "wrong"*
Translations based an these hypotheses are supported by the coherence
106
of the system of hypotheses, and by notiling mere, "now and forever*
"
There is no criterion for choosing among different 'translations
of a sentence, each supported by a different system of hypotheses* A
systematic criterion, such as simplicity, is not wanted here because,
at the level of comparing different indiwidual sentence-translations,
the simplest system may have produced a translation which is wron^ :
which has a different truth-value from the sentence translated.
Here we are at the heart of the problem* The ascription of' synonymy
between terms is supported by a system of analytical hypotheses, -*uiy
such systems are possible, each self-coherent and consistent with all
dispositions to verbal beluvior in both languages. However, tiie mapping
of synonymy-relations between terms vdll differ in different systems in
3uch a my that one Other sentence will receive several — and not al-
ways even truth-iunctionaUy equivalent — translations in English#
Quine h«3 accepted with equanimity a theory-relative concept of
108
,
truth for science* ,rI4ay v» conclude," lie ask3, fiat transla tional
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aynorgragr «t it# worst is no worse off than truth in physics? To be
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thus reassured is to misjudge the parallel.” To assert that a
statement is true, where ’true* means 'true according to Newtonian
physics’, is to be ready, if challenged, to support the claim with
other statements from the theory. This is, in fact, what happens. The
reasons given becaas increasingly theoretical, if the challenge is pressed
far enough, until one comes to the basic assumptions of the theory. In
a conflict between A, defending common sense, and B, defending modem
physios, with respect to a statement which A claims is true and B claims
is false (e. g. , VSA chair is solid. ”), the supporting statements made
by A and B will quickly enough get down to fundamental assumptions. One
may not persuade the other, but neither will be puzzled at the end as
to why they disagree on the truth of the statement.
On the other hand, the analytical hypotheses used in compiling
a lexicon are hidden from view. They are not even entirely explicit for
the lexicographer himself, and are not available for settling disputes
about variant translations of a sentence. One does not, on any account,
lode to principles of translation for support far the translation of a
sentence. A sentence is thought to have a meaning, related to the mean-
ings of its constituent words and it® syntactic form. One would look up
the wards, check a grammar, and if A and B found one Other-word trans-
lated by two entirely different and Incanpatible English wards or ex-
pressions in their two lexicons, they would conclude that one lexico-
grapher had made an empirical error which could be settled by a field
trip and usage-questionnaires. The trouble is that a given word in the
unknown language could be translated in the following assorted ways for
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the following assorted* but unstated
Native words
Lexicon English translation
A
’animal’
*spirit dwelling in
all animals 1
7 spirit dwelling in
all living things*
*result of a success—
ful hunt* or dispo-
sition to be such*
’portion of running*
or disposition to
be such*
reasons
i
Plunko*
Analytical hypotheses
There must be a word for ’animal 3
because many kinds of animals are
hunted and indiscriminately stored*
Tessa is used only in sentences
which appear to function as prayers*
expressions of awe, wishes* etc*
as above
language nominalizes effects* not
things*
language nominaliaes actions*
viewed as divisible who£si7'not
things*
This may give some hint of the drastic differences possible* which can-
not be dissolved by further field work because they are all compatible
with all the observations and depend on interpretations of those obser-
vations*
The problem cannot be solved by bilingual linguists* because a
bilingual only represents an internalized system of analytical hypothe-
ses* one of inasny* and two bilinguals could find the same "differences
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in net output" between themselves as between two rival lexicons*
Furthermore* the problem of indeterminacy exists* although in a practi-
cally much less troublesome form* in translating closely related languages*
111
or languages of closely related cultures* It even exists* as a dis-
tinct theoretical possibility* in understanding and paraphrasing the
112
utterances of another speaker of one's own language* How often* for
example* in conversation* one makes allowances for another’s slips of
the tongue, false starts* deviant usages* etc* If* instead of making al-
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lowances, one sought to make sense of them by hypotheses about their
-meaning”, one could do so in a number of ways, with the same result-
ing inability to choose the
-right” way, as in radical translation.
Quine does not dai^ that the linguist may come across genuine
"c-ulturai contrast© which are not merely cases of Indeterminacy of
translation. He gives the example of a language which contains an oc-
casion sentence assented to in the presence of half-brothers or peli-
cans, but which does not contain a sentence assented to in the presence
of a member of either class exclusively, and contrasts this with Eng-
llsh. An Eskimo language having numerous words for kinds of snow,
but no generic term for ’snow1
, and the opposite case in English, is
presumably also a case of cultural contrast. However, when the linguist
comes up with really exotic translations, such that we can barely ccm-
ru;
prehend the way the speakers appear to think — as Whorf did — we
are more likely coming vp against the results of indeterminacy than of
cultural contrast. Quine has become less Whorflan than he was in -Mean-
ing in Linguistics”.
One frequently hears it urged £ footnote to
Cassirer* Lee, Sapir, WhorfJ that deep dif-
ferences of language carry -with them ultimate
differences in the way one thinks, or looks
upon the world. I would urge that what is
moot generally involved is indeterminacy of
correlation. 115
When the culture is very different from the linguist’s, it is more dif-
ficult to distinguish cultural differences from failures in translation
due to indeterminacy. However, indeterminacy exists, although it does not
alwayB intrude as a practical problem, all along the continuum from two
speakers of the same language to two speakers of totally unrelated languages.
3U
CHAPTER II
THE PROGRAM OF REGIMENTATION
A. Purpose and Procedure
In turning to the subject of this chapter
,
we are following
Quine's own course in Word and Object* The relevance of the problems
raised by regimentation to indeterminacy of translation will be de-
veloped in the course of the discussion. At first, however, it looks
as if Quine is abandoning the virtually impossible — translation be-
tween languages — in order to deal with the manageable and promising
— the clarifiestion of ambiguity within one natural language by logic.
Using the case of radical translation, Quine has argued that the
extensions, as well as the intensions, of terms in two languages can-
1
not be matched on the basis of "surface irritations", but only via
analytical hypotheses which are unempirical because they are not falsi-
fiable by any observable behavior. Although, in principle, the English
of A and the English of B can be considered two different languages —
as, in seme ways, they are, with respect to language-learning history
and numerous differences in usage — and thus subject to the same in-
determinacy as the English of A and the Kalaba of Q, A and B manage to
communicate in English, making allowances for isolated peculiarities of
each other's utterances, and avoiding speculations about irresolvable
differences of meaning between them. Quine therefore proceeds to outline
how a child learns the referential devices of his native language, in
this case, English, and then, taking "the mastered language as a going
concern. . . considerfs] the indeterminates ancjirregularities of refer-
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ence that pervade it*”
Quine puts aside, after Chapter II, the indeterminacy of trans-
lation of terms, which so drastically hinders the linguist in his en-
terprise, and turns to problems in communication between speakers of a
common language which could not even arise for the linguist attempting
radical translation. There are two preliminary comments* (l) the theo-
retical indeterminacy of translation between two speakers of the ”saine”
language, and the practical problem of different speech sub-communities
within the "same” language, play no part in the discussion of these
problems in communication) (2) the problems dealt with are no longer
those of a fictional linguist, but of a philosopher concerned with "logi-
cal grammar”.
The problems arise from several kinds of ambiguity (of terras, of
particular constructions, of syntactic structure, of scope) and of the
3
failure of reference in indirect discourse and intentional contexts.
There are two stages in the procedures for dealing with them. The first
stage involves "practical temporary I "opportunistic" J departures from
k
L
5
ordinary language” "for getting over a sudden block in communication."
These may be the use of variables to clear up problems of cross refer-
6 7
ence, the use of parentheses for problems of grouping, the "such
8
that" construction for problems of scope, and the distinction between
referential and nonreferential position to clarify one f s intentions in
- 9
sentences of believing, hoping, thinking, doubting, etc.
The second stage is "regimentation". Regimentation is not differ-
ent in kind frcta the paraphrasing operations of the first stage, which
also drew on the standardizing and simplifying functions of logical
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theory in the use of parentheses, variables, etc The ultimate pur-
poses are different: on-the-spot paraphrasing has as its purpose "get-
ting over a sudden block in coranrunioation” j regimentation lias as its
„
10
purpose "simplification of theory". We regiment, rather than merely
patch up ordinary language
-when "we are limning trie true and ultimate
structure ol reality. " In this posture, we adopt a more severe atti-
tude toward the expressions of ordinary language than the usual attitude
12
of using words without intending to postulate the entities they name.
This more severe attitude is the acceptance of the "ontological conrnit-
13
ments" of our discourse. Quine's "double standard" is the differential-
ly rigorous treatment of expressions in ordinary language, depending on
1U
one's purposes: everyday or scientific discourse.
A paraphrase intended to clear up an ambiguous construction in
everyday discourse may use fragments of logical notation in a sentence
of English, for the sake of the clearer standards attending the use of,
for example, parentheses in logic than of commas and relative word
position in English. In a regimented paraphrase, the logic must be more
thoroughly "digested" by the English sentences than it is in its "oppor-
tunistic” use above. In order to make all one’s commitments explicit,
and to take advantage of deductions possible in quantified first order
logic, English sentences must be "transformed" into logical notation
"adapted to the theory." The English sentences may be drastically al-
tered in the process. Some redundant constructions vri.ll be assimilated,
some puzzling ones eliminated altogether. The quantity of change ex-
ceeds that of the first stage because the motive for change is different.
Quine compares paraphrase in regimentation to the refomilation of a prob-
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lem being programmed for machine computation* it prepares the way for
"the methodical manipulation of formulas according to fixed rules of
algorithm”.
Whether the ambiguity of grouping attending *pretty little girls 1
camp' i3 clarified by the use of parentheses, as * (prettyClittle girls')
camp, 1 depends on wiiether the speaker or writer intends to refer to a
pretty camp for little girls or rather to a camp for girls who are both
pretty and little. The sentence-paraphrase in full "canonical notation"
must also bear a relation of some sort of equivalence to the pre-para-
phrased sentence. If not, there is no gain in the undertaking. It would
be difficult to count how many times Quine reiterates in these pages
that the ordinary-language sentence and its paraphrase in canonical no-
tation are not synonymous. What does this negative claim amount to?
Let us take the following two ambiguous sentences i
(1) Everyone in the room knows at least two languages.
(2) At least two languages are known by everyone in the room.
Both of these sentences are ambiguous because it is not clear whether
the two languages are the same two or any two. The following paraphrases
are the two ways of resolving the ambiguity*
(3) (x)(3y)(3x) (x is in the room • y is a language • z is a lan-
guage . r> • x knows y and a)
(U) QyKWOc) (x is in the room . y is a language • z is a lan-
guage • 3 • x knows y and z;
Paraphrase (3)* with its arrangement of quantifiers, resolves the ambi-
guity in favocr of any two languages (which does not entail, of course,
that each person in the room must know different languages from every
other person in the room), and paraphrase (U), with its arrangement of
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quantifiers, resolves the ambiguity in favor of the same two languages.
j-t is cleai
-hat neither ( 3 ) nor (U) is synonymous with either
(l) qj. v 2 ) simply because (l) and (2) are ambiguous and (3 ) amt (I*) are
not. (1) and (2) have each two possible interpretations, and therefore
two possible truth-values for any given utterance, while (3 ) and (U)
have each a single interpretation and only one truth-value for any given
utterance. In this sense, no paraphrase, successful in resolving ambi-
guity, can possibly be synonymous with the ambiguous ordinary language
sentence to be paraphrased.
I«t us consider the following two sentences, in what Quine calls
18
"semi-ordinary” English*
(p) Each person in the room is such that there are two languages
that he knows.
(6) There are two languages such that each person in the roam
knows them.
(5) is synonymous with (3 ), and (6) is synonymous with (U), or might
"naturally enough be spoken of a synonymous", according to Quine, because
(3) and ft) "mechanically" expand into ($) and (6), respectively, by
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the metalinguistic rules of the logic. But, from this, one cannot move
to assert synonymy of either (l) with (3 ) or (l) with (5). The transi-
tion from (l) to (£) involves settling on one interpretation of the am-
biguous sentence as well as accepting rules in the logic for the signi-
ficance of the order of quantifiers and the "such that" construction.
With respect to the order of quantifiers, whether in logical notation
or in "semi-ordinary" English, the user is strictly coomitted by them to
determinate interpretations as lie is not by the inversion of word order
39
in ordinary English, which nay be used merely fur empheeis, poetic
meter, or emotive effect*
In the above exiles, we did not touch the questions of what
"knowing a language" is, or, for that natter, "being a (distinct)
language", because, problematical as these predicates are, they are
unrelated to the ambiguity of sentences (l) and (2). There are cases,
however, where paraphrasing must directly attack the predicates. Ex-
amples are found on pages 1S2-15U of Wwd and Object, when Quine is
dealing with the referential "opacity" of particular verbs. One brings
out the propositional attitude implicit in "The commissioner is looking
for the chairman of toe hospital board" "by expanding
-look for* Into
enoearor „o find'.” "Anyone is ready enough to paraphrase" " 'Qior-
gione was so-called.
. into " 'Giorgione was called 'Giorgione*. . . >«
2*
"Just as looking for
1| endeavoring to find, so hunting is endeavoring
to shoot or capture." The underlined words show the expressions Quine
uses in substituting predicates for one another, T&thout ever claiming
that the substituted predicate means
,
the same as the predicate substituted
for. His insistence on the nongynonyny of sentences vtith their para-
phrases applies fully to cases of paraphrase which involve changes of
predicates.
Qaj.ue fakes a very permissive course with predicates, even in the
process of full regimentation. There is "no inventory of allowable
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terms," — "a fixed, closed vocabulary of simple terms" in the manner
2i|
of Carnap — and no intrinsic distinction between "simple" and "ccra-
2$
plex" terms in the manner of Russell. Any predicates are, in principle,
acceptable, however complex, however unobservable their referents. Some-
Uo
tiaes paraphrase
-will nevertheless involve analysing predicates, not
because the theory requires it but because the paraphraser finds it
perspicuous to do so, and these predicate-pairs are not to be consi-
dered synonymous# Indeed, two paraphrases of one English sentence may
exhibit wide differences with respect to analysis (or "translation”)
of predicates# Stimulus synonyuy of general terms, even within English,
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is likely to be "too loose" to individuate finely enough# How, then,
can they be compared with each other and with the paraphrased sentence ?
To this question, as well as to the one about comparison of
paraphrases and paraphrased sentences generally, the answer is that it
all depends on the purposes of the paraphraser# It is assumed that the
paraphraser is also the utterer of the English sentence which is being
27
paraphrased# This is at least the "paradigm case”# He knows what he
means, and he knows if the paraphrase resolves difficulties and preserves
what he intends to preserve of the "meaning”# He can compare alternative
paraphrases, and choose between them on the basis of his intentions# He
may be advised by others, and even on occasion persuaded, "but his choice
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is the only one that binds him." Two speakers of English, both engaged
in the regimentation of discourse, van, by "semantic ascent”, make clear
to each other what they are doing, and perhaps why, but, for a given
English sentence, there are no common standards for choosing the para-
phrase of one over that of the other, nor for determining that one para-
phrase — or both, or neither — is a paraphrase of that English sentence#
Quine 1 s argument seems to turn on the acceptability of any pre-
dicates, and the problems that follow from that# He does also mention
that there is no mechanical procedure for determining the equivalence oi
Ul
quantixicational sentences in notation, "no general limit to the length
29
of inquiry that may be required." The more crucial premise appears
to be the dependence of the "survival" or "disappearance" of general
30
terms on the "momentary purposes" of the paraphraser. Comparing sen-
tences in notation involves comparing both their logical forms for
equivalence and their predicates for synonymy. However, this test for
"structural synonymy" mistakenly emphasizes predicates, because, in reed-
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mentation, their choice is "wholly casual".
He rejects, as we have seen, altering this state of affairs by-
formalizing a vocabulary of science. Regimentation is not system build-
ing in the Camapian manner. Quine* s arguments against the usefulness
of formalized languages for analyzing analyticity apply here. He char-
acterizes the specification of only certain predicates as acceptable in
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notational paraphrases as "arbitrarily assembled groundwork". One
cannot expect to delineate "the true and ultimate structure of reality",
the expressed task of regimentation, from such a base.
Once we grant that all predicates are acceptable, we are up
against the problems raised by the principle of indeterminacy when we
try to match them. Paraphrase is a kind of translation, after all, and,
beyond stimulus meaning, which will fail to distinguish sufficiently in
many cases, there are no satisfactory criteria for "meaning the same".
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Without drawing explicitly on the conclusions of Chapter II, Quine
repeatedly denies synonymy claims and proposes the criterion of the para-
phraser* s purposes.
The question that arises is how "purposes" can be specified and
compared. It is hard to believe that Quine is sketching a state of affairs
U2
in which individual philosophers, with idiosyncratic purposes, regiment
ordinary language for the sake of expressing an "ultimately true" world
view, not measurable against anyone else’ 3. This would be absurd. Indeed,
and more reasonably, in his discussions of particular explications in
matneraatics, the "purposes" are spoken of as ccmmon purposes/ Anyone
interested in certain problems is interested in certain devices or lo-
cations, which are generally agreed to serve particular purposes with
respect to the problems in question. The "purposes" are thus given,
in the context of the device and the field of discourse. Regimentation
is the procedure by which one redefines the device ao that it serves
its purpose more clearly and effectively. Explication will be discussed
next, and these features will come out in some detail.
322 can be viewed as a sustained, and even virtuoso,
effort uo interpret scientific discourse within the framework of an
n A „ 35
"austerely" extensianal logic. If it now turns out — and it seems
to be far from hidden in Quine* s exposition — that "purpose" and "func-
tion" are fundamental notions, has he not built unquestionably nonex—
tensional concepts into the foundation of his extensional superstructure?
And if there are good reasons for using these concepts as fundamental,
why can they not be used with equal effect in translation? These questions
will ccsne up again in later sections.
Seme paraphrases achieved by regimentation have the status of "ex-
plications". Explication is often held to be the fundamental task of
philosophical analysis. It is the clarification of an important, but
ambiguous or otherwise troubling, expression by reformulation. How is the
reformulated expression, the explication, related to the original expres-
to
sion?
We do not claim synonymy. We do not claim
to make clear and explicit what the users
of the unclear expression had unconsciouslyin
“t
1** a*^ along* Wq do not expose hidden
meanings, as the words Analysis* and *ex-
piication’ would suggest) we supply lacks.
We ilx the particular functions of the
unclear expression that make it worth
troubling about, and then devise a substi-
tute, clear and couched in terms to our
liking, that fills those functions. Beyond
those conditions of partial agreement/
dictated by our interests and purposes, any
traits of the explicans come under the head
of "don’t cares". 36
Note that determining the functions of the expression "that make it
worth troubling about" is one step in this procedure, and that "devisfing]
a substitute. . .that fills those functions", and (implicitly) deter-
mining that the substitute fills the functions, is another step. There
.
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is no "uniquely right" explication — here is Quine as relativist
again — but iu is clear in this section that there are standards for
being an explication of a given expression. "Explication is elimination
38
but not a-J. elimination is explication*" The former, because explica-
tion always eliminates seme unclear features of an expression! the
latter, because some pruning may disqualify the expression from serving
the function for the sake of which it was cleaned up. Elimination is
explication "just in case the new channels parallel the old ones suffi-
ciently for there to be a striking if partial parallelism of function
between the old troublesome form of expression and some form of expres—
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sion figuring in the new method."
Quine recognized this requirement well enough in "Two Dogmas,"
although it is expressed there in terms of "contexts" of the use of an
an expression* But the
expression rather than of "functions" of
function of an expwaaion is its use in seme contorts, so this dif-
ference of terminology is not important, 'Shat is significant is that
explicate* is mentioned in "Two Dogmas" as a kind of definition, and
the point Quine rents to make about all definitions, except stipulative
defmitions-bjr-fiat, in that essay is that they rest "on prior relations
oi synanyuy." For explications, the prior synonymy is between contexts!
Any vrord worth explicating has some con-
texts which
, as wholes , are clear and pre-
cise enough to be useful$ and the purpose
of explication is to preserve the usage of
these favored contexts while sharpening the
usage of other contexts* In order that a
given definition be suitable for purposes
of explication, therefore, what is required
i3 not that the definiendum in its ante-
cedent usage be synonymous with the defin-
iens, but just that each of these favored
contexts of the definiendum, taken as a
whole in its antecedent usage, be synonymous
with the corresponding context of the defin-
iens* Ul
:L°£d and jojoct, Quine insists that explicata are not synonymous with
their explicanda a and he does not mention "contexts" of the expressions
at all* However, there i3 a germ, in the similarity between the dis-
cussions of explication in both works, of a theory of sameness of mean-
ing which rests on sameness of function or purpose (however that may be
measured)*
It might be useful to go from this abstract discussion to a con-
crete illustration of explication* We will consider Russell *s theory of
definite descriptions, "that paradigm of philosophy," according to Ramsey,
and then Quine 1 s extension of it, the elimination of all names and sin-
gular terms* We will be interested in seeing what the salient features of
Wilts the«y are, and In trying to see .hich .options are central
ana which fortuitous. With respect to Quine, we will raise the question
Of the extent to which his "extension” of Russell’s theory is a signi-
fieant modification of it, and how the program of regimentation looks
in the light of the consequences of this example of regis^ntation.
B. Two Examples of Explication* Russell and Quine
Russell's treatment of uniquely denoting phrases can be readily
seen as an explication by Quine’s standards. Russell has "fix[ed] on the
particular functions of the unclear expression that Fake it worth
troubling about” ; he has eliminated sane features and preserved others.
The substitute expression serves the desired functions of a uniquely-
denoting phrase while avoiding the problems which Russell wished to
avoid. When we come to Quine's modification of the theory of definite
descriptions, we shall see that among the undesirable features far him
is a distinction which Russell particularly wished to preserve, in such
details are the different purposes of philosophers made manifest.
Russell wants denoting phrases in propositions to be meaningful,
whether or not there 13 anything in the physical world which is actually
denoted by them, because he believes that much of our "knowledge about"
kz
things is expressed in this form. He also wants to keep the distinction
between such "knowledge about” and knowledge by acquaintance which, for
him, entails preserving the distinction between descriptive ohrases and
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proper names. Russell alms to selectively define " 'the* in the singu-
lar.” Indeed, this aim has been taken by some, for example, G.E. Moore,
as the sole purpose of the theory of descriptions, but this seems too
narrow because Russell demonstrates the same technique with respect to
indefinite descriptions* Descriptive phrases beginning with ’the*
rather than »a» are more likely to deceive, according to Russell, but
’the 1 phrases differ fron ’a* phrases only in implying uniqueness^ and
he is more seriously concerned with existence than with uniqueness*
-ax purpose of Russell’s analysis is the closing of truth-
value gaps. Every proposition expressed by a sentence containing a
uniquely denoting phrase is either true or false. Strawson’s criticism
of this feature of the theory is based on the supposed fact that in or-
dinary conversation we take certain statements containing descriptions
1|8
to be "neither true nor false"* This may be, but Russell sees the
closing of truth-value gaps as a "great advantage" not as a reproduc-
tion of the vagaries of ordinary language* From the viewpoint of the
logical simplification of the analysis of language, it certainly is an
$0
advantage* Of course, from Strawson’s point of view, simplification
is a mistaken goal* Fundamental differences of approach are at issue here*
Russell wants to avoid attributing significance to a denoting
phrase as a unit in isolation, that is, apart from the meanings of the
constituent words of the phrase and apart from the meaning of the whole
proposition* He believes that the meaning of the phrase as a whole can
$
1
only be its denotation* The argument runs as follows* The meaning of
the denoting phrase is the meaning of its denotation* If ’the author of
Waverley ’ denotes, it denotes a person. In this case named Scott* The
meaning of the denoting phrase is, therefore, the meaning of ’Scott*,
and the meaning of ’Scott*, according to Russell’s doctrine of proper
names (see below), is the man Scott*
hi
If the phrase does in fact denote something existent, then the
sentence ’Scott is the author of Waverley ’ is reduced to a trivial
statement of identity, ’Scott is Scott,’ which Russell says is "plainly
different" from the first sentence. What he seems to mean by "plainly
different" is that the former sentence conveys information (i.e., there
were people who knew of Scott and who knew Waverley and who did not
knew the fact expressed in the sentence because the work was pseudony-
raously published) while the latter is a tautology. This is really an il-
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lus oration o_ the inadequacy of a denotational theory of meaning, but
Russell does not see the problem that way because of his theory of proper
names. If the phrase does denote, and if its meaning is its denotation,
then taking it as independently significant changes the meaning of the
sentence as a whole.
If, on the other hand, the phrase do©3 not denote anything exist-
ent (e.g., 'the round square*), then there is a fatal metaphysical tempta-
tion to posit "subsistent" or "nonexistent" entities which Russell wants
to avoid at all costs in the interest of "that feeling for reality which
ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies." "There is only
&
one world, the ’real' world."
To preserve the meaningfulness of the whole proposition while
denying meaningfulness to the denoting phrase in isolation, Russell
shows that in a "rightly analyzed" proposition of this type the denoting
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phrase disappears, or rather appears "broken up" in a "fully expressed
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proposition". In Principia Mathematica , in sceaewhat different terms,
he "proves" that descriptive phrases are "incomplete symbols" which
57
have meaning only in use, in context. The logical apparatus which al—
U8
lows him to do this includes variables, propositional functions, and
quantification. Variables stand for entities nameable by proper nanes.
Propositional functions "define the property that makes a thing a so-
and-eo." The distinction between what Russell means by a "proper name"
and a descriptive phrase is crucial.
Although, in practice, "almost all uses of what look like proper
59
names" are "abbreviated description [s]", the distinction is important
in principle. A proper name has meaning "by itself, without the need of
60
any context. " A proper name "directly designates an individual which
61
is its meaning." The individual so named is a "constituent" of the
fact or proposition expressed by the sentence in which the name appears
62
as subject. A proper name cannot appear meaningfully as subject in the
sentence 1 exists 1 because, if it is a name, it must name something,
63
something which is. It is because none of these statements are true
of descriptions that descriptions, unlike proper names, depend on their
context for their meaning and do not necessarily denote anything. It
is curious that Russell wants to maintain that there are proper names,
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in his sense, when they are admittedly so elusive and rare. The examples
he uses, Socrates' and *Scott*, are not real proper names at all. All
that concerns us here, however, is that he does maintain this distinction
in all formulations of the theory, and that we may accept it as import-
ant for him.
Russell has no doubts on the score of the meaningfUlness of single
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words.
In the proposition ’I met a unicorn,* the whole
four words together make a significant proposi-
tion, and the word * unicorn* by itself is sig-
nil leant, in Just the same sense as the
word ’man’* 66
*1 met a unicorn*. . .is a perfectly
significant assertion, if we know what
it would be to be a unicorn. • • i.e.,
what is the definition of [a unicornJ • 67
He passes, without stopping to explain or justify, from the apparent-
name subjects in descriptive phrases (e.g., ‘father*, ’author’) to
verb-phrase propositional functions (e.g., *hegat», ’wrote 1 ) on the
basis of his unquestioning understanding of the meanings of single words*
Moore, in commenting on and generally approving of Russell’s analysis
of descriptive phrases, comes up with an incredibly trivial objection,
namely that an author need not have written a work since he might have
composed it within an oral tradition i Moore suggests that an author
is one who has "invented or composed [the workl without the collabora-
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tion of any other person” subject to seme other conditions. After
pages and pages of this, Moore grants that this is not an argument
against Russell’s theory since this point (i.e., the adequacy of the
propositional function chosen in that example) is ”no part of the
69
theory.” Moore might have questioned the validity of tire procedure
in general, but he does not. In the remainder of his essay, using the
’King of France’ example, Moore does not bother to "translate” the sub-
70
ject-term but uses ’is a king of France’ as the propositional function*
71
Russell does the same with this example but "translates” his other
72
examples.
As for the analysis itself, for an example where something is
predicated of the presumed referent of a uniquely denoting phrase.
Russell offers an existentially quantified conjunction such that, if
50
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any conjunct is false* the proposition is false. In its ordirary-
language formulation, for *The author of Waverley was Scotch, 9 it looks
like this %
(1) at least one person wrote Waverley g
(2) at most one person wrote Waverlsyg
(3) whoever wrote Waverley Ws^cotch. 7h
More formally,
w f {(1x)(<f>x)] (3c)ifx, ^x S 8 ife Df " 75
or, in Maemi-ordinary" language.
There is one entity such that 9 semething is
_
* if
and only if that * something* is the entity, and the
entity is (also)
The descriptive phrase, in words or notation, has indeed been analyzed
out and no longer appears. The existential assumption in the correct
use of a definite description stands revealed.
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Strawson® s criticism of Russell, to the effect that a proposi-
tion containing a non-denoting phrase is not false but neither true nor
false, rests on his refusal to acknowledge that the implicit existential
assumption is binding in all such statements* Strawson 3 s position is that
if one does not explicitly assert the existential part of such a state-
ment, existence is not being asserted, even though it is presupposed,
77 78
"implied99 (in an "odd", ncnlogical sense), "signalled" fcy the ut-
terance of a sentence containing a denoting phrase* Strawson grants that
the utterance of such a sentence is "evidence" for the speaker* s belief
in the existence of the denotaturai it "shows but does not state" that
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the speaker thinks the "existential conditions" are fulfilled.
Now it is literally true that what is not audibly and explicitly
asserted is not an audible and explicit part of the utterance. But there
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is a sense in which we mean more than what we say: the sense in which
we stand ready to respond to queries and challenges to our utterances,
to clarify, to act on, to elaborate. This is the sense in which what
is implied or assumed is also asserted even if it is not audibly-
uttered. However, althougi many of the examples Strawson gives are
subject to this analysis, there are undoubtedly sentences which are
not. One is reminded that explication is not the repixxiaction of or-
dinary language in a different fonn, nor the supplying of "hidden
meanings", but it i3 a reconstructi or. of an expression, preserving its
useful functions and eliminating its problems.
Does it natter to Russell 1 s theory what is substituted for the
'4* : in the propositional function *4>x* ? In most of the exanples he
has chosen, this is not a problem, pace Moore. However, he writes as
if one should normally transform what appears to be a name in the de-
noting phrase into a propositional function (or conjunction of proposi-
tional functions) by selecting the relevant property or properties and
expressing it in verbal or adjectival form. This is what he usually
does. ’I met a man* is translated as " *1 met x, and x is human* is not
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always false."
Thus when we say *x was the father of Charles
II' we not only assert tKat x had a certain
relation to Charles TT, but also that nothing
else had this relation. The relation in ques-
tion. • .is expressed by *x begat Charles II* • 82
Russell assumes that the analyzed sentence is equivalent in meaning to
the preanalyzed sentence. Moore is right in saying that these transla-
tions of apparent-names into predicates are not part of the theory.
Russell offers no guidance on how one should go about selecting defining
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properties, but he takes it for granted that it can be done.
It is interesting that Russell left the ’King of France' example
^transformed, substituting for the
'f ' in this case 'is-King of
France', because a more complicated propositional function is involved
here than in the other examples ho uses. Re may have
-wanted not to get
embroiled. Consider the contrast between it and his other examples i
^i) 'Author' may be dofined as one -who tribes (or composes)
books.
(2) He is the author of x but he did not write x.
(3) 'Father* may be defined as one who is male and has be-
gotten a child.
(li) He is the father of x but he did not beget x.
(5 ) 'King' nay be defined as one who is a king.
(6) He is the king of France but he is not the king of France.
As the 'King of France* example has been treated, (6) is self-contra-
dictory as are (2) and (U). However, only (6) is purely logically self-
contradictory. The other examples depend on a relation of synonyny be-
tween the predicates and the apparent-names. Russell had no misgivings
about synonymy in principle, and, in any event, (l) and (3) are reason-
ably acceptable definitions in English. What would be the defining pro-
perty of being a king?
(7) 'King* may be defined as one who is male and rules a
state.
(8) He is the King of France but he does not rule France.
We can see from (8) that this is not an example that lends itself to ana-
lytic statements. Semeone may be king in name only, a figurehead} some-
one may be king but in exile} someone may be king and refuse to perform
his functions.
And yet merely being called 'king of France* will not do. It
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would be simple to make false statements true and true ones false if
that were allowed. ’The World’s Best Bakery* may be, for advertising
purposes, a good choice of name, but " ’The World’s Best Bakery* is
not the world's best bakery” is not self-contradictory. Similarly, the
most power'ful man in Washington is not likely to be called that, but
may be called ’Assistant Secretary 3 or 'Boss So-and-so 3 . To move from
denoting phrase to propositional function on the basis of x being
caUed whatever the words of the denoting phrase are is to treat the
denoting phrase as a name, as a mentioned, not used, tem, within quo-
04
tation marks. As Russell puts it, a denoting phrase within quotation
8c;
marks ”is merely part of the symbolism by which we express our thought."
He goes on to assert, "What we want to express is something which might
(101 example) be translated into a foreign language) it is something for
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which the actual words are a vehicle, but of which they are no part."
This translatable "something" is commonly called a proposition.
To admit propositions is to grant translatability, because propositions
are meanings which are not tied to a particular language. One may choose
to retain the wording of the denoting phrase in moving to a proposi-
tional function (e.g.
,
from ’the king of France* to ’is-king of France’),
but the theory neither requires it nor favors it. Russell's epistemology
does favor translation into relatively simple predicates, but this is
separable. What cannot be as easily removed from consideration is that
admitting propositions entails adnitting raeanings and sameness of meaning.
The sentence explicated by Russell's analysis means the same as the un-
explicated sentence (with its assumptions spelled out) because they both
express the same proposition. It will be important, in comparing Russell
with Quine, to remember that the former but not the latter assumes
that criteria exist for synonymy and uses the concept in his analysis.
Russell has explicated descriptive phrases by analyzing them out
in favor of quantifiers, predicate letters, variables, and identity,
while retaining the desired functions of those phrases in propositions.
He has shown that descriptive phrases always have meaning in context,
even in cases where they do not in fact denote anything* By making the
implicit existential assumption explicit, and separating it from the
meaning-in-context of the descriptive phrase, Russell has also achieved
the not quite incidental advantage of making all such statements either
true or false and eliminating previous truth-value gaps.
-
.
87
second stage of what Quine does is, with only minor notation—
al variations, the same as what Russell has done: he shows that sinpu-
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lar descriptions are eliminable. However, in the stage preliminary to
this Russellian maneuver, Quine shows that all singular terms are eli-
minable in favor of singular descriptions, or, as he puts it, can be
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Mreparsedn as singular descriptions* This is a step that Russell de-
cidedly did not want to take, since he wanted to preserve the name/
description distinction*
Before we take up Quine’s motives and justification for this move,
we should notice just how vast is the scope of this particular act of
regimentation* Quine is not merely explicating those phrases which have
the form of descriptions, definite and indefinite, as Russell is. His
is a sweeping regimentation of the entire referential apparatus of a
language. Henceforth, we have only to deal with general terras — predi-
&
cates —
-which are "true of” whatever entities we allow as referents
of bound variables, plus variables, quantifiers, identity, and truth-
functions. If an terras are general terras, one can adult, without
qualws, any words to terrahood and "safe” predicate position. We are
only comnitted to the assertion of the existence of an entity when we
allow it to be designated by a variable. One cannot avoid quoting
Quine *s^famous mot at least once, "To be is to be the value of a vari-
able."
Just because this reform is so vast, it is doubtful that one
should call it an explication, comparable to the explication, far
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example, of * ordered pair*. It would be hard to ask if the explication
fulfills the function far which the explicandum was considered worthy
of attention. Quine is dealing here with the referring and predicating
functions of expressions in a language, and these are functions of very
high generality. One can inquire whether, with the materials Quine as-
sembles, it is still possible to predicate something of a unique indi-
vidual, to assert or deny the existence of an individual with a particu-
lar set of properties, and so on. It is difficult to frame the questions
generally enough, and difficult not to fall into expressing them in
post-regimentation terns. Is there anything the reformed referential-
predicative apparatus does not let us say which we could have said before,
with the exception of just those ways of speaking which Quine wants to
avoid? Perhaps this can be more meaningfully discussed after an exposi-
tion of Quine* s procedure and reasons, and perhaps we can then give
mare substance to what Quine means by the "function" of an expression.
Singular terms have the troublesome feature, for Quine as for
%
Russell, that they "always purport to name an object, but Tare] power-
92less to guarantee that the alleged object be forthcoming. * like
Russell, Quine rejects positing special entities, existing otherwise
than physically, to stand for the objects named* In "On TRfhat There Is,”
93he does this partly in a spirit of aesthetic fastidiousness* In Methods
•2£ almost in Russell’s words, he rejects "existence in nytho-
logy” as a way of preserving the namehood of Cerberus:
afyths are literally false, and it is sheer
obscurantism to phrase the matter other-
vdse* There is really only one world, and
there is not, never was, and never will be
any such thing as Cerberus. 9U
But whereas Russell is content to deal with singular descriptive phrases,
including scow names which he, on grounds which are seldom mentioned but
which involve his philosophy of ’’logically proper names”, recognises as
9$
"abbreviated descriptions", Quine oasts his net wider and finds that
the same difficulty attends all singular terms* He includes all apparent
96 * 97
names, algebraic (i*e*, combinatory) singular terms (’x plus y’),
98
demonstrative singular terms (’this apple’), descriptions in forms
99
quite different from ’the ...* and *a •*•’ phrases, and even class-
100
names, attribute-names, and relation-names*
Pundamientally, the difficulty is that whether or not there is an
object named by a singular term "cannot be systematically spotted by
101
notational form*" If there is no such object in a particular case,
one’s statements purportedly referring to it and predicating things of
it are meaningless, and to say that it does not exist involves one in
the Parmenidean self-contradiction with which Plato struggled in the
Sophist* Quine succinctly states the problem in Mathematical Logic :
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To say that something does not exist* or that
there is something which is not* is clearly a
contradiction in teisnsj hence * (x) (x exists)*
must be true. 102
Russell writes that 3 x exists* is meaningless* \jy which I take him to
mean empty* giving no informaticn* which amounts to the same thing in
that context. If graiaaatical namehood alone qualifies a term to
stand in the place of *x** then all sorts of things have a claim on
10U
existence* and Russell’s "robust sense of reality1* would be rendered
anemic. What exists is a matter of fact and not of grammar. To allow
.some terms the status of names — which is Russell’s way — depends on
being able to recognize which apparent names really name. Subjecting all
singular terms to the same treatment that Russell devised for singular
descriptions :,is a way of maintaining control over questions of voca-
105
bulary independently of questions of fact."
Before departing from Russell in sweeping away all singular
terms* Quine considers an "impractical sort of reform" which "recalls*
if only in caricature* Russell’s early philosophy of proper names and
descriptions." One might keep as singular terms only those words learned
as single words "through the primitive kind of conditioning that ante-
106
dated the learning of compound singular terms." This means retaining
a special category for those "few hypothetical" "names which we may be
107
supposed to have learned by direct confrontation with name and object."
This is "impractical" indeed because we don’t remember which words we
learned by ostens!on* and because the set of such words would be differ-
ent for each speaker of a language. It would be a small, dubiously in-
stantiated* purely subjective category* and there is not even much
reason to suppose that keeping it would clarify the problems attending
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singular terms* Evan ’mama
’ * if x’s ’mams* no longer lives*
-would not
avoid confusion in singular term position in a sentence uttered at the
present time*
Quine *s conclusion* therefore* is that the category of singular
terms is an unnecessary one* It creates setae problems: deciding which
words belong to it* and it does not solve any* It Is* furthermore
* tied
to a particular theory of knowledge. The advantages of analyzing out
singular descriptions can be extended to all singular terms "tfthout
108
prejudice to epistemology or ontology." This move is "at the level
strictly of logical grammar*" a decision an which categories to a&ait
to the regimented language, and it is a decision in favor of "the pri-
109
macy of predicates"* No entities are eliminated by this move* but
entities become not "things which names name" but "things which predi-
110
cates are true of*" in some casesuniquely*
General terms and singular terms "are properly to be distin-
1
n
guished" by their "contrasting roles" in predication* In pre-
reginiented logical grammar* ’Socrates is a man* would be represented
by ’Fa** where *a* stands for a singular term ’Socrates 1 * and 'F 3
stands for a general term ’man 3 * For purposes of predication* *F* may
have the form in English of a verb phrase (’drinks hemlock’ ) or an
112
adjectival phrase (’is snub-nosed') as well as that of a general noun*
113
’Is 3 or 3 is a* may be regarded as a predicate-forming prefix* In the
course of showing that all singular teiros can be reclassified as gener-
al terras* with general term roles in predication* Quine is more ex-
plicit about what is, in effect* a reinterpretation of ’is'. ’Is* or
111
®—
' remains "a separate relative term" only between variables j other—
$9
wise, it acts as a predicate-forming prefix to a general term# The
general term thus formed contains ‘is* as an "indissoluble” part, as
in 'is-snub-nosed' or even ’is-Socrates'. The effect of this i3 to
combine 'is* or »= * with a general term or a singular term to form a
new general term.
There are two important consequences of this reinterpretation.
The f~rst is bhe elimination of the need to deal separately with singu-
lar terms. By the "theorem of ccnfinability" a singular term can be
confined to the context * - a* in which it is merely a part of an in-
dissoluble" general term which functions as a predicate rather than as
a name. The second is the rejection of the notion that "translation" is
necessary to cany a singular term into a general tom. Superficial
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grammatical considerations are irrelevant. In parsing English, we
would not consider 'is-Socrates' a predicate, but it is a predicate in
the regimented grarmar because it occupies predicate place in a sen-
tence, according to the reparsing effected by regimentation. Episte-
mological considerations are irrelevant. How we could know that it is
true or false to predicate 'is-Socrates* of an x is beside the point.
We might turn our attention to this problem in the course of another
kind of inquiry, but it need not concern us here. For Russell’s theory,
translation of apparent names into predL cates was, as we have seen, if
not forced, then at least strongly suggested by the theory of knoriedge
mixed in with the theory of descriptions. Quine deliberately rejects this.
This second consequence — the casting aside of "translation" —
is obviously of considerable importance to an inquiry into regimentation,
particularly one which seeks to relate regimentation to iraietermnacy
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of translation. This is the point on which Quine has altered the word-
ing of his exposition and the manner of presentation more from source
to source than any other. In "On What There Is" (191+8) Quine suggests
coining predicate-words where convenient.
In order thus to subsume a one-word name or alleged
name such as •Pegasus* under Russell’s theory of
description, we must, of course, be able first to
translate the word into a description. But this is
no real restriction. If the notion of Pegasus had
been so obscure or so basic a one that no pat
translation into a descriptive phrase had offered
itself along familiar lines, we could still have
availed ourselves of the following artificial
and trivial-seeming devices we could have appealed
to the ex hypothesi unanalysable, irreducible
attribute of being Pegasus , adopting, for its ex-
pression, t|ie verb * is-Pegasus *
,
or ’pegasizes*.
The noun 1 Pegasus* itself could then be treated
as derivative, and identified after all with a
description; ’the thing that is-Pegasus', ’the
thing that pegasizes*. 117
Two lines of criticism follow from this, for which Quine’s own
text can be cited, and which lead to conclusions unacceptable to him.
One is that the statement resulting from reparsing singular terms as
descriptions and then eliminating the descriptions must be "cognitively
synonymous" with the original statement, and that Quine’s rejection
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of synonymy undermines his own program of regimentation. Quine
writes in this essay, in approval of Bussell’s contextual definition,
"No unified expression is offered as an analysis of the descriptive
phrase, but the statement as a whole which was the context of that
^
phrase still gets its full quota of meaning — whether true or false.
"
If we look at the underlined phrase, we can see that it appears to be
out of line with Quine’s standards for "explication" which we outlined
120
The claim that post- and pre-regimented sentences areearlier.
61
synonymous is repeatedly rejected in Wwd and Object. "Pull quota of
meaning" is not the clearest expression Quine could have used had he
wanted to refer to synonymy between statements. Possibly significance,
not synonymy, is the intended concept, and yet significance i3 not a
121
matter of degree, at least not for Quine. The words "full quota"
suggest that the regimented statement does not mean less than the ori-
ginal, which leads one to an interpretation that the regimented state-
ment means the same as (is cognitively synonymous with) the original
because we do not operate with concepts of more or less meaning, but
with concepts of 3ame and different.
Note, however, the curious tag end of the quoted sentence,
"—whether true or false." The hyphen is ambiguous here. If it were a
comma instead, we could clearly read that both true and false state-
ments still get their full quota of meaning. This way, it is possible
to interpret the whole sentence as asserting that, under the program
of the elimination of descriptions, true statements come out true and
false statements false. This interpretation would seem more in keeping
with Quine's allergy to synonyny, although it is a very weak justifica-
tion for contextual definition since ary true statement and any false
statement would serve to fulfill the condition. Quine's position on
synonymy undoubtedly hardened after "On What There Is" so we need not
expect complete consistency. It is at least plausible to interpret this
formulation of the elimination of singular terms as resting cm cognitive
synonymy between statements. Both Quine* s close juxtaposition of Rus-
sell's program with his own, and his ambiguous language, encourage the
interpretstion.
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The second criticism focuses on the choice of ’pegasizes* as
tho ‘artificial and trivial-seeming device: . •
.[appeal! to the ex
unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of being Pegasus.
"
This choice of words led Quine into a dialogue with his imaginary
debating partners, McX and Wyman, in the pages of the essay itself,
where he denies that the selection of the coined predicate commits him
to recognize the existence of a corresponding attribute, meaning, or
other sort of uni-wersal. He undoubtedly wanted to argue these points
,
and coined the predicate because it raises predictable objections.
However, from the point of view of the program of eliminating singular
terms, it was probably unwise to raise the spectre of appearing to in-
121*
troduce an "undefined property terra”. ’Pegasizes* stands on uncer-
tain middle ground between a translated predicate such as *wrote Waver-
ley * and a name made a predicate solely by being in predicate form and
position 3uch as ' i3-£ocrates 5 . ’Is-Pegasus' is introduced as an alter-
native to *pegasi2es' from the start, but critics and canmentators have
usually referred to the more colorful of the predicates, and sometimes
to the issues apparently associated with it.
3h Methods of Logic (195>0) coined predicates are abandoned, and
the futility of a standard of synonymy is expressed but not lengthily
argued.
Whether a proposed deduction is to enjoy the be-
nefits of a descriptional premiss depends, evi-
dently, on whether a given singular terra can
fairly be translated into the form of a descrip-
tion. Now fairness of translation is a vague
matter, hinging as it does on the concept of
synonymy which was so dimly regarded irjpara.J 33«
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[from para. 33] Perhaps it will even be found
tnat of [ significance and synonymy] only sig-
niiicance admits of a satisfactory criterion.
ano, that all effort to make sense of * synonymy’
imist be abandoned along with the notion" of
meaning.
Given any singular term of ordinary language,
• • . the proper choice of »F» for" translation
of the term into ' ('f x)Fx ? need in practice
never detain us. If a pat translation such as
\ f x)(x wrote Uaverley ) * lies ready to hand,
very well; if not, we need not hesitate to ad-
mit a version of the type of 1 (1 x)(x is-Soc-
rates )’. • • since any less lame version would,
if admissible as a translation a_t all, differ
at moat in expository value and not in meaning. 125
One would think that Quine's conclusion should be that since "fairness
of translation" does rest on synonymy, and since synonymy lacks de-
fining criteria, the attempt at translation should be given up alto-
gether. And yet, if there is a "pat translation", "very well". Strange-
ly enough, Quine selects 'wrote Waverley ' as an example, ignoring
Moore's quibble over just this translation. If there are no satisfac-
tory standards for sameness of meaning, what makes a translation "pat"?
Leaving this aside, and looking at the underlined phrase, what is
even more curious is that Quine appears to justify predicates of the
' is-Socrates ! type on grounds of synonymy i The argument runs as fol-
lows:
(1) 'Socrates* is a singular term 'a' which we want to transform
into a descriptional phrase '(1 x)?x*.
(2) 'Athenian philosopher who drank hemlock' is suggested as a
choice for *F» which "translates" 'Socrates' into a predicate.
(3) 'is-Socrates' is suggested as a ("lame") choice for 'F*
which takes the singular term and joins it to a copula,
forming a predicate.
(U) The predicate suggested in (2) is acceptable as a translation
of 'being Socrates* if and only if it is taken to mean the
same as 'Socrates' and to be substitutable (no conditions
specified) for 'Socrates' in *x is Socrates'.
G) The predicate suggested in (3 ) clearly fulfills the condi-
tions of (.4), an the grounds that (x)(x - x).
(6 ) If the predicate suggested, in (2) is accepted as a translation,
cuen it, means the same as the predicate suggested in (3 )because of the transitivity of identity.
The best that a suggested predicate can do is to mean the same as the
singular term it is intended to translate. It cannot possibly mean as
midi the same (to be deliberately paradoxical) as a predicate using the
exact word(s) of the singular term. The latter kind of predicate is sv-
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nonymous on any criterion of synonyny.
The "less lame version. . . differ[s] at most in expository
valtfe. • • •" That is, a translated predicate gives information that a
particular singular term means the same as a particular description.
Identity is seen in this passage as the limiting case of synonymy, but
no one would claim that ” 'Socrates* means the same as 'Socrates' "
has any expository value. However, whatever information is conveyed by
a translated predicate is irrelevant) the predicate is acceptable to
the extent to which it "means the same” as the singular term. One might
expect Quine to conclude that the "lame" predicate is preferable to the
"less lame", on grounds of equivalence, and because his program is not
tied to a theory of knowledge for which "expository value" is wanted.
However, he is only arguing for the acceptability of these predicates
despite their artificiality.
In Word and Object (i960 ) the 'is- ' type of predicate is not
a second-best, but has become the model for taking a singular terra into
a predicate. Starting with the case where the singular term is in "purely
127
referential position", Quine shows that, by substitutivity of identity
and a few moves in elementary quantification logic, a sentence containing
6$
a singular term is equivalent to a sentence of the form
w 128U X vX - a and . . .x. . •)». The singular tern appears only
as a^whlch, "taken as a whole lsjln effect a predicate, or general
term.” Quine shows that nan-referential occurrences of a singular
term can be so paraphrased to be acoorrsnodated to the same procedure.
These paraphrases involve placing the singular term in referential
position at least "with respect to its immediately containing sentence."
We will stay with the simple case because it illustrates the non-
translation of singular terms as well as any other.
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A singular term can be transformed into a general term without
verbal translation because it can be moved into predicate position
according to permissible transformations of the logic. Quine speaks of
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"manoeuvering" or "getting it down to" predicate position. That thi3
can be done, and that doing it removes the problems of reference and
existence attendant upon singular terms, justifies the procedure. How-
ever, Quine does not suggest an indiscriminate use of the elimination
of singular terms in this way.
On the contrary, we suddenly find ourselves face to face with
the "purposes of the paraphraser" as Quine reminds us that "on pain
of introducing new problems of analysis of general terras” we should
limit the reparsing of singular terras "to those singular teims that
132
have no internal structure we care to perpetuate. " Which terms these
are is "purely relative to varying projects in hand", "the particular
needs of the argument or investigation that we may imagine ourselves
133
engaged in." In other words, we should move a singular term ‘a' into
the position a’ only if we are not interested in the meaning of the
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term, however complex it may be. Such a singular term is "simple-,
because we choose to deal with it as an unanalyzed whole, and Quine
rather mischievously suggests calling it a ’’name’', in the sense of a
proper name, whoce^meaning in natural language we also choose to ignore
for most purposes. If our purpose seems to c all for analysis of
a singular terra into a conjunction or disjunction of general terras,
tnere are of course no guidelines here for going about it. The selec-
tion of particular general terms in such cases will also result in the
elimination of singular terms, according to the same procedure with
respect to quantification and identity, but not with respect to "manoeu-
vering" the singular term into predicate position.
cannot very well ask, 'Well, what is the purpose of a para-
phraser in thi3 project?' because, as was noted above, the scope of
the reform effected here is so wide that innumerable projects can be
carried out within its terras. However, Quine himself attempts to ask
if, in achieving the elimination of the undesirable existence claims
of singular terras by reparsing singular terms as general terns, and
thus restricting referential position to variables, other useful func-
tions of singular terms have been tampered with. His conclusion is that
Directness aside, no losses are sustained.
It can be shorai that everything that used to
be demonstrable or deducible from given pre-
misses when 'Socrates' was manipulated un-
questioningly as a singular term is still
demonstrable or deducible from those same
premisses with the added help of the unique-
ness premiss ’(3 y)(y is Socrates and y only)'
... when 'Socrates' is repareed as a gen-
eral term. 13£
The function of an expression, according to this statement, is its role
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in a deduction. A given expression, regimented with respect to its
singular terms, still performs its function in a deduction if it per-
mits the same and only the sane inferences to be made. An expression
regimented by this procedure Tail not permit false conclusions to be
inferred Tram true premises, nor true conclusions from false premises.
It is the case that the class of statements which exhibit a non-denoting
name j.n referential position will cone out false after regimentation,
whereas they were uneasily neither true nor false previously. "But this
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was a purpose of the re-parsing. ** Thus, one can claim for the eli-
mination^ "simple" singular terms — and it can easily, if tediously,
be shown — that in those cases where the content (or meaning) of
the singular term is irrelevant to the deduction in wliich an expression
containing it appears, Quine* s transformation of singular terms di-
rectly into *i3
-
* predicates does not adversely affect the function
of the containing expression.
Quine deals with an objection that perhaps "the purport of
uniqueness" is part of the meaning of a simple singular terra, a "name".
Quine grants that this "may be conceded to be somewhat intelligible,
whatever its cogency," a rather hack-handed concession, but reminds
those who would press this point that some general terras also "obey
laws that seem accountable to the meanings of the terms and not to con-
139
tingent fact" (cf. the symmetry of ’cousin*). Nothing prevents a
weak implication of uniqueness ("one at moat") from being part of the
"very meaning" of some general terms. Strong uniqueness ("one exactly")
has, for good reasons, been externalised and made fully explicit in
1U0
the formula, '(3y)(x) (x ±s-Socrates if an only if x - y).'
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One wonders why Quine is willing to grant this much in the way
of "meaning” to "names". Singular terms may be treated as "nanEs" and
reparsed as general terms by 'is- * predicates in cases where the
resulting predica tes^are "no more than dummy predicates, blanks in a
sentence diagram. " One can, at increased length but with no logi-
cal losses, transform ‘Socrates’ from singular term to predicate posi-
tion, supplying the existential quantification and the uniqueness
premise, in deducing ’There was a philosopher who drank hemlock in
399 B.C. ‘ from 'Socrates was a philosopher, and he drank hemlock in
399 C. ' The use of what is in ordinary grammar a proper name may
lead us astray here. Of all the range of singular terms and singular
descriptive phrases, we may choose any to transform, treat airy as
'names' in this legislated sense, "that have no internal structure we
1U2
care to perpetuate." Such singular terms can be "systematically
1Ii3
spotted by notational form" after we have chosen them and regimented
the expression accordingly, but not before. W© are not dealing only
with examples like ‘Socrates'. V?e are, however, dealing only with ex-
amples of singular terms whose meaning is not relevant to the argument
in which they appear.
Consider the deduction of 'Someone wrote both Waverley and Ivan-
hoe' from 'The author of Waverley wrote Ivanhoej' an exercise pro-
31*
posed by Quine in Methods of Logic . Not actually to object to as-
serting that an 'author' can be said to have 'written' a work of which
he is the author, it is clear that this deduction depends for its vali-
dity on a meaning-relation between 'author' and 'wrote*. 'The author
of Waverley * cannot be taken into predicate position as 'is-«uthor of
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Saverley ' without changing the function of the sentence in the deduc-
tion from one which establishes the conclusion to one which does not.
One could only deduce ’There is someone who is-the author of Waverley
and who wrote Ivanhoe . *
To sum up Quine’s most recent formulation of the elimination of
singular terms:
(1) All singular terms are eliminable.
a) Some singular terms are eliminated because of the
problens they create.
b) All other singular terms may be eliminated by the
same general procedure for the sake of the simpli-
fication of logical theory and the clarification of
ontological commitment.
(2) ’’Simple" singular terns are trivially eliminable by the
formation of ’is- ’ predicates.
a) Simplicity is relative to the deduction in which the
expression containing a singular term occurs.
b) Singular terms which are not ’’simple" should not be
eliminated via ’is- ’ predicates.
(3) Singular terms which are not "simple" may be eliminated if
the paraphraser finds it perspicuous to do so.
a) How this is to be done, "toe nature of the more minute
analysis", depends entirely on the paraphraser. 1U5
b) "We are reminded once again that paraphrase makes no
synonymy claim." 1U6
Quine has set up a procedure for regimenting a vast class of ex-
pressions in a natural language, and one might agree that the scope of
this procedure is justified by the considerations referred to in (l)b.
However, he disclaims responsibility for that part of toe regimentation
which involves questions of meaning and synonymy. Russell was not much
more satisfactory with respect to predicate translations. He merely took
it for granted that translations could be made and that the analyzed
and pre-analyzed propositions (with respect to a determinate interpre-
tation of questions of existence) meant the same. Quine also assumes
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that there are cases where predicate "translations” vdll be made,
bat he might not even agree that there are limits to ivhat would be
considered a "minute analysis" of a particular general term, although
it seems unreasonable to allow translation "ad libitum". Quine has
no standard within his theory of language for setting Units. H© has
UU8
insisted that the choice of predicates is "wholly casual". All that
he definitely has is stimulus synonymy which, it is quite clear, can-
not even begin to serve the purpose.
We are left with the uneasy situation of a regimenting procedure
with many advantages, but without standards of adequacy for the re-
sulting regimented expressions. In cases where "more minute analysis"
is judged by the paraphraser to be required, one can determine whether
the regimented expression lias the same function in a deduction as the
pre-regimented expression only by understanding the meanings of the
terns in both. There are no grounds far this understanding within the
theory. Furthermore, the paraphraser is in no way constrained by some-
one else’s evaluation of what he has done.
A foggy appreciation of this point is expressed
in saying that there is no dictating another*
s
meaning} but the notion of there being a fixed,
explicable, and as yet unexplained meaning in
the speaker* s mind i3 gratuitous. The real point
is simply that the speaker is the one to judge
whether the substitution of S* for S in the
present context will forward his present or
evolving program of activity to his satisfaction. 1h9
Does the "real point" really provide a sufficient criterion of adequacy
for an activity that purports to clarify language for scientific purposes';'
71
C. The Program of Regimentation Reconsidered
Regimentatiai
,
as presented by Quine* is a technique for moving
from a sentence in a natural language to a formula in a logic with
rather meager resources. The purposes of regimentation are (l) clari-
fying or eliminating ambiguity; (2) making it possible to bring to
bear some of the mechanical advantages of the logic; and (3) simpli-
fying theory by reducing the variety of idioms of natural language to
those few constructions and modes of combination allowable in the logic*
The first purpose is also served, more informally, by piece-
meal paraphrasing within the natural language or with same help from
logic- *f it were not for the other two purposes, full-scale regimen-
tation would not be called for* The second purpose is important al-
though, as Quine points out in "On the Application of Modem Logic,"
we are far from being in the position of physics vis-a-vis mathematics
when we draw on the resources of logic to mechanize deductions* W© are
at such an early stage in the analysis of our concepts that we can use
the resources only of elementary logic* The advantages of more power-
ful logical tools await the refining of our ability to paraphrase sen-
tences. (This can be seen by noticing how simple are the logical oper-
ations used in the notatlonal parts of most philosophical arguments*
)
The third purpose is repeated often enough, but never made as clear as
on© might like. Is the "theory” that is simplified by regimentation
1$0 l£l
logical theory? scientific theory in its most general outlines?
the theory of the referential-predicative part of language? or perhaps
not theory but theoretical language? Are these perhaps not alternatives
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but related to one another?
We have noted earlier that regimentation is not system construc-
tion. Quine rejects system construction largely because of the artifi-
ciality and arbitrary limitations of a system *ith respect to allowable
terms. The situation he envisions is one in which the philosopher
keeps moving between severely regimented language, in which the prin-
ciple of minimum resources prevails, and fairly ordinary language, with
its conceptual untidiness but greater directness and brevity of expres-
sion. This is the stance of Quine’s in which he shows most strongly
the influence of Neurath, whose often-quoted simile about rebuilding
a ship on the open 3ea appears at the beginning of Word and Object.
In the same paragraph in which the simile appears, Neurath writes,
^3 gftbt kein Mittel , urn endgilltig gcsicherte
3aubere rrotokollsdtze sura AusgangBininkt der
Wissenachaften zu machen. Es "gibt keine taHla
rasa. Wie iichiffer sind wir. . • etc * 1$2
* There is no way to produce absolutely un-
adulterated protocol sentences as a point of
departure for the sciences. There is no tabula
rase* W'e are like mariners who must rebuild
their ship on the open sea, without ever being
able to bring it into dock and erect it anew
from the best materials.
Quine adds the commentary, "Our boat stays afloat because at each al-
153
teration we keep the bulk of it intact as a going concern. " With
15U
respect to "theory-building”, "we all must start in the middle."
And, one could add, in a sense we all must stay in the middle. A
closed system, which is what a formalization is, can do as little justice
to hop/ theory relates to the world as an insistence that any departure
from ordinary usage is to be avoided. Neurath writes, "The imprecise
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’conglomerations' [unanalyzed terms from ordinary language] are always
somehow part of the ship. If the imprecision i3 restricted in one
place, it can very well turn up strengthened in another.
"
Regimentation does have systematic consequences, related to
purposes (2) and (3)* However, with respect to (l), clarifying o^
eliminating ambiguity, there is every reason to think that we are en-
titled to consider the results of regimentation one by one, that we
can compare the ambiguous natural language sentences with their clari-
fied counterparts in logical notation, and do so at a sub—systematic
level. Judging a sentence to be ambiguous involves singling it out
from the corpus of sentences of the language. There is no such thing
as an ambiguous language. Quine considers it a distinctive feature of
languages that ”sentences are thought of as conveying meanings sever-
1
!
%
ally." It is proper, therefore, to expect that, in carder to judge
particular applications of regimentation we can match sentences with
formulae, and that not all the formulae which could be offered will be
acceptable. This last point is not as silly as it seems. If any formula
at all were acceptable as a clarification of a given ambiguous sentence,
then "clarification” would trivially be merely the replacement of the
157
sentence by any formula* This is not what we normally mean by clari-
fication* We normally mean that a sentence which was subject to more
than one interpretation has been reformulated, or put in linguistic
or nomlinguistic context, in such a way that it is now subject to only
one interpretation, and that that interpretation is the one intended,
or probably intended, by the speaker or writer*
The Quinian notching of sentences with formulae is one which
7U
rejects a criterion of "meaning the same" in favor of a criterion of
"functions the sane". Both criteria need to be qualified by "in some
contexts" because a sentence would not be a candidate for regimentation
if there were not some problematic contexts to revise or do without
as well as some Important contexts to preserve. The regimented sentence
cannot "mean the same" without qualification because, at the ve*y
least, regimentation eliminates ambiguity. It also cannot "function
the same" without qualification. Quine* s rejection of a criterion of
meaning goes back to the "Two Dogmas" arguments* hecan find no criteria
for "meaning the same" which are both defining and independent of
other undefined concepts.
To function the same in a deduction, two sentences must be in-
ferrable by the same rule of inference from the same premises, and
must permit the same inferences by the same rule of inference. If these
requirements are compatible with two sentences having different (in-
tuitive) meanings, so much the worse for meanings, on Quine's view.
According to the "maxim of the identification of indiscemibles * Ob-
jects indistinguishable from one another within the terms of a given
l£8
discourse should be construed as identical for that discourse.
"
"Function", as a matching and individuating criterion, win result in
quite a different correlation of sentences to sentences, or sentences
to formulae in the logic, than "meaning". However, for Quine, the ad-
vantages all lie on the side of "function" because "function", in this
restricted sense of "• • .in a deduction", is an extensicmal criterion
with an the straightforwardness that "meaning" so notoriously lacks.
Perhaps one should now put a fundamental question to Quine* Why
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is regimentation a good way to clarify ambiguous sentences in a natural
language? Quine's answer might include these points?
(1) What is ordinarily called 'grammar' in a natural language is
inadequate to the task*
(2) Paraphrasing ordinary language sentences into logical nota-
tion yields "a sharp analysis of concepts, a revelation of
fundamental structures" previously undetected} logic can be
a "source of syntactical insights'', 1#>
(3) Sentences paraphrased into logical notation can be handled
by "methodical manipulation. . .according to fixed rules
of algorithm." The advantages of efficiency, speed and
accuracy are similar to those of .achine calculation* 160
(U) Regimentation offers the systematic value of simplicity*
As argued in "Simple Theories of a Complex World," and in
Word and Object
,
the simpler theory, or base, accounts for
more data, establishes more interrelations
,
has a wider
margin for error, and is therefore more reliable than a
less simple tneory. 161
(3) and (U) are, in effect, versions of purposes (2) and (3) of
regimentation* (See above, p« 71* ) bet us grant that these are advan-
tages* (l) i3 an interesting claim* Quine is only one in a long tradi-
tion of analytic philosophers who, without a very careful study of lin-
guistics, conclude that the "logic of language" and the syntax of a
language have almost nothing in common, and may even be at cross-pur-
poses. This tradition, which includes Prege
,
Russell, and Wittgenstein,
takes it as conceded that traditional syntax makes distinctions which
are unimportant to tine logical analysis of language and overlooks dis-
tinctions which are essential to this analysis* One can hardly chastise
these philosophers for their assumptions since grammar in the mold of
matin grammar and its successor, descriptive taxonomic grammar, were
not very promising as tools of logical analysis.
Transformational grammar, on the other hand, decidedly claims
to include in its province the clarification of ambiguity. This rela-
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tively now approach to grammar has appropriated the distinction
between surface, or superficial, and dee£, or underlying, grammatical
structures which philosophers of "logical grammar" have previously
used to demonstrate the insufficiencies of grammatical (taken to mean
surface grammar exclusively) analysis# The deep structures determine
the semantic interpretation of a sentence. In fact, the border between
syntax and semantics is not drawn, and every attempt is made, by
Chomsky at least, to include as much as possible of semantics wit’nin
the territory of syntax. This is done by the use in syntactic analysis
of such categories as ’abstract’, ’human’
, ’animate’, as well as
’transitive’, *pre-adverbial’, etc, each associated with context-
162
limiting rules. If thi3 could be satisfactorily worked out, it
would be a way, within syntax, of accounting for many kinds of aifbl-
guity. It is interesting that Chomsky is trying to include so much
within syntax \ his distrust of ’meaning*, of "unanalyzed semantic in-
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tuition" is not far from Quine’s, and his attempt to rely on the
loh
syntactic component, identified by purely formal features, is per-
haps parallel to QuineVs choice of an extensional logic for the regi-
165
mentation of language.
Whether transformational grammar has the means to clarify all
the ambiguous constructions which are of interest to philosophers re-
mains an open question. It is certainly not yet established, and when
166
Word and Object was written, it was hardly a possibility. On any
account, Quine ha3 opted for a program of clarifying language which
proceeds directly from sentences in natural language to formulae in
I67
logic, and the claim that we have to consider is the cave made in (2)i
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{*) sentences in natural language can be nontrivially transformed
into logical formulae j and (b) this procedure does clarify sentences
of a natural language*
Quin@ s as we know, assumes (a) and is enthusiastic about (b).
Another way of stating this claim is to say that truth-functtonal predi-
cate logic with quantification and identity can be considered a suit-
able, and rewarding, model for either English alone, or for all — or
some — natural languages* Taking up the questions of the restriction
of the domain of application of the model first, is it plausible to
restrict the domain of application to English? Quine deals only with
English* He introduces regimentation only after the principle of in-
determinacy of translation has undercut an interlinguistic concept of
meaning beyond stimulus meaning of observation sentences* He writes
that "the artificial notation of logic is itself explained, of course,
168
in ordinary language" and that sentences, regimented in "canonical
notation", are a "sub-class of the eternal sentences" of the language
169
in question*
On the other side, Quine* s rejection of the putative "prelogica-
lity" of some cultures, and his attribution of this apparent charac-
170
teristic to "bad translation," seem to be evidence for a belief that
this logic can be a model for all languages* Only the truth-functional
part of logic can be behaviorally determined and translated, however j
indeterminacy sets in for the predicates and even for the quantifiers
171
because the criteria for these go "beyond extension. " One might
conclude that every language could be mapped on to the fuller logic,
as English can be, but that it is not possible, because of indeterminacy.
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to correlate these mappings interlinguistically* It -would be, if true,
an astounding linguistic universal, but perhaps an empty one. If the
logic is interpreted in the language which is to be mapped on to it,
then, without further restrictions, the universal might be only that
the particular set of symbols which constitute the logic can serve as
a model for every language individually* But any 3et of symbols, with
an appropriate interpretation, can serve as a model for any domain*
Returning to the main part of Quine 3 s claim, that truth-functional
predicate logic with quantification and identity can serve as an il-
luminating model for English (at least), let us consider what is implied
by it*
(1) The English language, or at least the assertive part of it,
is the field of investigation we are trying to illuminate, and logic,
as specified above, is the "more familiar, or better-organized secondaiy
172
domain.
"
(2) There is some structural relationship between the original
and the secondary domains* According to Black, it should be “identity
173
of structure," and according to Swanson, the property of symetxy
that identical structures possess is not wanted because a good model
has "surplus sub-structure", is richer in structure than the original
17U
domain* Swanson argues that a model Identical in structure tc its
dosain of application is "conceptually vacuous' *
(3)
"Explicit or implicit rales of correlation are available for
translating statements about the secondary field into corresponding
17$
statements about the original field*
(U) Inferences that can be made in the donain of the model
can
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be translated by (3) and applied to the primary domain*
(?) These inferences can be "independently checked’1 in the pri-
mary domain*
If these conditions are satisfied, the logic proposed is a suc-
cessful model for English*
Gan English and logic, respectively, take the roles of field of
investigation (primary domain) and model (secondary domain), according
to the above requirements? There is some structural relationship between
English and logic, but clearly not structural identity* Is the logic we
are contemplating "richer" in structure than English? It depends on
what we mean by »structure*. The logic is amore familiar*8 and "better
organized") rules of inference are explicit and inferences are more
secure. However, Quine often writes as if we are to map the more ccia-
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plex structure, English, on to the simpler, logic* Explication, after
all, is elimination which still preserves desired functions* The demon-
stration of the eliminability of all singular terns illustrates as well
as anything that mapping, in this case, proceeds from the "richer" to
the simpler.
On the other hand, if we consider structural relationships
rather than structural elements, the logic can be seen to be richer
than English* The number of elements and the number of relationships
are correlative in a system* the fewer the elements, the greater the
number of relationships that can be elaborated in terms of them. %
mapping English, with its multiplicity of idioms and relatively few
relationships, onto a logic with a very small sot of elements highly
interrelated, one is mapping the simpler on to the more complex struc-
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ture.
Condition (3), which calls for "rules of correlation" between
th® doraains > Presents Ul« greatest problem for the program of regimen-
tation. If this, and related condition ik) are not satisfied, we need
not caisider (f>) at all because we can not get that far. There are
"explicit or implicit" rules for translating the logical connectives,
and probably also the quantifiers (since we are operating within
English now,. . However, the sweeping away of ail but general toms, and
tiie lack ol guidelines about the degree of minute analysis of general
terras, deprive us of even "implicit" rules of correlation between
ohe two domains. Thera will be cases where the standard of "functioning
the same" works perfectly well, but there will also be cases where
"function", in the narrow sense in which it is here used, will be un-
satisfactory because it does not wake fine enough distinct!one. Vfl*n
predicates appear vacuously in arguments, there is no problem in trans-
ferring inferences from the secondary to the primary domain., and in
checking them by '’function in a deduction". When predicates appear
nan-vacuously, however, we can neither translate nor check with assurance.
Because of the freedom allowed the paraphraser with respect to
predicates, Quine rules out a standard of synonymy between sentences
and paraphrases. Conversely, the difficulties that Quine sees with
synonymy remove any grounds for restricting the paraphrase r ! s freedom.
A regrettable consequence of this is that there v&ll be cases where
the sentence and the paraphrase are functionally equivalent by fiat
of the paraphraser alone, and this greatly weakens the "rules of correla-
tion" between the domains and, therefore, the claim for the model.
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CHAPTER III
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO QUINE'S PROBLEM
The program of regimentation is justified by its alleged efficacy
in eliminating ambiguity from expressions of a natural language, and on
the other grounds discussed in the previous chapter. Regimentation is not
required because of a principled indeterminacy of translation of terms.
Quine does not justify turning to logic by the failure of full-blooded
concepts of meaning in natural language. However, the ways and means of
regimentation are affected by this failure. Quine's denial that there is
a relation of sameness of meaning between the expressions in a natural
language and the logical formulae which regiment than is a direct conse-
quence of his belief that meaning is an insufficiently precise and opera-
tional concept. His restriction of regimentation to one language, and
his denial of the possibility of interlinguistic meanings for logical
formulae, are directly related to indeterminacy of translation. A closer,
critical examination of indeterminacy of translation, therefore, may well
have consequences for the procedure of regimentation, if not far its
rationale.
Indeterminacy of translation deserves another look on its own
account as well. It is a "shocking** doctrine, appearing to undercut sup-
posedly empirical labors in linguistics and anthropology, as well as
denying any empirically sound concept of meaning beyond ’’stimulus meaning' •
It has received relatively little response in the professional litera-
1
ture. Often, when it is mentioned, it is dismissed without serious coun-
2
terarguments as something too foolish and obviously false to bother with.
Sometimes Quine is taken to be proposing "stimulus meaning” as the concept
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of meaning adequate for describing or translating a language.
3
This
is an easy enough straw man to knock doro, but it is certainly not
Quine's position. Quine holds that, if you are a behavioral empiricist,
you cannot defend mors than a "behavioristic ersatz" for "intuitive"
semantic concepts. "Stimulus meaning", the behaviorally justifiable
substitute for meaning, will not take you as far as meaning} therefore,
there is indeterminacy of translation*
At the beginning of Chapter X, it was asserted that Quine’s be-
haviorism and his "Two Dogmas" argument against an exhaustive analytic-
synthetic distinction were the two strands in his thought chiefly respon-
sible for the principle of indeterminacy* It might ba interesting to
examine some criticisms of these positions, and some alternatives to
them, to see how much and what kind of change in Quine’s behaviorism or
in his view of analyticity would be necessary to produce a change in the
doctrine of indeterminacy of translation#
These two strands are obviously not completely independent of each
other. A linguist wants to investigate whether ’brother' and ’male sib-
ling' mean the same for a sample of speakers of English* This is the
linguist as "empirical scientist", and the methods allowable to him
depend on the behaviorist strand* But what is to count as 'meaning the
same ’ ? Affiraative answers to the question under investigation will vary
with the respondents’ interpretation of ’meaning the 3ame'. The linguist’s
operational definition of 'meaning the same' "in terms relating to lin-
6
guistic behavior" will depend on his choice of interpretation for 'raean-
7
ing the sane’* The decision on a definition of 'meaning the same' depends
on the analyticity strand. Different behavioral tests will be applicable
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to different theoretical criteria.
^ can teat empirically for the meaning of
-waning the same'
if *e take aa data that certain pairs of words are ^
other pairs are not synonymous. wa ear test for the synoz^ of
ooiar pairs of words if we fix on ,n interpretation of Wing the
sane, and derise a behavioral criterion for it. W9 cannot vezy toU
test in the abaenoe of any fixed points.
a. behaviorism* Ianguage-Description, and
One can distinguish a description of language-learning from a
language-description. According to Quine's account, learning a language
13 being conditioned,
-trained", * society, by means of zvarards aaa
penalties, to respond correctly to stimuli.
9
As aid, most stimulus-
response theories, learning is viewed as a zmther passive process. Because
me is hard put to account for the learning of language, even the "first
learning of words-, ty simple ass<*iati* of words and things, albeit
reinforced by rewards and penalties, Quine posits a -sort of prelinguistic
quality space" as part of the infant's innate equipment.
10
This is held
to be a -prior tendency to weight qualitative differences unequally."
11
Indeed, the prohlen for an association^ theory is that "a dozen rein-
forcements of his response 'Red', on occasions where red things were pre-
sented, would no more encourage the same response to a thirteenth red
12
thing than to a blue one," but one would not think that positing such
a specific Innate discriminatory ability would be preferable from an em-
piricist's viewpoint than abandoning association for a more creative pro-
cess. Quine puts it a little differently elsewhere' one learns a word
"by induction from observed instances where it is applied," and therefore
8U
the instances must be sufficiently alike to "afford fthe leamer7a besis
of similarity to generalize upon." "Prelinguistic quality space" is
not mentioned here; the viewpoint is external instead of internal (i.e.,
the ward must only be applicable in cases where. . . etc. ; y.ho determines
and enforces this?), and the criterion for "sufficient" likeness i3
not made explicit.
In the case of radical translation, the linguist can not count on
induction to determine even the extension, much less the intension, of
a term. The likenesses that he perceives may not be the rolevant liknness-
es, and he has no way to discover his error. If the child learns his
native language under the same conditions in which the linguist attempts
to translate that language, what accounts for the child* s succeeding and
lU
the linguist’s failing? Surely Quine would not want to defend children
being born with a prelinguistic conceptual set for learning a particular
language.
Quine grants, furthermore, that, in principle, indeterminacy may
exist within a language because of the individual language-learning his-
tories of the speakers. How, .ve my ask, do specters come to speak a
common language? Tfaat answer can Quine give that is not metaphorical, in
terns, for example, of "trimming" shrubs? language is "the complex of
present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same
language have perforce come to resemble one another;" "it i3 to the inter-
ests of caammication to efface" the individual variations in language-
15
learning. His answer is that it is a matter of practical necessity*
if they didn’t come to speak the same language, they couldn’t speak to
each other. However, this is not an explanation.
The point we are getting to is thi3* Quine rules out a difference
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in kind between the case of the linguist and the case of the child. He
even grants that a linguist can fluently learn the language he is out to
translate, particularly if he "simulates the infantile condition”. But
if the child and the linguist arc equally held to the same kind of evi-
dence, how can either one learn a language that goes beyond " stimulus
meanings "?
Jonathan Cohen asks how, using Quine's standards of acceptable evi-
dence, it could be detemined that
(1) anyone can adequately learn to speak and understand his native
language?
(2) there is a speech community beyond observational sentences and
17
their truth-functional compounds?
Quine does not regard (l) and (2) as doubtful. He assumes that a child born
in a speech community will, under normal conditions, learn to speak and
understand the language of that community. Although he makes a point of
the fact that, in learning a language, each person is conditioned differ-
ently, these original associations are not remembered, and the result is
the "trimming u of each speaker into the shape of the language. He also
assumes that one can speak of a single language in one speech cousnunity
which goes well beyond these sentences translatable by stimulus meanings.
Quine explicitly presents indeterminacy of translation as an intra-
linguistic as well as an interlinguistic problem. Two speakers of a lan-
guage may interpret a given sentence of that language differently; that
is, they may choose different paraphrases of it or infer different con-
clusions from it (by equally valid procedures). One native speaker may
impute '‘unimagined views” to another which nevertheless conform
nto all.
18
his dispositions to verbal response to all possible stimulations. ^es-
86
pite this acknowledgment of indeterminacy within as well as between lan-
guages
„ Quine sees no problem, at all in distinguishing the intralinguis-
^ic and int®rainguistic cases* The fonasr, the ^domestic" c&se^ has no
serious consequences# ,rPositiv±stic reasonableness” tells us "that if two
speakers natch in all dispositions to verbal behavior there is no sense
in imagining semantic differences between them.” It is in the interlin-
19
guiatic case that ’'semantic indeterminacy makes clear empirical sense."
Quine simply bypasses the question of the individuation of languages, al-
though it would seem closely related to indeterminacy# He assumes that
cone can speak of a speech community, a language, and that indeterminacy
20
does not require positing one language per speaker# In the case of radi-
cal translation, the linguist attempts to translate a totally unknown
language, not the set of languages spoken and understood by the speakers
within a certain geographical boundary.
Given Quine 9 s assumptions about the ability of speakers to learn a
caramon native language, plus his granting that a linguist can learn a
foreign language as a child learns his native language, it would not seem
that the difference between the native and the foreign cases were more
than a difference in degrees of difficulty®
Let us go back for a moment to the case of the linguist’s success
in learning the language fluently which he remains unsuccessful in trans-
lating. It is a little surprising that Quine is willing to grant this
possibility, but, as Cohen points out, Quine does not want to conclude
that a language is unleamable. If one denied the possibility of learning
the highly exotic language we are dealing with to the ma ture linguist,
despite his experience, we could always arrange for the linguist’s infant
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to be born and spend his first decade among native speakers, learning the
language as any other infant would, and learning English as well frcm his
English-speaking parents. It is significant that the test of a bilingual's
adequacy in both languages is "observing the fluency of his communication
21
in both communities. " It would not be enough to test the correctness of
his stimulus meanings against the standard of the community. Quine assumes
that there is more to the language than this, and therefore what one tests
is his ability to get along with other speakers of the language in a va-
riety of language-using situations. Does he make himself understood? Does
he appear to understand what is going on? Does he respond in nonanotaalous
ways, and do the others behave normally toward him? This is not terribly
precise, but it is reasonable enough.
Cohen’s criticism is that, with the tools allowed by Quine, the
linguist could not judge either his own child’s successful learning of
the language unknown to him or any other speaker's mastery of it. The
test of "fluency of. • .ccEmunication", proposed by Quine, is not justi-
fied by his own standards of evidence. The linguist can only, on those
standards, certify the existence and meaning of "sentences asserting the
immediate presence of conspicuously segregated objects. • .and their truth-
22
functional compounds.
"
In the same way, the language-learning procedure that Quine en-
dorses shrouds in the mysterious perception of similarities and analogies
everything beyond the learning of the first few words. A passive process
of association of words and things, or words and other words, cannot ac-
count for how one learns to isolate the correct properties picked out by
words, nor for how one learns to understand and use a word in a variety of
contexts, including in new contexts, nor far how one learns to use and
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understand^ *ord dlsorlmlnattogly with respect to beHef and other in_
tentions. A natural language, of the richness that Quine as
-.veil as
most People take for granted, cannot be learned by a process of cendi-
tioning.
In describing the learning of a language, one can plausibly repro-
duce utterances in the order learned, and rely on one’s psychological
theory of learning to explain hem these utterances are related to events
withm and outside the learner. In describing the speaking of a language,
as a native speaker or a linguist might, one is concerned to do more than
that. Short of attempting to translate, or give equivalences for, ex-
pressions of the language being described, one will attempt to correlate
things said with observable situations. One can begin by taking "obser-
vable situations" in the large, rather than trying to narrow them down to
the "prompting" elements. These situations will then not only be the
presence of objects which appear to prompt particular utterances, but mil
include a variety of human actions and inferred purposes, attitudes, ex-
pectations, etc. In observing infants learning to speak, we rigfrtly fail
to impute a complex conceptual background to what we directly observe;
we assume that children acquire a language and a conceptual framework to-
2U
getlier. We therefore have only the very limited evidence of uttered
noises plus the presence of objects, grimaces, clutchings, movements, our
25?
knowledge of the time of the last feeding, and so on.
It is true that the expression of inner states by outer movements
may vary drastically in different cultures. Error is likely, and complete
eventual success doubtful. The question is whether, when describing the
language of mature speakers, one is required by sound empiricism to rule
out, at the start and forever, any evidence but the evidence for the
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stimulus meanings of observation sentences? One can give up stimulus-
response associationism without giving up the view that "language is
a social art. In acquiring it we have to depend entirely on intersub-
26
^actively available cues as to what to say and when. " Let us take the
strong view that there are no specifically linguistic innate mechanisms
required try a theory of language. Everything that becomes a part of the
learned language is learned by "intersubjectivoly available cues”. Let
us even grant Quine that "entification begins at arrays length," that
ordinary physical things are in "sharpest focus”, and that words de3ig-
27
nating them are learned first. Hone of this commits us to limiting our
description of a language to a description of the conditions for the use
of those words. Hot all "surface irritations", not all of the "past and
28
present barrage of non-verbal stimulation", derive from those ordinary
physical things whose paradigms are stones and apples and rabbits. To
doubt that we can always infallibly identify what someone is doing is
perfectly right} to entertain a general doubt that we can ever identity
what people do, intend, expect, etc. is not rigorous empiricism but un-
29
reasonable skepticism.
I would like to take up a few examples of this broadly-conccived
way of describing a language. The examples are very different from one
another, because the writers proceed from different starting points for
different purposes. The first is Stanley Ggveil's essay, "&ist We liean
30
What W© Say?".
The significance of the title is as follows « Gavell is discussing
statements about the use of ordinary language of the type, "When we say.
90
• •
• s' vre mean, imply, suggest, etc. that • .
. (where the se-
cond blank is not merely a paraphrase of the first, but a specification
31
the "pragmatic” implications, presuppositions, etc.). He i3 asking
in the title, and examining in the essay, whether such statements are
necessary truths. He concludes that they are, although in a special
sense. On the one hand, they are "obviously" not analytic, and, on the
32
other, "the question of evidence is irrelevant." Their "necessity"
33
resides in the normativeness of "ordinary use itself." On the existence
of a relationship, he argues
that something docs follow from the fact that a term
is used in its usual ways it entitles you (or, using
the term, you entitle others) to make certain infer-
ences, draw certain conclusions. (This is part of what
you say when you say that you are talking about the
logic of ordinary language. ) Learning what these im-
plications are is part of learning the language ; no
less a part than learning its syntax, or learning
what it is to which terms apply! they are an essential
part of what we communicate when we talk. ... We are,
therefore, exactly as responsible for the specific
implications of our utterances as vre are for their
explicit factual claims. And there can no more be
some general procedure for securing that what one im-
plies is appropriate than there can be for determining
that what one says is true. " 3U
On the necessity of the relationship.
If truth consists in saying of what is that it is,
then ( this sense or source of) necessary truth con-
sists in saying of what is what it is. 35
Max Black subscribes to this point of view, and, in "Presupposition
and Implication," draws some interesting contrasts between "what is said
36
1 in so many words* and what is implied". He interprets implication in
these contexts nonlogically, as neither material implication nor strict
implication, but rather as belonging "to the same family as 'suggest,'
37
'hint,' 'insinuate'. ..." ‘Ihese are "two modes of expression" and
91
the latter, "implicit comunication"
,
is important "for an adequate con-
ception of language" because the former, what is "said outright", is
interpreted so strictly as only a report of the speaker* s words in indi-
rect discourse, or even, "under pressure" of a dispute, quotation of the
38
speaker *
3
words# This omits such features of utterances as (signifi-
cant) silences, ^ellipsis, stress, intonation, sentence construction,
choice of words, or allusion" which are expressed by specifiable linguis-
tic devices.
Sometimes one checks whether some implications of the utterance
ho
were intended by questioning the speaker* He may "disclaim some resDon—
Hi
sibility for his implications*" "To the extent, however, that the
speaker uses formal linguistic signals of implications, ^alternatively,
"conventional rules for implications "1 he forfeits the optical of disclaim-
H2
‘ J
ing the implication* 11 One can distinguish in some cases between what
the speaker intended to imply and what his words implied, where the speaker
H3
is responsible for the implications of his words, like it or not. This
is close to Cavell’s normative "necessity".
The "normativeness" of the ordinary use of language that Gavell has
in mind is not to be opposed to "descriptive" nor exemplified by "pre-
HH
scriptive utterances". The statements of the type Cave11 is discussing
are normative because they are action descriptions, and the "most charac-
teristic fact about actions is that they can. • .go wrong, that they can
be performed incorrectly." Something only counts as an assertion, a
question, a command, if it is performed in a certain way. They are rules,
in the sense that they "tell you what to do when you do the thing at all
H6
• .
•
[not] how to do the thing well, with skill or understanding." The
latter sort of directions are expressed by prescriptions, principles*
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The ordinary language philosopher, or indeed any native speaker,
is "entitled, without special empirical investigation,” to make these
assertions about utterances and their meanings and implications.^ k
linguist, on the other hand, can make a corresponding assertion, but for
him it is the result of empirical investigation, and therefore not neces-
40
sar.ily true, not a rule* The two assertions have the same truth-condi-
tions, and describe "the identical state of affairs," but "the question
of evidence is irrelevant" to the native speaker because he knows that
U9his assertion is (necessarily) true because he has learned his language.
Gave11*3 chief purpose is to deny that toe ordinary language philo-
sopher who is a native speaker requires the empirical apparatus of
questionnaires, as Mates has suggested in "On the Verification of State-
ments about Ordinary Language," to go about his job. Native speakers
"do not, in general
, need evidence for what is said in the language; they
are the source of such evidence." No one would deny that native speak-
ers are the "source" of evidence about usage in their language, nor that,
"in general" a native speaker knows her to speak his language. However,
usage is not totally uniform within a speech community so that each speaker
is not a "source" in the same way that all the speakers together, or a
properly selected sample, are. Gavell grants that "to answer some kinds
of specific questions" even native speakers may find it wise to conduct
$2
surveys.
For our purposes, the Gavell essay is interesting for its strong de-
fense of a close connection between some surrounding circumstances of an
utterance-type and the utterance-type itself. Some of these surrounding
circumstances: typical ways in which the speaker is prepared to follow up
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that utterance with others or with nonverbal actions, typical expecta-
tions aroused in the hearer expressed by verbal or nonverbal responses,
are eminently observable. Since we know it to be the case that these
connections vary in different subccCTcronities of one speech community,
and that they vary even within one subcommunity over time, it is harder
to gra3p what Cavell means by their necessity. He concedes that there
is temporal ctange in a language but holds that, because it changes
"naturally", as opposed to artificially (i.e., by stipulation), ordinary
use at any given point in time (how small?) is normative. He concludes,
both mystically and tendentiously, "To see that ordinary language is
natural is to see that (perhaps even see why) it is normative for what
5U
can be said."
Hie next position we will consider diverges from Gavell on the
question of the noriaativeness of language-descriptions, although norms
have a place elsewhere in this fully worked out theory of meaning. To
understand what Jonathan Cohen has to say about language description and
concepts of meaning in The Diversity of &eaning
, it i3 necessary to un-
derstand the three fundamental distinctions which he makes. (See Figure 1.
)
The distinction of levels of discourse is the distinction between
talking about particular wards or sentences and talking about what is
conveyed by particular words and sentences. On the verbal level, a quoted
word cannot be translated} on the conceptual level, it can be. On the
verbal level for a language-sentence, one discusses syntactic structure,
paraphrase and translation} cm the conceptual level, one discusses the
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implications and appropriateness of its utterance.
The distinction between occurrences of words and sentences and
words and sentences in a language is a very important one for Cohen. An
9U
figure 1
Level of discourse
Meaning of
an occurrence of a
word
an occurrence of a
sentence
VERBAL
"utterance
word"
"utterance
sentence”
CONCEPTUAL
"saying
word"
"term"
\
"saying sen-
tence"
"saying"
m u *'
Kind of
semantics!
de jure
a word in a language "language
word"
"culture
Tjord"
a sentence in a
language
de facto
"language "culture
sentence" sentence"
occurrence of a rrord is not a word—token because the duplication oA a
particular utterancc-^vrord (by recording or writing) does not double the
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number of utterance-words as it doubles the nrnabor of tokens. An occur-
rence of a word or a sentence is its utterance on a particular date in
particular circumstances which render its meaning fully determinate anti
fixed once and for all. A word or sentence in a language, on the other
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hand, has a meaning which is a "changeable property" of it. One cannot
specify the meaning of any language-word tirelessly, because words change
their meanings through time, nor even the correct moaning of a language-
Yttrd on September 1, 1968, because meanings change with the noticeable
acceptance of a new use and one can never predict when a new use
will be
58
initiated.
Utterance-words and sentences and their conceptual counterparts,
saving-words and -sentence and terns and swings (the last being
Cohen's
proposed substitute for proposition.), arc the province
of translators
and logicians. language-words and sentences and
their conceptual counter-
parts, culture-words and -sentences, are the
province of lexicographers
and historians of ideas. This brings us to
the third distinction, “tween
de jure, or rule-guided, "tiaeless" semantics, which
is required for
occurrences, and de facto, or purely descriptive,
"temporal " semantics,
which is required for language. Cohen
belabors the totally factual,
descriptive nature of semantics for language
words and sentences and toe
absence of the slightest taint of
normatirenesa from its generalisations.
He is equally adamant about the absolute
nenfaotualnoss of semantic rules
for the meanings of utterances. It is
highly questionable that any empiri
cal generalisations are "purely"
descriptive, in Cohen's sense, ana
teat
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cie jure semantic rules are independent of any and all factual state-
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ments, as he claims* However, Cohen feels that much harm ha3 been done
in philosophical linguistics by a normative "rules of use" approach to
•word use, and that a descriptive approach to translation of utterances
and to the correlation of logical formulae frith sentences is misplaced*
for the semantics of wards ana sentences in a language, Cohen takes
33 paradigm the procedure of the compiler of dictionaries, the lexico-
grapher* In arguing against the relevance of rules to bhi: branch of se-
mantics, he points out that ’howler’s -.uoexn Ingjisl: I ~.u;,c- and the Concise
Oxford Dictionary ware written with obviously different aims in view,
even though they had an author in common* The evaluative approach is as
pervasive and characteristic in the i'oxuer as it is rare and superfluous
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in the latter. ..." In the Preface to the latter work, the authors
state their purpose as "on the one hand restricting ourselves for the
most part to current onglish, auu on the other hand omitting nothing to
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which that description my fairly be applied." Once a change of meaning
for a word, "an old word in a new use", lias gained sufficient cur-ency
to be recorded in a dictionary, its use is traced, as far as possible,
to its first recorded occurrence* That first occurrence in not treated
6U
as a "breach of an old rule or obedience to a new one." °ne might
open a chink in Cohen's impenetrable wall between ie tacto and ne jure
semantics here* there is no automatic recording machine which s nply in-
gests all uses of all words and prouuce3 an up-to-date list of actual
usage. The lexicographer must decide that a new meaning is in
*
- le •n0US*1
use "to be worth recording”* The principles for selecting
relevant
data are no different in kind for the lexicographer than
for any other
empirical scientist, ana no less normative.
97
Cohen then considers different ways of discussing word-use in a
language in order to determine the best concept of meaning for temporal
semantics* The first* and simplest* uses a causal concept of meaning*
If there is an observable correlation between sound—patterns and situa-
tions and behavior (on the part of both speaker and hearers), then, with-
out taking anything else into account, the linguist can take the meaning
of an utterance for a hearer as "its causal property of generating such-
66
or—such responses* " He can likewise take the meaning of an utterance for
the speaker as a "causal property [of the circumstances] to generate the
utterance." Cohen finds this restriction of evidence justifiable in
discussing the infant's first learning of words since, in effect, no
other evidence is available* The causal concept of meaning, which is sub-
stantially "stimulus meaning", can be used here because no fuller concept
is applicable* However, we do not continue to think of a word as having
two meanings, one far the speaker and one for the hearer, and we do not
consider utterances meaningless which are not simply "evoked" by situa-
68
tions*
If the linguist adds to his assumptions that particular utterances
are made for particular purposes and that the speakers know which utter-
ances are likely to achieve which purposes, then he can go beyond corre-
lating utterances with situations and describe speakers as "giving orders,
conveying information, communicating gratitude," etc*, and take "the
meaning of each sound—pattern as the normal purpose for which it is uttered*
This is a simple purposive concept of meaning* The difficulty with a pur-
posive concept in this form is that each sound—pattern uttered ior a pur-
pose is considered independently of every other sound-pattern* A linguist
98
cannot account lor the fact that we relate sound-patterns in reasoning
and often make utterances about other utterances. If same sound-patterns
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are taken to be "supplementary of their context,” the linguist can
teilk about the meaning and truth—value of the remaining sound-
patterns. This amended purposive concept of meaning can account for a
language of a sort, but it is not yet sufficient to account for the
, T 71known natural languages, its main shortcoming is lack of economy.
Utterances are taken as a whole, and individuated by purposes. Learning
such a language, or describing it fully, would be a task of superhuman
proportions, involving ”a number of sound-patterns equal, say, to the
number of non-equivalent statements, commands, promises, etc*, containing
scoe four dozen words or less than can be constructed from the five-
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thousand odd words of commonest use in mid-twentieth-century English.”
This concept of meaning fits rather well the foreign language-English
phrase books which one uses to get by for a brief interval in a foreign
country. Anyone who has ever used one knows how difficult it is always
to find exactly the right sentence, and how helpless one is in an effort
to alter an almost-right sentence without knowing the gramnar of the
language.
For an ilberwindung of this difficulty, the linguist must break
utterances down into "words” and must attempt to formulate the grammar
of the language. We know that the impossibility of this is just what
the principle of indeterminacy asserts, but we will not consider Cohen* s
answer to Quine at thia point. The linguist will discover that all words
can appear in different positions in sentences, play different roles, and
that a word* s "meaning" is not exhausted 1yy what it means "when uttered
in isolation*
"
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Instead the meaning of a word or common phrase as
dictionaries conceive it is the part it plays in
achieving the normal purposes of the serial arrays
of words in which it occurs* Its moaning is the
function or functions it performs in the utterances
of those who speak the language to which it belongs. 7U
This xs a functional concept of meaning, and according to it, the meaning
of a word is described by (l) giving another word or phrase in the same
or another language which performs the sane (semantic) function, (2) plac-
ing the word among the classifications of the grammar in order to give its
75
syntactic function, and, on the conceptual level, giving the implica-
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tions and appropriate contexts of the use of the word*
A number of different points are emphasized in this account* Each
single word in a sentence does not achieve its own distinctive ’’normal
purpose", part of the "normal purpose” of the whole sentence* This would
be the image of a sentence as a string of beads, where a word is added to
add same partial purpose to the total purpose* The functional view stresses
the interaction of words in a sentence* a word's meaning in a given sen-
tence is affected by its syntactic category (which may not be uniform far
one word-shape* e.g.
,
'fly* as both noun and verb), its position, endings,
and the other words with which it is associated*
A functional concept of word meaning depends on being able to des-
cribe ’’the function or functions / a word} performs, as a matter of fact,
r i 77in the sent® ices of
|
theJ language.” The syntactic function can be des-
cribed if the word can be located in a grammar of the language, for which
there are grounds of adequacy, if not of uniqueness* The semantic function
can be described if a word or phrase in the language, or in another lan-
guage, can be given which can be held, with evidence, to serve the same
or a closely similar function in a sentence with a particular "normal
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purpose". With a purposive concept of sentence-meaning, the pragmatic
function of a word is closely related to the semantic. Indeed, if a word
has no close equivalent in its language, or in the translating language,
one may have to move directly to the pragmatics of its use and specify
the situations in which the ward is used and what are the implications and
consequences of its use. These functions must all be "identifiable. • •
in normal utterances" and Cohen compares the approach with functional
description in biology (although he also perceives differences, chiefly
that particular organs, but not particular words, are indispensable for
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the performance of their functions.). Cohen* s exposition is again
couched in terras of wholly de facto temporal semantics, and again one
must protest that functions of words are not changed by all actual uses
of words, but that a normative element operates to identify the functions
of words and to trace their changes.
The points at issue between Cohen and Quine are critical ones.
For a functional description of language to be a viable alternative to a
causal, or as3ociational, one, the different kinds of functions must be
identifiable, and yet functions are not observable in the way that the
concomitance of a presented physical object and a prompted (elicited)
utterance is. This may be expressed in different ways* One must observe
the use of words in situations with a considerably longer "stimulus raodu-
79
lus" than Quine would accept as experimentally satisfactory. One is
committed to holding that sentences are not atomic, isolated, but that
they have implications, such that when a speaker says »p» he is saying
something that can be expressed in indirect discourse; he is doing
some-
thing like asking a question, convoying information, paying a
compliment,
delivering an insult, etc. ; he is uttering a sentence in the
subjunctive
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mood or in the past tense or referring to plural objects, etc.
Words relate to other words in sentences and in the language} they
relate to nonverbal events of all kinds. These relationships and implica-
tions go far beyond the extensional bounds that Quine would set. We know
that there is a failure of extensionality in verbal contexts of indirect
discourse, believing, knowing, doubting, hoping, etc. because of "refer-
ential opacity11 . And yet here Cohen is proposing that when one says some-
thing, one is also (simultaneously albeit silently) saying, conveying,
and implying much else besides. Quine would perhaps accept those implica-
tions which cceae from the truth-functional connectives in sentences. If
x says, ’Cicero denounced Catiline,’ he implies that it is false that
Cicero did not denounce Catiline. However, he will surely not accept those
implications from the use of one word to the use of one equivalent in
function in the same or a different language because the only kinds of
equivalence of words that he recognizes — and rejects — are too-weak
extensional and inscrutable intensional equivalence. Thu3 the condemna-
tion of indirect discourse as "perhaps irreducibly non-extensional" can
only be softened by the reflection that it is "in any event at variance
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with the characteristic objectivity of science, ^t is a subjective idiom.
"
A regimented sentence serves the same function as its replaced sen-
tence if, in a deduction, the same inferences can be drawn, etc. (See text,pp.
66-67,7h*) There is little doubt that "serving the same function" can
be applied with far clearer standards here than among language-words and
-sentences. There is also little doubt that, on Quine’s concept of meaning
and standards of evidence, determining the functions served by language-
words is a task which cannot be performed empirically. A functional approach
always rests heavily on a working assumption of the universality of some
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functions in the universe under discussion (in this case, speech camauni-
ties). For the description of languages, the number of functions is liable
to be extremely large and the selection of functions vulnerable to the
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charge of "ad hocness".
Cohen* s defense of the empirical soundness of the linguist's hypo-
theses based on a functional concept of meaning is that they can be tested
in use
,
by being "acted on", and that they are therefore subject to con-
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firmation and refutation as "analytical hypotheses" are not* This ap-
proach uses precisely the test -which Quine proposed — but really had no
grounds for proposing — for the fluency of the bilingual* observing his
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success in communication. The linguist can himself "act on" his hypo-
theses; two linguists at an impasse or two rival bilinguals can do the
8U
same.
K.L* Pike, whose creation of an imaginary language, Kalaba, as a test
85
case for students of phonemic analysis inspired Quine's imaginary case
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studies in "leaning in Linguistics" and Word and Object, makes this point
strongly in the section of his monograph on identifying 'words" among the
phonetic data. He writes that "our establishment of phonemic principles
and procedures must ultimately rest upon our observations of native reac-
tions to the phonetic data." The native speaker's "unconscious physical,
linguistic or social reactions to the structural unity of his phonemic
system may be analyzed by the observer." "A procedure which ignored
[these reactions j . . . would be just an arbitrary type of ’algebra’ which
does not analyze the facts of the language as a structure! system
function-
87
ing as a medium of communication *
"
According to the functional concept of meaning, a word function*
both in the language and in the world. The putative syntactic,
semantic
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and pragmatic functions of any particular word have plications in the
language and in the world. This means that a functional definition of
any one word affects many other words: "families” or "linguistic fieldsn
°°
of words which may substitute for each other in some contexts or associate
with each other in sentences. A functional definition of any one word
affects many nonverbal contexts in which that word may be used. There
is more relateoness in a language so conceived than Quine wants to giant.
dot only aoes Quine take as the linguist’s only proper method
the matching of things presently happening (narrowly interpreted) with
utterances, but he takes it to be a distinguishing feature of language
***** are •*s*8ned t0 sentences one by one rather than systema-
tically. In a certain sense, the sentences of a language are clearly
not comparable to the sentences (assertions) of a scientific theory. This
is the sense in which the sentences of a language are the data for the
theory of that language, and not the theory itself. We may equally' Hin-
der at" the significance of soma phenomena which are held to be the re-
sults of an experiment, if no one has told us the hypotheses being tested
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in the experiment. However, the sentences which constitute the theory
of language are precisely like the assertions of any other scientific
theory, and the language-sentences generated by the theory (including
translations, interpretations, paraphrases) are also interrelated to the
extent that there are families of words, limited grammatical categories,
semantic and pragmatic connections, and so on. Ho decision in the theory
can affect only one sentence in the language. A sharp difference of opin-
ion between linguists on one sentence is not a dead end, and is not with-
out empirical possibilities for settling the dispute, or at least for
carrying it much farther along than the doctrine of indeterminacy allows.
lol*
Cohen* s approach undoubtedly ewes much to Wittgenstein, as he ac-
knowledges* He has, however, been selective in drawing from the insights
of the later works. He is as critical of “rules of use" as an illegiti-
92
mate blend of factual and normative approaches as he is approving of
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Wittgenstein's emphasis on “use 11 and on words as “institutions 1**
It is a decided risk of the aphoristic style of writing philosophy
which Wittgenstein practiced that bits of one } s work can be appropriated
by followers of widely different persuasions* Wittgenstein eschewed the
systematic development of his ideas and was deliberately un~ and even
9k
anti-theoretical. It is therefore not always easy to determine when his
words are being used in the spirit; of his philosophy, and when not.
For an example which is pertinent to our present concern, Quine
quotes Wittgenstein 1 s “Understanding a sentence means understanding a
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language“ in support of indeterminacy of translation. It is possible
that he is not really entitled to do so* In context, Wittgenstein is em-
phasizing the interrelatedness of sentences in a language, and the im-
possibility of understanding any sentence of English without understand-
ing English and its whole system of "customs” with respect to such
features as pronouns, pluraHzation, tense, sensation words, etc* Some
stress must be placed on “understanding" j one can surely know how to use
« single French sentence in a specific limited context without knowing
French, but one cannot know how to use a sentence fully and in all possible
contexts without knowing the language*
Quine is extracting from Wittgenstein the expression of a sentence ’ 3
intimate connection to its language, and he concludes from this x>hat there
is no “linguistically neutral meaning* 15 However, what is to prevent Witt-
genstein frem stating as a corollary, “To understand that a sentence in
1X£
English and a sentence in German are equivalent means to understand
both English and German,” particularly since in the Imesti^ations
the sentence we are considering is the purported translation of its
German original, "Einen Satz verstehen, heisst, eine Sprache verstehen,”
which appears cm the facing page?
Another functional approach to language description, which utilizes
the concept of a "linguistic role”, is taken by Wilfrid Sellars and
Bruce Aune. Their point of departure is a critique of an associaticml
concept of meaning* Sellars writes that many theories of meaning which
are nominalistic with respect to ” ’thinking in absence 1 ” "turn out to
be quite ’Augustinian 1 in accounts of ’ thinking in presence 1 ? of those
occasions on which the fundamental connect! on of language with non-iin-
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guistic fact is exhibited*” However, thl3 is a mistake, according to
Sellars. There are no ”selfauthenticating nonverbal episodes”! learning
to apply a word to a thing presupposes a great deal besides the presence
of the thing and the utterance of the word, such as background knowledge
97
about observers, conditions of observation, grounds for inference, etc.
”De facto correlations of different sound patterns with one another,
with physical movements, and with certain features of reality that we
might regard as occasioning them” cannot determine meanings. To "decode”
sound patterns, the observer needs to know the "criteri* internal to the
98
conceptual scheme” of the language.
There is nothing here that Quine would not assent to when he is
discussing radical translation, except that perhaps Sellars and Aune .uke
a dimmer view than he does of even the "stimulus meaning”
correlations.
The Sellars-Aune view reinforces Quine’s argument against the translation
of terms by the same means by which he has translated
observation sentences.
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The translation of the sentence *G»vagal* is probably acceptable, but one
cannot go on to translate , gavagai* without "criteria internal to the
conceptual scheme". This is just- what Quine uearis when he writes, "Occa-
sion sentences anti stimulus meanings are general coin; terns ami refer-
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ence are local to our conceptual scheme. **
However, Quine wants to insist in Chapter I that conditioning
100
(association plus reinforcements ) is responsible for all language learning,
and the challenge of this view is that Quine must explain har such con-
ditioning can account for more of language than can be translated by
stimulus meanings. How is the conceptual scheme of the language (what
counts as an object, as standard conditions of observation, etc. , learned
by as ociation and reinforcement? Association alone will clearly not do it,
as Quine recognizes in Chapter H. Wtat must illicitly be packed into
"reinforcement" in order for it to make up for the inadequacy of associa-
tion? Is it entirely nonlinguistic ? If it is, it should be available to
the linguist in his efforts to learn the language within the community.
If reinforcement is not entirely noniinguistic, then Quine is paying lip
service to association, while not x'eally holding association responsible
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for learning the enriched language.
An a3sociational theory of meaning, which postulates separate
con-
ditioning bonds for each word-sentence/thing or word/word or sentence/
sentence relationship, fits well with an atomistic view of
language.
Functional theories of meaning, on the other hand, tend
to emphasize
interrelatedness '• of linguistic elements with each
other, with action,
and with knowledge, and to stress c-he importance
of norms. As Sellars
writes.
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The language of observation is learned as a
whole* we do not have any of it until, crude-
ly and schematically, perhaps, we have it all.
We acquire the ability to use colour words
along with the ability to speak of physical
objects located in space and time. ... etc. etc. 102
Sellars approves of the pragmatist's definition of the meaning of a term
as "its role as an instrument in the organism’s transactions with its en-
vironment’ 1 °n3y if this connection of language with conduct is interpre-
ted as "intrinsic to its structure as language, rather than a ’use* to
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which it ’happens* to be put. ..."
Both interrelatedness and normativeness are brought out by the
notion of "linguistic role". The language, its use, and its related con-
ceptual scheme are conceived as a single system in which different ele-
ments play parts. Different languages are seen as different systems of
the same type. Their speakers, that is, are the same sorts of entities,
observably engaging in the same sorts of activities, both sound-emitting
and not sound-emitting. This is the framework in which translation is
viewed as quite unproblematic. With respect to the normativeness of lin-
guistic descriptions, characterizing the role of an utterance is seen as
"subsumfing J it under a network of essentially normative concepts," in the
way that characterizing movements as actions or shapes of wood as chess
10U
pieces involves norms.
Sellars objects to taking the term 'means’ in interlinguistic seman-
tic statements as a relational term, and defines it instead as
a linguistic device for conveying the information
that a mentioned word. • .plays the same role in a
certain linguistic economy. • .as does ^another
wordj which i3 not mentioned but used ... and
which occurs 'on the right-hand side' of the seman-
tical statement. 10f>
The two central points here are that
(l) a linguistic element play3 a role in a "linguistic ecancny"*
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The metaphor of an "economy" is a very good one for the kind of
system we are considering, an open system, one in which exchanges are con-
tinually taking place, one in which there are norms , but fluctuating ones,
equivalent and nonequivalent values, and one, finally, which is involved
in both domestic and foreign trade l
(2) to play the same role
, which is to mean the same , is perfectly
compatiole with being different in other respects, e. g. , physically, as
shapes*
Aune writes that one role or function "could in principle" be per-
formed by linguistic expressions "with very different empirical features",
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giving the example of ' p3q » and ’ Cpq *,
Both Sellars and Aune use the example of chess and "Texas chess"
(played with different makes of cars on counties) to demonstrate sameness
of role and difference in other grossly observable characteristics* Play-
ers can learn to perceive the relevant saiweness, although it is not at
all self-evident* If one’s experience in a particular area includes only
one kind of physical thing performing a particular role, it may take a
while before the sameness of role is recognized in abstraction from the
difference of physical appearance* Sellars and Aune make a good deal of
the fact that a complete language must include linguistic means for ex-
pressing formal analogies between linguistic roles exemplified by empiri-
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cally different forms* Sellars relates this to "theoretical discourse"
and it3 use of models.
The essential thing about a model is that it is
accompanied, so to speak, by a commentary which
qualifies or limits — but not precisely nor in
all respects — the analogy between the familiar
objects and the entities which are being intro-
duced by the theory* 108
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‘7hile it is true that, without means in the language for expressing
such analogies, one could not account so easily for translation and
paraphrase, such a language would be impoverish* in many other areas
as well. After all, if the perception and use of analogies are funda-
mental intellectual tools (see text, p. 3 . ) and if analogy involves more
than physical resemblance, which it surely does, then any language in
vrfiioh one could reason at all would be one with such means. The point is
only that this requirement of a language is not a requirement for seman-
tics ’ sake alone, nor, perhaps, does one have to argue for it so hard.
Hotve^/er, when one tries to see the relation of this concept of
theoretical discourse to behaviorism, its relevance and importance ap-
pear to increase. The discussion occurs in the context of this problem:
what additions must be made to a public language "of which the fundamental
descriptive vocabulary speaks of public properties of public objects
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located in Space and enduring through Time" in order to make possible
talk about thoughts, sensations, feelings, etc* ? Can one, in other words,
remain in some sense a behaviorist while describing a language function-
ally in such a way as to include intentions, expectations, consequences,
etc., of utterances, or crust such descriptions rest from the start on the
positing of thoughts and other inner episodes which are sui generis ?
Sellars* position is that no additions are required which diminish the
intersubjectivity of language, and that this intersubjectivity is the
crucial requirement for the empiricist in his commitment to restrict his
evidence to overt behavior.
The first addition to the public language is semantical discourse ,
language for talking about linguistic expressions, presumably down to
no
no
ward-level, about their meaning, truth, reference, etc. Quine would
not deny that, within a language, semantical discourse is possible. fot
Sellars, this addition is related to the eventual possibinty of being
able to talk about thoughts because "semantical talk about the meaning
or reference of verbal expressions has the same structure as mentalisticin
discourse concerning what thoughts are about." They are both "inten-
tional" in Brentano*s sense of having an object.
The second addition is, for Sellar3, theoretical discourse , as men-
tioned above, with its use of models and hypothetico-deductive reasoning?
for Aune, it is language for expressing formal analogies between linguis-
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tic roles. Given the structural, or formal, similarities between the
"aboutnoss" (or intentionality) of semantical discourse and discourse about
thoughts and other inner states, the resources of theoretical discourse
make it possible to apply semantical categories to postulated
"inner epi-
sodes". Their arguments use an imaginary case of c
primitive, "exten-
sional" speech-cciflinunity in which people do all their
reasoning and prob-
lem-solving out loud. They could have used actual
psychological case studies
of the development of "inner speech" in children
after a stage of "egocen-
llU
trio speech" which is "thinking out loud". In
these situations, if one
were to observe Intelligent behavior (i.e., the
sort normally preceded by
overt reasoning) not preceded by such overt verbal
behavior, one slight^
reasonably formulate a theory of thinking, using
a model of speaking.
Sellars holds that the addition of theoretical
discourse to a lan-
guage in no way makes that language less
intersubjective. H« holds that the
behaviouristic requirement that all coroepts
be
introduced in terms of a basic vocabulary
jer-
taining to overt behaviour is compatible
with
the idea that some behaviouristic
concept are
to be introduced as theoretical concept’.
Ill
The theoretical concepts, that is, nay be themselves of unobservables,
without being unempirical or unacceptable to behaviorism, and he gives
the physical sciences as illustrations. Because overt behavior is evi-
dence in both cases, "concepts pertaining to. . .inner episodes. . .
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are as intersubjective as the concept of a positron."
veluine would object to the interlinguistic use to which theoretical
discourse can, on this view, be put. Although a model may be found by a
speaker of one language to translate another language on the basis of
sorne of the similarities of function perceived in observing the behavior
of native speakers, there is no way to justify that model over any other,
even very different, one. For any given sentence, one cannot ask if a
translation of it is "correct" apart from the particular model, or
ii ,
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general scheme 01 translation", according to which it was translated.
If the two sentence translations differ in truth-value, as they may,
one appreciates the quandary of radical indeterminacy# Curiously, a de-
fender of Quine, Gilbert ilarman, chooses as an example a sentence "trans-
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lated" from number theory into different formulations of 3et theory.
^ne might answer that, using a kind of sentence with more links to con-
duct than a sentence in mathematics, one translation might well be found
to be, in testing it by using it, if not "correct" in the sense of unique-
ly so, then at least significantly preferable to the others. "Whether one
accepts that there are empirical grounds for choosing among, or ranking,
different translations, or rejects this, as Quine does, depends a great
deal on whether one stresses interrelatedness within language and between
language and nonverbal behavior or an atomistic view of language in which
all relations are seen as having been separately conditioned. Sellars’
view, which allows for functional descriptions of language, both behavior-
ally respectable and inclusive of mental attitudes, and of functional
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translation between languages, dearly stresses interrelatedness.
No one can doubt that theory occupies a central place in Quine's
view of knowledge. Sven the cmraan sense knowledge that we have of
ordinary physical things is "woefully underdetemined" by "surface ir-
ritations, vdiich exhaust our clues to an external world. * Theory
fills in, and there is no difference in kind between common sense
"theories’1 and esoteric scientific ones. The scientific theory is more
"vivid”, by which Quine means more self-conscious and reasoned, "yet in
point of function and survival value [/’the hypothesis of ordinary physi-
cal objects’^ and the hypothesis of molecules are alike.” ”So much the
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better,” he adds, ”of course, for the molecules." He is not against
unobservables and he is not .against theoretical discourse. As a philo-
sopher whose touchstone is modern physics, he could take no other posi-
tions on these matters, but as a behavicrist, it is -north remarking on.
It is even possible to tease out of Quine’s parallel accounts of
the learning of language and the development of science (Chapter I) same
features close to Sellars* account. After the early stage of learning
words as whole one-word sentences, the child "tends increasingly to build
his new sentences from parts,” but this still involves learning words in
context by learning "the usage of sentences in which the word can occur. "
Note that "can occur" can not be identified with "does occur", but in-
cludes that and "may occur" as -veil. Learning this is in fact not differ-
ent from learning the "function" or "role" of a word. Words vdth unob-
servable referents are partly learned by describing their referents by
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"the special form of analogy known as extrapolation. " This is of only-
limited use, however, because there is no clear -way of distinguishing
what the theoretical objects are frem what the theory says, or posits.
113
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of them* Theoi‘eties1 discourse is therefore indispensable.
Here Quine* s and Sollars* (or any nou-associationlst's) paths di-
verge. Learning a scientific theory, for Quine, is being conditioned to
"associations of words with words" (or sentences -with sentences, or words
with sentences). The sentences of a theory nay be associated with each
other by "so-called logical connections" and "so-called causal ones"
"but any such interconnect, ons of sentences mint finally be due to the
conditioning of sentences as responses to sentences a3 stimuli. . • by
12$
the mechanism of conditioned response." Quine remarks that he has
represented the evaluation of evidence for or against a theory "to be a
strangely passive affair. • .we just try to be as sensitively responsive
ns pos sibli’ to the ensuing interplay of chain stimulations." He suggests
that perhaps even the "vaunted" standard of simplicity is "just a feeling
of conviction attaching to the blind resultant of the interplay of chain
126
stimulations in their various strengths."
Quine at times represents his associationism so baldly as to appear
perverse. He does not address himself to the problems of learning a
theory by being conditioned to respond to specific sentences with other
specific sentences, in what would have to be a rote fashion, is there a
unique set of sentences for each branch of theory, and is being condi-
tioned to respond with sentence no. 19 to a stimulus of sentence no. 18
what is meant by "understanding" a theory? Furthermore, on this view, the
young student would understand the concepts of the theory just as well as
his teacher once he was conditioned. This seems contrary to our
experience
of school children who can parrot assertions from a branch of science,
history, mathematics, or whatever, without understanding fully
what they
liu
have "learned’
,
and also the novice's apparent growth in understanding
of concepts in hi3 field* as evidenced by numerous operational criteria*
Quine’s lack of attention to these questions can only be explained
by the fact that he accepts stimulus-response learning theory largely
on faith* It is one of the assumptions that he is holding fixed in this
investigation. This was borne out by Quine’s answer to a question after
a lecture at Amherst- College in March, 1965 when he blandly remarked
that he didn’t think his acceptance of Skinner’s behaviorism was at all
controversial* (Mis colleague at Harvard, B* ?. Skinner, appears to have
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a similar attitude to criticism.
)
Ihe above pages have attempted to demonstrate that the particular
brand of Quine's behaviorism, one which employs an associationist theory
of meaning and takes an atomistic view of language, is directly related
to the conclusion that "stimulus meaning" is the only empirically sound
fragment of ’meaning’, and that this restriction of the concept of mean-
ing cannot help but result in the indeterminacy of translation of all but
observation sentences* Apart from the inconvenience of this conclusion,
which perhaps could remain merely theoretical while translation would
still be undertaken in practice, we have suggested that Quine’s position
undermines the existence of a language which is both enriched beyond
stimulus meanings and common to a group of speakers* Since the theory
does not permit us to account for anyone learning such a language nor to
describe it being spoken, we have neither toe means nor the justification
for asserting that there is such a language* From the outside of a wall
which we can neither peer nor climb over, we can have nothing to say
about what, if anything, is on the other side* However, this unperceived
115
and unpcrceiv&blo enriched c canon language cannot "drop out of considera-
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tion" like the beetle in the bOK because Quine's view of Cleaning de-
pends on there being something there whiaih we cannot get at, and his view
o- language, pcrtic ilarly when ho turns fran Anterlinguistic translation
to amoiguity in English, is of u language with considerable resources
and ceman to a speech community*
furthermore, Quine's death blow to translation with his assertion
tiat moaning in language and truth in physics have nothing to do with one
another — his view of the linguist’s enterprise as entirely different
..rctc that o any other empirical scientist — is u conso<juence of his
seeing the sentences of a language as indepenuent of one another* An
atomistic view of language holds that an interpretation or translation of
a single sentence has no consequences apart from setting a weaning for
that sentence* It follows naturally enough from a theory that language
learning is an accretive process of establishing separate conoitioned
bonds*
Although science r^pr.. cuts ’the- highest values for Quine, and he
recognises the complex relationships between theory and experience in any
science, his insistence on learning by conditioning makes learning a
theory something rather mystifying* To insist upon this learning process,
and to speak of "so-called" logical and causal connections between sen-
tences of a theory, makes it seem entirely fortuitous why the assertions
of a theory comprise the theory as they do* A scientific theory can cane
to seem as atomistic as a language, if the connections are all duo to in-
dividual conditioned bonds.
On the otnor hand, if we delete associationism from Quine’ 3 view of
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the cosplenentarity or theory and experience, end recall his emphaais
cm the indivisibility of knowledge, then there appears no particular
reason to exclude linguistics from the empirical sciences. If on- views
translation on the model of mapping one set of symbols on to another,
then, formally, there can be a "difference of net output"
-without
possible criteria for choosing between different mappings. If language
ia seen in the context of its use as a means of conraunicati on, then the
linguist's problems seem no worse than those of any other scientist.
B. Analytic Truth and Meaning
A classical defense of an absolute analytic-synthetic distinction
would assert that (l) every proposition is either analytic (if true;
self-contradictory if false) or synthetic; (2) an analytic proposition
is true solely by virtue of the meanings ofjthe terms contained in it,
while the truth or falsity of a synthetic proposition is determined ex-
clusively by nonverbal facts. To give the meaning of a term may be, as
130
for Morris lazerowitz, to give a "fact about verbal usage," and such
facts justify the necessity of the containing propositions, but apart
131
from "exhibiting" facts about verbal usage, necessary propositions
132
are wholly uninforaative• Synthetic propositions are informative, and
their truth rests on extralinguistic facts. All synthetic propositions
are 3een as on an equal footing with respect to possible refutation by
adverse facts. There is a clean, clear line between analytic and synthe-
tic propositions, and one can always tell on which side of the line to
place a given sentence by looking at it and asking, 'What could possibly
make the true proposition expressed by this sentence not tine?' If the
answer involves something happening to referent(s) of the sentence, it
expresses a synthetic truth. If the answer involves nothing but a change
117
In the meaning of a term or tern in the sentence, it expreesee an analy-
tic truth*
Quine has taken the position that such a line cannot be drawn, and
such a neat division of true sentences into these mutually exclusive cate-
gories cannot be made. Any sentence can be held as true despite the evi-
dence, any sentenoe can be overturned despite its form. Hie picture is
one of a continuum of sentences, related to each other and to the nonver-
bal world in such a my that (l) no sentence is linked only to nonverbal
experience or to verbal facts j (2) sane sentences are more secure in the
system than others, but none is irrevocably secure and none is dependent
for its truth on an isolated experience. He has also argmsd that no satis-
factory definition has been given for ’analytic’, so that there is no way
to show that any sentence is analytically true. As Harman renarks,
Quine’s conclusion is not merely that the distinction is a vague one, but
that “nothing is analytically true." He compares this to the "witch-
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nonwitch distinction". It is not only that there is a substantial area
of vagueness within which it is difficult to decide whether an entity is
or is not a witch, but that the definitions of ’witch’ (or ’analytic’)
which have been given have no extension whatever.
Giving up the absolute analytic-synthetic distinction creates
questions about meaning and reference, meaning and experience, and same-
ness of meaning which were previously settled. The dichotomist ’ s interest
in meaning is only in what might be called essential meaning. Two terms
are synonymous if they have the same essential meaning. He considers it no
great problem to get at the essential meaning of a word. It takes a dic-
tionary plus native speakers' intuition which can be expressed by the
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formula, n * » and not . . • is inconceivable.’' (" « t is . . ,» is
analytic. ) If he is troubled by the criterion of inconceivability, which
does seem irredeemably pictorial, vague and subjective, but is hard to do
without entirely, he may withdraw to facts — or better, rules — of
usage. That a rule strong enough to get at essential meanings is a rule
that presupposes necessity, and hence offers a circular criterion, does
13H
not bother him. The rule itself is simply a convention, a matter of
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contingent fact, and can be changed at any time. That there are roles
with this force, and that they can be distinguished from other conven-
tions which do not support analytic truth, he simply assumes.
Quine, however, cannot find answers to questions about meaning and
sameness of meaning that satisfy him. He therefore proposes doing with-
out these concepts. We have seen the effects of this decision in both
translation and regimentation. The enterprise of translation, without an
"intuitively” complete concept of meaning, has had to make do with "stimu-
lus meaning", with the resulting indeterminacy of its products* The enter-
prise of regimentation, without a concept of jameness of meaning to check
the regimented expression against its explicandum in natural language,
has taken the standard of a narrowly defined "function in a deduction"
and, where that is not adequate, the very permissive "purposes of the
paraphraser".
Quine’s arguments against the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, parti-
cularly in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," have evoked considerable critical
response. It will not be possible to deal with all of these critical pro-
posals in detail, but we will consider scroe of them, grouped with respect
to their general approach* There are five groups of crioicisms, which, frea
the most critical to the least critical, are (l) the Ordinary language
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criticisms, (2) the Artificial language criticisms, (3) the Satirical
Survey criticisms, CU) the Gradualist criticisms, and (5 ) the Normative
criticisms. The la3t of these does not lend itself to the sort of point-
by-point comparison vdth Quine as do the other four. It is in some ways
close to the Ordinary language criticisms, and in some ways independent
of the discussion in the terms in -which Quine has formulated it. It is
placed last, not because it is least critical, but because it stands by
itself. First we will summarize the criticisms, and then go on to evalu-
ate them.
Ordinary language criticisms. The most important paper in this
136
category is H. P. Grice and P.F. Strawson’s "In Defense of a Dogma.
"
Almost all of Quine’ 3 critics acknowledge some justice in his argument,
and Grice and Strawson are no exception. Their adaptations of their posi-
tion include an acknowledgment that not only matters of fact cause revi-
sions in the truths of a theory, but also "at least partly" changes in
137
the meanings of words, and a nod to the interrelations of statements
in their formula that two statements are synonymous if the set of confirm-
ing or disconfirming experiences "on certain assumptions about the truth-
values of other statements" confirm or disconfirm both statements "to
138
the same degree '• However, they plead that "the existence. . .of state-
ments about which it is pointless to press the question whether they are
analytic or synthetic, does not entail the nonexistence of statements
139
which are clearly classifiable. ..."
Grice and Strawson’s chief positive point is that the use of a dis-
tinction, by which they appear to mean the use of terms in which the dis-
tinction has conventionally been made, entails that there is such a dis-
lliO
tinction. Thus, in philosophical tradition and present practice, ’ana-
120
lytic 1 and 'synthetic' are used, and with considerable «,-;reefflent.~‘
In ordinary usage, '.scans the sane' and related expressions are used,
Ui2and not as equivalent to 5 is true of the same objects*. Grice and
Strawson accuse Quine of being impractical and unreasonable. They do not
know how impractical he is willing to be I They ask
Id all talk of correct or incorrect translation
of sentences of cm language into sentences of“
another meaningless? It is hard to believe that
it is. U t3
This may even have suggested to Quine tire consequences that had to be
drawn from a position that he was not willing to give up for practical
reasons. Grice and Strawson also point out that if there is no sameness
of meaning between sentences* then there can be no meaning for a sentence.
Here* too* Quine has been willing to accept unpalatable conclusions.
The chief critical point of the Grice-Strawson paper is that Quine
has set impossibly high standards for the "adequate clarification'' of
*analytic 1 * and, because this clarification has not, and probably cannot*
be given* has "deniefdj its reality”. Quine J s outline of the problem
and his requirements for clarification are summarised as follows s
(1) There is a family of expressions j
(2) If one member of the family could be satisfactorily explained*
so could all the others
j
(3) Each member "is in as great need of explanation as ary other"
$
(U) An explanation cannot use any expression from the farallyj
(f>) An explanation must have the form of a formal definition* and
1h$
"specify some feature common and peculiar to all cases'
.
The authors remark of (H) and (£) that it is "dubious whether any such
1U6
axplanation can ever be given" of ary expression. They suggest less
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formal kinds of explanation which satisfy/ the noncircularity raquire-
Mnt C: Dut not definitional requirement of (5)*^
7
Fran the
example given of explaining 'logical impossibility*
,
it seems to be a
kind of verifies tionisista
Art^icial jffflgnaso criticisms. Since we have dealt with Quine's
criticisms of Oarnap and Martin’s defense of Carnap earlier, (see text,
H“l^« / w® "d-1 consider this line of criticism rather briefly <, and
through another spokesman, Benson Mates, in "Analytic Sentences.”^
8
It is interesting, in taking these criticisms seriatim , to see the links
connecting veiy different philosophical approaches. Mates, for example,
is in agreement with Grice and Strawson that it is significant that both
’analytic' and 'synonymous' are used in natural language, and that
1)|Q
Quine's standards for an adequate definition of 'analytic* are too high.
Taking the latter point first, Mates’ outline of Quine’s (and Morten
150
White’s) standards is somewhat different, oriented, of course, more
toward Quine's criticisms of the artificial language approach to the
problem:
(1) A definition should be close to "standard or preferred usage"
j
( 2 ) The syntax of the definition should conform to "ordinary" syn-
tax]
(3) A definition should not contain the word(s) being defined, ncr
words not from natural language]
(U) A definition must be better understood than the definiendum.
Mates says that the addition of (U) may very well make the set of require-
ments too high to be met.
One could test for the existence of notions of 'analytic' and ’sy-
nonymous' by sets of questionnaires, follow-up questionnaires, and revi-
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sions made by the subjects. For the former '’notion”, erne would teat
attitudes toward sentences with respect to the relevance of evidence
for truth. Mates holds thatihe investigator would find "a rather remark-
151
able agreement”. For the latter, one would test the interchangeability
of expressions. These tests do not ’’define" the notions, but are "prac-
152
tical criteria" far then.
Frcsn this evidence of ” ’intuitive* notions of analyticity and
synonymy," Mates goes on to urge the usefulness of artificial languages
for "refining" our understanding of semantical tens. An artificial
language makes the rules behind the application of the "intuitive" notions
explicit, and "otherwise differs as little from the natural language as
153
is compatible with reasonable simplicity. " V/hen an artificial language
uses a tern " 1analytio-for-LQ ’
"
"an analogy is being drawn" with
'analytic* in a natural language. The closer the artificial language is
to the natural language, "the mare adequately will *analytic-!'or-L- *
15U
explicate 'analytic'."
Empirical Survey criticisms. There is, perhaps surprisingly, con-
siderable mutual support between some advocates of artificial languages
and of empirical surveys# Arne Naess, the chief representative of "eiapiri-
155
cal semantics" whom we shall consider, takes Gamap as his philosophi-
cal guide, and Gamap considers Naess's work to "provide abundant evidence
156
in support of the intensionaliot thesis."
Briefly, tbsbackground for this is as follows: Gamap has defended
the idea that semantical concepts arc most fruitfully examined within
constructed languages, and lias proposed the "method of extension and in—
157
tension". Quine, in "Two Dogmas," challenged the relevance of such
studies to the natural-language difficulties with these concepts. There-
123
fore, in "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural languages,” Carnap proposes ”to
158
clarify the nature of the pragmatical concept of intension in natural
languages, and to outline a behavioristic, operational procedure for it."
he expects that this "will give a practical vindication for the scmanti-
159
cal intension concepts." He wants to show "that the assignment of an
intension is an empirical hypothesis which, like any other hypothesis in
160
linguistics, can be tested by observations of language behavior."
Mates reflects Carnap in casting the problem in terms of "two basic
approaches," the extensional and the intensional, of which the former is
161
often ^mistakenly) considered "more scientific". He points out some
162
difficulties with the extensional approach, difficulties which Quine
makes much of in "Meaning in Linguistics" and ?Tord and Object, but which
Carnap does not acknowledge in "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural languages"
when he assumes that linguists can reach "complete agreement in the deter-
163
mination of the extension of a given predicate in a given region.
"
Mates defends the use of both approaches together in detcmining the "or-
dinary use" of a word* the extensional approach in observing cases of
use of the word, and the intensional approach in administering both Soc-
ratic and "anti-Socratic" (leading and open) questionnaires to get at
16U
"what Pthe subjectj means by the given v/ord.
"
Naess writes rather piquantly that
in spite of the in many ways appalling crudity
of the questionnaire techniques and in spite of
the manifest inability of many subjects to enter
into difficult linguistic or other fields, the
data gathered are often apt to reveal or suggest
as much to the researcher as do penetrating
meditations or introspections based on data
found in one’s own head or gathered in an inform-
al way. 165
121*
In a paper on the ’’Topology of Questionnaires Adopted to the Study of
Expressions with Closely Related Meanings," Naess suggests developing
different questionnaires for different philosophical criteria or defini-
166
tions of 3ynonyny. He notes that the "indirect character of most (good)
questionnaires and the non—operational character of the criteria or de-
16 "?
finitions M make the relation between the two subtle 3nd "intricate".
168
He proposes something like the following s
Associated philosophical concept
1# Interchangeability salva _sig-
nlfftcaflone ( intens iona1
synonymy)
2. Inconceivability of logical
inequivalence
3* Logical equivalence
1*. Equivalent for the "logic of
argumentation (pro et contra
dicere)"
5>. Extensional synonym
y
Questionnaire
the subject is asked whether
two given expressions mean
the same to him in a particu-
lar context.
the subject is asked to imagine
or to judge what, if any, dif-
ferences in conditions would
affect the truth-value of sen-
tences which differed only by
the substitution of one expres-
sion for another. "Inconceiv-
ability of a difference in ac-
ceptance" is synonymy.
Is x a necessary and suffi-
cient criterion (condition)
for the truth of y? The ex-
pressions being tested may be
used or mentioned.
the subject is asked to imagine
or to judge arguments which
differed only by the substi-
tution of one expression for
another. Synonymy is the same-
ness of pro- and contra- argu-
ments.
the subject is asked, 'Is this
an example of ’ 1 (or )?’
or 'that is an example of
* ’?• or ’What is this an
example of?’
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As can be seen, the questionnaire our. be more or less direct, the
danger or the ’error being that the subject is led, and or the latter
that the relation or the results to the "philosophical criteria" my be-
come very tenuous. Saess proposes the use or "^questionnaires" to test
h°*- subject interprets "crucial" questions or toe questionnaire.
169
He bora in Carnap's direction with the caooent that "in term or opera-
tions, concepts or intension are not necessarily more vague or specula-
tive than those of extension*”
171
Perkins and Singer's paper, "Analyticity,« is consonant with this
approach, proposing experimental tests for detoraining the synonymy of
two
-xoris^in context (linguistic and nonlinguistitf) for an individual at
a time. The only criterion they consider is saxaaness of "testing pro-
cedures" for the subject. However, they offer proposals for refining
and extending the 3cope and reliability of the results, and place this
enterprise in the context of experimental psychology, its assumptions
17u
and procedures. In the same negative way in which Naess defends inten-
sions, they write tnat the difficulties in testing for synonymy of words
are "not any greater than those that confront psychologists who work on
175
theories such as those about belief and drive."
Perkins and Singer are quite confident about the possibilities of
generalization and extension, through further experiments and the use of
samples, from synonymy of two words for an individual at a time to syno-
nymy of those vrords for an individual to synonymy of words for an indivi-
dual (presumably an over-all mapping of his vocabulary) to, ultimately,
176
"a criterion of analyticity for a society". Naess probably also has
hopes of such ultimate extrapolations, but because he is actually engaged
126
in this &ort of ^search, he sees the complexities more clearly. For
example, he views intrapersonal questionnaires as much leas problematic
than interpersonal ones, because the "same” results on separate ques-
tionnaires may be taken to indicate a "high degree of constancy as re-
gards. .
. L -ho meaning assigned to » ’] within the system of speech
habits of different persons”, nob that the meaning (“interpretation")
of ’x’ x or one person is the same as the meaning of ’y» for another per-
177
son, even where both respond that ’x’ - ’y*. He prefers to test for
interpersonal results in interpersonal situations, such as when tvro
physicists question each other om their interpretations of a statement
about 'iaass :
,
reformulating the sentence in such a way as to eliminate
some interpretationr and. select others. The result is 1 two maps of syno-
nymity and heteranyiaity relations, one map showing relations with the
usage of p, lie other. . .•with uhe usage o.:‘ q« " The correspondence between
these maps is measurable, and identically structured maps indicate
178
interpersonal synonyay with respect to ’mass’ in that context. It can
be seen from this how great is the distance between starting such in-
vestigations and coming up with "a criterion of analyticity for a society".
Gradualist criticisms. This line of criticism is limited to showing
that, although Quine is right in denying an exhaustive analytic-syntheti
c
distinction, he is mistaken in denying that there are no amlytic truths
at all. These critics do not believe that they are dealing Quine a deci-
sive blow, but merely making a small necessary correction in his position.
The most important of these critic* is Hilary Putnam, althou^i Jerrcld
Aatz, with an entirely different theoretical apparatus, also falls in this
127
category.
Putnam admits that the ana lytic-synthetic distinction is "of
overwhelming unimportance" compared to an appreciation of the "monolithic
character of our conceptual system" and of the many different (rather
179
than merely tiro) kinds of statements. However, he writes,
there is as gross a distinction between fa
trivial analytic statement and a simple em-
pirical statement
^ as between any two things
in the world. • .and no matter how long I
might failjin trying to clarify the dis-
tinction, I should not be persuaded that it
does not exist. 180
The task of a defender of the distinction, according to Putnam, goes
beyond pointing to clear examples of itj he must try to clarify its
181
nature and ^rationale s'* This is what Putnam attempts to do.
182
"Analytic statements properly so called" are distinguished first
by showing what they are not. They are not "framework principles",
statements of high systematic import, such as the central scientific
generalisations. Framework principles may deceptively appear to be just
like traditional exmaples of analytic statements because they have defi-
nitional form and because they cannot be "jeopardized by any possible
183
experimental results". However, framework principles are not revised
merely by redefining their terms but by substituting other, incompatible
181*
principlej which alter the permissible inferences in the system.
Analytic statements also are not statements with "cluster-concept"
18^
subject-words* The difficulty with these werdfc is that any element of
the cluster may be eliminated, changing tiie intension of the word but not
its extension. They are clearly not suitable subjects for statements
held to be secure from revision. Putnam has shorn great ingenuity in
128
demonstrating that with "cluster-concept” (sometimes called "natural
kind” ; '*°rd8 > 413 or ’cat*, the "discovery” can be made
uiat any property at all does not belong in the cluster.^
?h® standard Putnam offers for a sentence in a natural language
to be an analytic statement is for it to satisfy, or coma reasonably
close to satisfying, the following criteria for " Analytic definitions 5 %1&7
or to be consequences of such statements*
(1) The statement has the form* ’Something (Semeone)
Is an A if and only if it (he, she) is ’a B,’
•where A is a single word*
(2) The statement hold3 without exception, and pro-
vides u3 with a criterion for something’s being
the 3Qrt °r thinS to which the term A applies.
(3)
The criterion is the only on© that is generally
accepted and employed in connection with the
to2Ul»
(U) The term A is not a 1 law-cluster’ word* 188
Putnam then proceeds to offer a ’’rationale" for this distinction.
The advantages of having aace *fixed points*’ in a language are "brevity”
a/id { in ce
l
ligibility f » These are clear and rather obvious and, farther—
more, to hold just 3uch analytic statements which Putnam* s criteria ad-
189
rait as "fixed points" "can’t hurt. *' It ’can’t hurt" because no other
laws are involved in holding 5 bachelor* interchangeable with ’unmarried
male’ apart from ’All bachelors are uruasrried, 5 and also because the
one—criterion words available for analytic statements are the names of
synthetic, not natural, classes, classes constituted by that one defining
aspect alone. This limited concession to the analytic-syntlietic distinc-
tion thus has some conveniences and no real disadvantages.
Despite this, Putnam grants that there is far more danger in re-
lying too heavily on the distinction than in denying it altogether.
Taking it to be an absolute distinction involves assimilating very dif-
129
ferent kinds of statement!, end leads to confusion and error* Narrowly,
which is properly, interpreted, the distinction cannot accomplish much
with respect to philosophical problems apart from those directly connected
with the distinction itself s it ,rbakes no philosophic bread and washes
190
no philosophic windows."
Jerrold Kate sees the significance of his paper, "Analyticity and
Contradiction in Natural language," "in its solution to the problem of
distinguishing analytic and synthetic truths raised by W. V. Quine in
191
his 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism. ' " And yet he agrees with Quine's
criticisms of Carnap and joins Quine in doubting that a "full-width ana-
lytic-synthetic distinction" can be supported even if some "obvious oases"
192
of analytic statements can be identified. Katz attempts to offer cri-
teria which are formal, noncircular, and "beg no questions of empirical
193
justification, " for attributing analyticity to some statements. Ana-
19U
lytic statements are those which are "predicatively vacuous". The "philo-
sophically significant oases" do not turn out analytic, and therefore the
troubling question of "their epistemological status" is not eased by this
195
analysis. The aim of a "full-width" distinction is "to leave no middle
ground" between necessary and contingent truths. Those defending such a
distinction have rested all necessary truths on purely linguistic grounds
and all contingent truths on nonlinguistic facts. Katz, like Quine, holds
out no hope for doing this successfully.
Katz's definition of 'analytic' occurs within the context of his
semantic metatheory. The metatheory specifies that a semantic theory in-
cludes a dictionary, not real but "ideal", and projection rules comparable
to "what the fluent speaker has at his disposal. • .for applying the in-
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formation in the dictionary." A dictionary entry includes (1) syntac-
330
tical infonaation, (2) semantic “sense characterisations" in the form of
"semantic markers" and "semantic distinguishere"*
'
' and (3) optionally,
J$8
synonyms *s a "technique of cross-reference-'. (2) is meet important.
Semantic marker* ’’are the .lament* in terns of which [systematic] semantic
relations are expressed" and distinguishere "reflect what is idiosynora-
199
tic about the Meaning of the word. For example, semantic markers which
appear in the theory’s dictionary entry far ’bachelor® are ’Human' , ’Ani-
AAQ
mV, and ’Male’j one of the distinguishere is ’who has never married*.
semantic markers and distinguishere are not to be thought of as words
in the language, but as ’theoretical constructs" expressed by words. Only
for ohus reason does suen a 'theoretical definition*’ actually "provide
an account of [the] meaning" of words J It pairs a word, not with other
words as a lexical definition does, but with elaments of its conceptual
201
content.
A sentence le.g., ’Bachelors are unmarried males, 9 ) is analytic on
a particular "reading" (i.e., for one fixed sense of •bachelor’) with res-
pect to one distinguisher of ’bachelor* if and only if all the semantic
elements in the entry for the subject-word are identical to those in the
entry for the predicate-word. This concept of ’analytic* as "meaning in-
clusion" is, Katz acknowledges, close to Kant’s. He maintains that his
version is not open to the criticisms that have been made by Quine and
others of Kant’s view because, first, "containment of meaning" is no long-
er merely metaphorical, and second, Kats has extender the analysis to
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apply to more than subject-predicate sentences.
Katz holds that his definition of analyticity is noncircular because
it does not use other members of the ’analytic* family in defining ’ana-
lytic*. It is "formal” because the standard of "meaning inclusion", defined
131
203
in the semantic metathecry, can be applied
-within a particular semantic
theory "formally", that is, by Hatching identical constructs*"
Quine has also required that a definition of analyticity not be
merely stipulative. Such a definition is "empty" with respect to our use
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of ‘analytic’ in natural language. It was for this reason that defining
’analytic* in a constructed language was rejected. Cfcn defining ’analytic*
within a semantic metatheory fare better? Katz thinks so because a parti-
cular semantic theory for a particular language, constructed according to
the metatheory, can be tested fcr empirical adequacy. This is done by
testing the “correctness" of the dictionary entries and projection rules
of the theory, specifically by "comparing the claims that [the theory
j
makes about the semantic properties of sentences in a sampl e drawn from
£the3 infinite set fof sentences of the language J with the linguistic
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intuitions of speakers." The particular "predictions" (e.g., that a
given sentence is analytic) receive their sufficient "empirical justifi-
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cation" by being predictions of a "highly confirmed semantic theory".
This procedure suggssta that one will have to test the intuitions
of native speakers with respect to the technical terms of the theory. %at,
otherwise, are the "claims that it makes about the semantic properties of
sentences"? In Katz*s more recent article in the Journal of Philosophy,
he recognizes this difficulty and proposes a more indirect procedure.
Subjects are asked to assign sentences to lists which contain, not the
words * analytic*, * synthetic*, etc., but "sentences that are clear cases
20
of That we would regard as analytic" (or synthetic, contradictory, etc* )•
This indirect procedure raises other problems, the main one being the un-
certainty about -what the subjects take the sentences on the lists, given
as examples of "clear cases", to be "clear cases" of. Katz remarks that
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the experiment oust be "conducted properly”. ' The paradigm sentences
must be "sufficiently different frcsn one another in the appropriate res-
pects, [so that! there -will be no spurious coalman features that might lead
speakers to classify sentences on the basis of irrelevant linguistic proper-
ties. ..."
Normative criticisms. This group of criticisms takes us back to the
proponents oi a functional concept of meaning for language—descriptions.
We can speak of a "normative" approach to analyticity here in the sense
that "where there are functions or roles, there are norms or rules "which
specify what constitutes performing a function. Although the proponents
of a normative approach do not form a unified group, they can be viewed
as holding on to the traditional distinction at least in the sense of a
distinction between regularities and rules.
Quine has considered only "semantical rules" of foraal languages as
possible rule-supports for analyticity, and not the kind of "rules" at
issue here. Wittgenstein^ vacillations on the subject show the difficul-
ties vdth "rules of language" which all their supporters must face to
some degree. Wittgenstein is so concerned to show the ambiguity, lack of
strictness and openness of rules that one is often tempted to wonder why
he calls them "rules" at all. does not wish to speak only of the
"regularities" of language, however, as Ziff doe3, who holds that these
211
"regularities" are not "sources of constraint". Wittgenstein, and those
influenced by him, do want to hold that these "rules of language", al-
though they are mare like "regularities", "conventions", "institutions",
are sources of constraint. To speak a language is not like "operating
212
a calculus according to definite rules" and the constraints do not
133
involve penalties fear every illegitimate raove as in « game like chess.
and remain part of the language-speaking community.
Wittgroatein, of course, spealcs of meaning as "use" and often as
governed by "rules of use". Cohen, with his laneuage-eentenoe/utter-
anoe-sentenoe distinction. Is much concerned to keep “rules" separate
iron "use", '^e former give the meaning of utterances only, and the
latter the meaning of sentences of a language only. Combining the two,
as Wittgenstein does, may seem reasonable because it "achieves a kind of
211;
semi-adequacy in both fields" but it is illegitimate. For Cohen, an
utterance is a "single event", "for ever true, or for ever false", and
never ambiguous. The different causes of ambiguous language-sentences
— unclear reierents of indicator words, different senses of contained
words, ambiguous syntactic constructions, unexpressed intentions, and
supplementary beliefs, etc. — cannot account for failure to determine
the meaning of an utterance-sentence. Any given utterance settles all of
these possible ambiguities, and thus, its meaning, "correctly understood",
is also settled.
Remembering that the conceptual equivalents of language—sentences
and utterance-sentences are "culture-sentences" and "saying-sentences"
(and "sayings", which abstract from the "original event of utterance and
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from certain peculiarities of wording" of the saying-*oentence), one
finds that Cohen’s attitude toward Quine's gradualism with respect to the
analytic and synthetic is that it fits culture-sentences very well but
"fully determinate assertive sayings" not at all. The former are not
217
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sufficiently specific to indicate on their face whether they are
statements about the correct use of the subject-word or about something
true of the referent of the subject-word. Changes in knowledge and opinion,
from place to place and person to person, all contribute to the conception
of the truth of such statements as "a varying reluctance on our part to
call them in question. The latter — not all "sayings” but all "fully
determinate assertive sayings" — are either analytically true or not
analytically true.
The critical point is change of meaning. No sentence
-whose meaning
can change can be analytically true, and all language-sentences and culture-
sentences are subject to such meaning-change. Only utterances can have
fixed meanings, and those that do can, absolutely and finally, be classi-
fied as either analytic or synthetic. Putnam takes quite a different po-
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sition. In arguing that even such obvious candidates for necessary
truth as 'All cats are animals* are ruled out by possible future discover-
ies that cats have always been merely cleverly manufactured automata,
Putnam specifically disallows a "rescuing move" in terms of meaning change
(e.g.
,
the sentence was necessary at time-, and became contingent — and
221 1
false — at time,,). Within the framework of Cohen's distinctions,
Putnam’s argument holds for language-sentences but not for utterances.
Prior to the discovery that cats are really automata, the utterance, ’AH
cats are animals,* is necessarily true, although the identical language-
sentence is not.
Cohen* 3 account seems to turn Quine on his head. The meaning of a
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language-word or -sentence "is basically a fact about human behavior"
and no rules can set standards of correctness for these meanings, nor
halt at any moment the continuous change within a language. Quine's one
fixed point, the sotting of stimulus mesninge, and his greater opti-
mism for meanings intoalinguisticalijr, are rejected. On tee other hand,
the meaning of an utterance-word or
-sentence is best given by a trans-
lation or paraphrase, and such specific correlations are governed by
ruhts, although not by "uniquely relevant" rules, but, for a given utter-
ance-sentence, by "one or other of an indefinitely large disjunction of
rulcs for or paraphrasing that sentence." These are rales
governing the "verbal fidelity" of a translation, its Hteral correctness,
the "legitimacy" of tee move, rather than its "brilliance". A trans-
lation from "particularly exotic languages" nay alter and extend tee
22$
translating language in the process. These changes vdthin the language
are "neither correct nor incorrect") correctness is a standard in ap-
praising a particular word or expression — new or old — in one language
"M * of old usage in another, or even as a paraphrase of
226 —
an old usage in the same language." Precisely in those cases where
227Quino believes that there is nothing "to be right or wrong about"
Cohen believes that rules for appraising correctness are applicable.
It is not surprising that Cohen finds a place in his scheme of things
far an interlinguistic vehicle of timeless meanings on the conceptual
228
level. These are 'Mayings". They are held to have decisive advantages
over propositions while serving all the wor thwhile purposes of proposi-
tions. They are not limited to indicative assertions, not identified
with "meanings", not subsistent entities. In abstracting from "peculiar-
ities" of wording, on© does not abstract from wording altogether, although
some differences of language do not prevent sameness of sayings under
229
proper conditions. Cohen proposes that Quine accept "sayings” as the
meanings represented by logical formulae in regimentation. He asserts
136
that "there must be some determinate
-nay of correlating the formulas
of • • • a calculus with the utterances of ordinary speech fur winch
they may stand proxy, and clearly this is best achieved by assigning
meanings to the formulas*" He brushes aside Quine’s disclaimer chat
the regimented expression "means the same" as its explicandm ay taking
Quine* s jta;idard of "function" as an expression of a functioaial concept
230. 232
of meaning* He denies that there are "eternal sentences", and as-
serts that to achieve the kind of sentence with fixed truth-value that
Quine seeks, one must turn from language-sentences to utterances of one
person during a very short period, abstracting from peculiarities of
2
language and from "authorship". The results of this process are "sayings".
Cohen’ 3 particular apparatus is distinctly hi3> but any functional
approach to language will be inherently interlinguistic. Sellars and
Aune can easily speak within their framework of "linguistic roles" of a
23U
role being performed by "more than one set of sign designs." The role
or function of a linguistic element is not to be identified with tiiat
element, but is something that the eleukant can be used to do. Tc specify
tiie role is to separate one aspect of the element from others. It is not
a great step after that to find that different linguistic elements 3hare
that one aspect, i.e., have the same role.
Norms, or rules, are what link particular utterances to their impli-
cations* truth-conditions, inference relations, intersubstitutable ex-
235
presaions under seme conditions, relevant responses, and so cau. It is
misleading to speak only of the use of expres dons because speakers are
not free to use expressions as they please • The game/language analogy
may also be misleading in certain respects, but it is held nevertheless to
reveal some significant features of language*
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Do any of the above criticisms of Quine's radical position on ana-
lytic!ty go far enough to make a difference to the effects of that posi-
tion on indeterminacy of translation and the procedure of regimentation?
An effective criticism would have to accomplish the following:
(1) Define ’analytic* mmc5^rcj^rlyj
(2) the definition must be explanatory with respect to the use of
’analytic* and related expressions in natural language]
(3) the definition oust be empirically justifiable:
(U) the definition must be in terms of meanings 3 and exclude the
effect of "intrusive” shared information;
(5>) every statement (sentence; must be classifiable as analytic or
not analytic; the distinction must be absolute ;
(6) the definition must be interlinguistically valid.
If defense is needed of these requirements for an effective criticism*
it would be that (l) is a requirement for any definition; (2) is a re-
striction cm arbitrariness: we do not simply want a stipulative definition*
but a definition which is demonstrably related to actual practice* even
if it is a critical improvement on actual practice; (3 ) is connected to
(2): because of (2) we want the definition to be reached by sound proce-
dures. Requirements (U)* (5 ) and (6) are intrinsic to the particular term
to be defined here. A definition of 'analytic* which did not distinguish
validation by linguistic facts alone from validation by nonlinguistic facts
would violate the general requirement of (2) by overlooking an essential
traditional feature of analyticity. A definition which did not effect an
absolute distinction between the analytic and the synthetic would not serve
the purpose for which the distinction has been made: to be able to classify
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«nd locate the source of truth of all true statements to the language,
particularly the central theoretical-scientific and philosophical cites.
A definition which was good for one language only would not affeot the
question of translatability.
The ordinary language criticisms* represented by Grice and Straw-
son, meet the noncircularity requirement only at the expense of the
requirement, implicit in (l), of a formal definition. This is in harmony
iiith Wittgenstein's insistence that many words cannot be "defined" by
giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for their application and
236
the camaon features of their referents. Of the types of "informal
explanation”, whose availability is the argument against declaring the
expressions of the analytic!ty family to represent "pseudo-notions,"
the only illustration given involves distinguishing between logical and
physical impossibility by « distinction between not understanding and not
believing what is alleged. In the case where the subject judges both as-
sertions to be false, but asks himself under what conditions they could
be true, he "know js ] what to prepare for" in the case of physical impos-
sibility but not in the case of logical impossibility. This is nothing
more novel than the criterion of inconceivability, and the position is,
in effect, the classical dichotooist one. (See text, pp. 116-18.) This
is not a counterproposal to Quine’s criticisms but a reiteration of the
237
view he is criticising.
With respect to (2) and (3), Grice and Strawson assume that there
238
is agreement "to a very considerable extent" in the use of 'analytic'
and related technical terms in philosophical usage and in the use of
•means the same* and related ordinary language expressions in ordinary
13?
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»<»(!<>. It U cm this Mswptlon that th«y rest their resistance to
Quine's approach. "Instead of oxaminlng the actual use that we make of
the notion of meaning the same, the philosopher measures it ty some per-
haps inappropriate standard (in this case sen. standard of clarifia-
bility), and bemuse it falls short of this standard. . .denies its
reility. ...» However, 0ri.ee and Strawson do not "eraaine the actual
use" of the relevant terms, and do not attempt to measure the extent of
the assumed agreement in their application, hika other ordinary language
philosophers, they are content to roly on their intuitions as native
speakers. (Cf. Gavell, text, p. 92.)
Apart, from their unquestioning acceptance of the introspection of
native speakers as empirically sound for linguistic questions, the po-
sition of Grice and Strawson ftias another serious flaw. Even if it were
well established that there is wide agreement in the use of certain terms,
that fact alone would not suffice to indicate the basis of agreement. It
would not tell us whether a concept of analytici^r or synonymy supported
the agreement, or something else, or nothing. This is what Mates calls
9)|T
"an armchair version of the extensicnal method", and it has all the
weaknesses of the approach of Quine* s self-restricted linguist.
The ordinary language approach does not satisfy (U) because the
.
21*2
ordinary use of ’means the same* does not eliminate "shared information".
If one is content to rely on actual, unreforraed use, then one must be
satisfied with a somewhat untidy result. lacking a systematic empirical
method for examining actual use in some depth, this approach cannot elu-
cidate either the ordinary or the philosophical uses of these terms.
Grice and Strawson concede to Quine that the distinction is not
JiiO
•bsoluf, that than are statute "about ahloh It Is polntleao to
preae the question whether they are >nalytic . synthetic. They
aleo ntee no provision for an interlinguistic standard. They are con-
tent to deal with English*
The artificial language critics and the empirical survey critics
are stronger together than either is separately* As Quine has rightly
observed* an approach to analyticity through constructed languages suf-
fers from arbitrariness, which no claim of "analogy" nor of ‘analytic-
for-V "indicating* that ’analytic* (in English) is being explicated
can evade on its own. (See text, pp. 12-13.) One can always ask for jus-
tification of the analogy, and this justification must come frcm out-
side the constructed language* It is just such support- that empirical
surveys can provide, ty "plugging* the definitions of the artificial
language in to natural language in use. The alliance is of mutual bene-
fit because any survey needs hypotheses, precise criteria, and a theory
of the relationships among its terms* those can be offered by a formal
system. It may be the realisation of these benefits that explains the
actual mutual support among seme members of these two superficially 30
different approaches*
With reBpect to \U), it is not difficult for a formal system to
define 'analytic* in terms restricted to linguistic relationships. As
Hannan points out, however, outside of a formal system, one must dis-
tinguish postulates, or stipulative definitions, which may not be true
at all from true statements which are "true by (linguistic) convention"*
The assignment of meaning by the rules or conventions of a language
2bk
"does not guarantee truth". What is a fairly simple matter for a
contracted Ungusge, then, is a complex one for a natural language, and
there is no a priori answer to whether a delineation of statements true
55 ^Sl^tis firoSS^ can be made by any oonbimticw of questionnaires.
On the question of an absolute distinction, here also it can be
drawn formally, but remains an open question for natural languages. One
Troxld think it likely, however, that speakers of a natural language will
33 "iiadecld'5d" *bout miW 081,03 of sentences, that empirical research
will yield a large intermediate area of neither clearly ‘analytic* nor
clearly ‘synthetic* statements.
The definitions of one formal system, applied in surveys to dif-
ferent languages, would satisfy the requirement of interlinguistic vali-
dlty. But as In any discussion of linguistic "universal!!% whether such
a single set of definitions would be applicable to all natxiral languages
2U5
cannot be determined in advance of attempts to apply thesra.
The slight sketch of Naess ’3 work should show that the results of
research in what is not philosophy but a branch of sociology will be
undramatic
, inconclusive, to be summarised in terms of less-than-perfect
correlations. In these characteristics, they are like all scientific
investigation (particularly in the social sciences) but unlike the
universal generalisations of philosophy. What i« involved is "a whole
21*6
strategy of research" which vdH, in time, redefine the concept under
investigation. There is no guarantee that the redefined concept will bear
a close resemblance to traditional analyticity. Tt may be the only justi-
fiable way to examine synonymy in a natural language, but it may turn
out that Quine was right, after all, in deploring all traditional defi-
nitions of ‘analytic* and * synonymous *• As we have seen, all the important
1U2
requireiMnta for . definition, (U). «) (6), ^
under a cosamitownt t.o this approach.
w ‘*m>n9 as ft gradualist", does not really consider himself in
opposition to Quine. The criteria he establishes for analytic state-
swita make explicit defensible standards for attributing analyticiiy
t° those few, trivial, clear cases which have played such a role in
philosophical discussion, if not in life* However, aa the name X have
given this group iallies, Putnam agrees with Quine’s gradualism, his
denial of an absolute distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.
His modification of Quine changes nothing basic in that position.
In evaluating Katz’s position, we can look at a response of Quine's
*hioh iea
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good example of failure of oouammication between philo-
sophers. Quine begins by saying that his complaint with analyticity
has been that it is "insufficiently empirical", "A notion having to do
with language seems peculiarly unpromising if its relation to observable
2U8
behavior is 6b3cure. « . • " He notes with satisfaction that Kata ag-
Zh9
rees with him on the need far a "behavioral criterion". He then gug-
gosts shearing off the "apparatus” of Kata’s semantic a»tatheory "a*
inessential to the central issue.” He includes "by-pass(inc’l ,t the system
250
of "semantic marker#”. Quine considers Katz's central proposal to be
tile indirect empirical test outlined in his Journal of Pliilosophy article,
the "lists” for classifying sentences under "dear cases" of different
251
kinds of sentences, and criticizes it as not interlinguistic. Then he
conclude® by saying that Katz's lists would measure only "degrees of ana-
lyticity" rather than effect an absolute distinction, and none of the
"really Interesting" cases (to science and philosophy) would come out
2^2
analytic.
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This is amusing because Katz rests his whole case for providing
a noncircular, explanatory, empirically justifiable, wholly linguisti-
cally validated deflation of ’analytic* (requirements (l), (2), (3) and
(4)) on the fact that the definition occurs within the semantic xaeta-
theory. The definition is probably interlinguistically valid as well,
although the "lists* mentioned in the article Quine devotes his atten-
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tion to do not make this so clear* Katz grants that his definition
of *analytic* applies only to "predicatively vacuous* sentences! he
does not claim to be drawing an absolute distinction. However, every-
thing depends on the metatheoiy. If one rejects it, on whatever grounds,
Katz’s definition amounts to nothing! IT one accepts it, Katz has done
better than most other critics* But one cannot, as Quine suggests,
“by-pass" the semantic markers and the "apparatus that surrounds his
account of analyticity*
"
It seems more reasonable to say that because of insurmountable
difficulties with the theory, particularly with the semantio markers,
Katz’s effort is unacceptable. Katz holds, on the one hand, that "waning
inclusion" is not merely metaphorical* One "path" of a dictionary entry
contains the concepts in the meaning of one sense ofa word* The readings
for the subject-word and predicate-word of an analytic sentence are
254
"formally identical* * This makes matching semantic markers in paths
of dictionary entries seem like matching truth-table columns or inscrip-
tions for identity. And yet, on the other hand, Katz insists that seman-
tic markers are not words, although w® use words to "label" the "constructs"!
255
they are abstract objects, ideas* Furthermore, for those who don’t
256
like "ideational theories", Katz grants that these ideas are not neces-
sarily consciously present in one’s experience* Rather, they are
theoretioal^unobservables,
"constricts” or "posits'* like unobservables
in physios. With this explication, the concreteness of "meaning in-
clusion" pales, and one wonders about the "formal" features whose
matching the definition provides for, when these turn, out to be formal
features of abstract entities.
This account take 3 the assignment of meaning to a sentence to be
the result of a compositional process, and the meaning of a word to
be a conjunction of properties. There is reason to think that a decision
to apply a word in a given case is not the automatic result of having
completed a check-list of properties. It is a simplified account of wcrd-
raeaning, and in accepting it, one met accept a great deal of "appara-
tus" as well as the transformational grammar assumptions about Innate
ideas. Katz's arguments are minimal, and perhaps the prudent course is
at least to defer acceptance of what, at present, appears a simple pro-
duct in a theoretically burdensome wrapping.
It is difficult to bring the normative criticisms directly to
bear on Quine’s requirements for a definition of ’analytic*. Quine did
not concern himself in "Two Dogmas" with any rule-supported approach
other than the "semantical rules" of the formalists. Another difficulty
is that the proponents Of this approach are not really offering an alter-
native definition of ’analytic*. Their contribution to this discussion
is an emphasis on the existence of constraints in speaking a language
rather than on an attempt to locate the analytic-making ones. Cohen ap-
pears to leave vdde open the selection of "a workable procedure for the
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identification of analytic-malcLng synonymies and contradictions.”.
^ne can nevertheless see that the normative approach will not
saUaiy requirement (U). Just as a strength of this approach in language-
description is that it view*} speech in the broader context of actions,
intentions* and dispositions to respond to utterances and their impli-
oations, it is a weakijess in coming to terms with analyifcity that it
does not, in principle, separate language from the rest of the world. By
broadening 'meaning* beyond extension and intension, the functional
approach can males finer distinctions than an extensions! appro® ch and
can those distinctions more objective and observable than an inter*-
sicnal approach. However, it is not in a good position to separate purely
linguistic truths from other truths.
Despite the differences, there are some interesting points of con-
tact between this approach and Quine’s. The most obvious is Quine's use
of "function* in regimentation. Another is that the paradigm case of
regimentation is one in which the person who utters a sentence is the
one to regiment that sentence. This is a recognition of the "fixed
meaning 1" of an utterance. The sentence is "fully determinate" for the
person who utters itj he knows what Ire means. Another is "primary syno-
nymy*-, the "time5* and "genuine" synonymy between "sufficiently long seg-
2$9
raents of discourse. n Since its specification may even Include "stage
directions", this comes close to a functional language-description.
To see why the functional approach cannot represent a solution to
the problem Quine has set for himself, let us look at these points of
contact and the difficulties they suggest to Quine. The lexicographer
cannot deal directly' with "primary synonymy" because he cannot specify
260
and catalogue "the infinitely numerous genuine pairs of long synonyms.
“
11*6
But the lexicographer mat go on to apecily and catalogue, and so he
finds himself dealing only in ’’quasi ayncnywa”. In the later writings,
his task is depicted even more pessimistically. The paimdigB case of
regimentation only leads Quine to conclude that there are no standards
hy which cne person can reject another’s regimented expression, not that,
for an utterance in context, a meaning (or paraphrase, or translation)
can be given. Finally, pace Cohen, "function” in the restricted sense
in which Quine uses it is very different from the function of an exprea-
aicn in conmunicatAon. The ways in which it is different are critically
important for Quine. The function of an expression in a deduction can be
formally identified and specified. Geaer&l rules can be given from which
inferences follow mechanically. The function of an expression in commu-
nication is not generally nor precisely specifiable at all.
Alston finds himself ”reluctantly forced to conclude” that there
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my be no way wto generally define ’linguistic act 1 *. This does not
lead him to abandon the concept, but to accept a piecemeal strategy of
analysing particular linguistic acts. To compromise with generality and
exactness is certainly not Quine’s way. It is hard to see how the tension
in his aims between Quine^the-logician and Quine-the-^&mpirlciat can be
resolved with equal justice to both Quines.
At the end of section A.
,
I tried to suggest that Quine*# associ-
al!onist behaviorism not only limits him to stimulus meaning and, con-
sequently, lead# to indeterminacy of translation, but that it does not
allow for the kind of language that he assumes all along nor for scien-
tific theory. TKhat was proposed in section A. was that perfectly sound
standards of evidence support a functional concept of meaning, which
gives Quine a language as enriched as he require# and theory a# well,
U*7
and .1.0 av.dea dire consequence ech a, Uckrt^^LMoy of t«mal,tlon.
We ere doling «tth behavloriea and «npirlclmj and yet also with a
preferred concept of meaning.
In this section, purportedly limited to questions of meaning, we
have come up again against considerations of empirical support. Perhaps
there is no reason to deplore this blurring of the tidy categories we ori-
ginally drew. Quine also sees them as different sides of one problem. He
investigates the problem of empirical support, however, in much less de-
tail and depth than the problem of defining analytic! ty. I have been
critical of him for his dogmatic acceptance of a crude behaviorism and
his equation of that position with "empiricism". H* b<5 accused of
complacency or carelessness for his arguments against the analytic-synthetic
distinction. They are far better than the arguments used against him.
None offered, if I am correct in interpreting them, meets Quine’s challenge.
Another way of saying this is that Quine
-the-logician was the
dominant author of ted and Object. If it were not for his manifest and
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